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Abstract
People are usually confronted with an emotion/deliberation dilemma during the course of
judgement and decision making, such that an emotional want is at odds with a reasoning-
based should/need. Such dilemmas can occur at a social level and be related to others’
welfare. Meanwhile, experience and activities in everyday life can often induce certain mood
in people. This means a decision maker may be in a certain mood when confronted with
an other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemma. However, the potential role of mood in
judgement and decision making in other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas has been
largely unexplored. The purpose of the current thesis is to explore the influence of mood on
judgement and decision making in other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas, by looking
at whether and how mood aﬀects socio-economic decisions and moral judgement. Treating
such emotion/deliberation dilemmas with a dual-process approach, and building on theories
of aﬀect that suggest an informational function of mood and mood’s eﬀect on information
processing strategy, we propose that mood can aﬀect judgements and decisions in other-
regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas through its informational value.
Theoretical and empirical research suggests that mood can influence processing strategy
by providing information about the situation (“aﬀect-as-information” approach; Schwarz &
Clore, 2007). Positive mood signals that the present situation is non-problematic and in
turn encourages the use of a heuristic, top-down, reflexive processing strategy; in contrast,
negative mood signals that the present situation is problematic and encourages the use of a
more systematic, bottom-up, reflective processing strategy (Clore et al., 2001; Schwarz, 2000,
2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Based on the aﬀect-as-information theorising, we hypothesised
that, when confronted with other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas, positive mood
would give rise to emotionally compelled judgements and decisions, whereas negative mood
would give rise to more cognitively controlled judgements and decisions.
To test this idea, three studies were conducted using two experimental paradigms — one
pertaining to socio-economic decisions and the other to moral judgement — both of which are
assumed to incorporate an other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemma. Study 1 examined
i
the influence of negative mood on socio-economic decisions using a paradigm called the “mini-
ultimatum game” in which the divergence between emotion- and reasoning-based decisions
corresponds to that between outcome-focused and intention-considered decisions. Studies 2
and 3 examined influences of positive and negative mood on moral judgement using a moral
dilemma paradigm, in which an emotion/deliberation dilemma is posited by the fact that
deontological (or, non-utilitarian) choices are at odds with utilitarian choices.
Results of Study 1 show that mood did not aﬀect decisions in the mini-ultimatum game.
A closer inspection of the behavioural economics literature suggests that this might be caused
by a contextual extremity such that outcome plays a dominant role over intention in de-
termining socio-economic decisions. Main results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate that mood
may aﬀect moral judgement by providing information about individual moral disposition;
thus, whether negative/positive mood is associated with more reasoning-/emotion-based (i.e.,
utilitarian/non-utilitarian) judgements may be subject to individual moral inclination. More-
over, a pattern that is contrary to the initial thesis hypothesis was obtained from Studies 2
and 3, such that utilitarian judgements tended to increase with positive mood but decrease
with negative mood. This suggests that mood may influence moral judgement in a diﬀerent
way from aﬀecting the use of a certain processing strategy. Taken together, our findings,
adding to the line of research of judgement and decision making, suggest that mood may
aﬀect judgements and decisions in other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas through
its informational value, and that its influence (or absence of influence) may be determined by
interaction with contextual and dispositional factors. Our findings are discussed in relation
to interplays between mood and contextual and dispositional factors, and to mood eﬀects on
willpower and on processing scope. They are also thought to have possible implications for
legal decision making.
ii
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
Human life is filled with judgement and decision making (JDM), from simply deciding what
to have for lunch to more seriously evaluating job oﬀers. Much decision making – rather
than simply making a choice based on individual preference or reaching a conclusion based
on rational analysis – is hard, in that embedded in it is a dilemma between an emotion-based
want and a reasoning-based should/need. As a result, people often struggle with the fact that
a mutually satisfying trade-oﬀ is diﬃcult or impossible to achieve. Some such dilemmas are
chiefly about personal concerns, and some are of greater social significance and related to
other individuals. A young graduate may be faced with a dilemma between choosing a job
that is financially reliable and another that is much less so but would allow him to pursue his
professional dream. In more socially serious situations such as criminal trials, jurors may find
that their emotionally compelled judgements run counter to legal code (Carlsmith & Darley,
2008)
In essence, one feature of such scenarios is that people feel tempted by one option while
seeing a rational for another. As I will introduce later, contemporary theorisations in psy-
chology have in general entertained a “dual-process” perspective for JDM in such dilemma
scenarios. According to the dual-process approach, both emotionally compelled processing
and more deliberative, cognitively controlled processing are at work during the course of
making the judgement or decision; the two types of processing interact to determine the
final outcome, which is subject to the (eventually) more dominant form of processing (Kah-
neman & Frederick, 2002; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007). The current thesis aims to
explore the influence of mood, a factor that is widely embedded in everyday life, on JDM
1
in other-regarding emotion/deliberation1 dilemmas as described above (for simplicity, called
emotion/deliberation dilemmas hereafter), by examining the possibility that mood can ex-
ert influence by moderating the reliance on emotionally compelled or cognitively controlled
processing.
Moods, as aﬀective states of mild intensity, are almost ubiquitous. A piece of good news
in the morning can infuse the whole day with a pleasant tone; stress from work can result
in a few weeks of feeling downhearted; even more subtle causes such as weather, listening to
music or watching a movie can lead to a positive or negative mood that lasts for a while.
Since they happens so naturally, moods provide an “underlying aﬀective context for most of
our outgoing thought processes and behaviours” (Forgas & George, 2001, p. 5). Research
on JDM has seen various ways in which mood can influence JDM (Clore & Huntsinger,
2009; Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000). However, to the best of our knowledge, with quite
a few exceptions (Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Harlé & Sanfey, 2007; Valdesolo & DeSteno,
2006), potential roles of mood in JDM in emotion/deliberation dilemmas have been largely
unexplored. This is unfortunate given the frequent occurrence of both such dilemmas and
personal mood. The purpose of the current thesis is to explore whether and how mood may
aﬀect JDM when emotionally compelled and more deliberative, controlled judgements and
decisions are in tension, by looking at the influence of mood on socio-economic decisions and
moral judgements.
The central idea of this thesis is that positive mood would give rise to emotionally com-
pelled judgements and decisions, whereas negative mood would give rise to more deliberative,
cognitively controlled judgements and decisions. This hypothesis is built on the “aﬀect-as-
information” theoretical framework (Schwarz, 2000, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2003, 2007),
according to which mood can influence processing strategy by providing information about
the situation. Specifically, positive mood signals that the current situation is non-problematic
and in turn encourages the use of a heuristic, top-down, reflexive processing strategy; in con-
trast, negative mood signals that the current situation is problematic and in turn encourages
the use of a more systematic, bottom-up, reflective processing strategy (Clore et al., 2001;
Isbell, 2004; Isbell, Burns, & Haar, 2005; Schwarz, 2000, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). As
I will review later, a considerable amount of evidence has shown that moods aﬀect JDM by
exerting such processing eﬀects. The rest of this chapter presents a general methodology of
1Emotion, so described, is treated as being caused by rapid, automatic rather than slow, deliberative
processes. However, I do not intend to assert that emotions are evoked exclusively by automatic processing.
I will discuss this further when clarifying the term emotion in Chapter 2.
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studies in this thesis and an overview of the thesis structure.
It should be noted that dilemmas in this thesis, which I will introduce soon, were imple-
mented in such a pattern that participants could take time to make judgements or decisions.
This means there was neither time pressure nor any explicit requirement to ruminate on
a problem, both of which, arguably, can interfere with mood eﬀect on decision making in
dilemmas. Dilemmas that in principle incorporate an emotion/deliberation tension some-
times allow no temporal space in real-life circumstances. Imagine that a small rescue troop
has only one hour to save a large group while knowing that a few in the group have to be
sacrificed. Under such circumstances, decision making should become highly goal-oriented.
In other words, decision-relevant information is salient, which is a kind of condition wherein
mood is not expected to aﬀect decision making (Schwarz & Clore, 1987, 2007). Prolonging
time may also interfere with a mood eﬀect, as suggested by work on the cooling-oﬀ eﬀect on
emotion (e.g., Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2008). There is also evidence of the influence
of temporal cost on economic decision making in social dilemmas (e.g., Smith & Silberberg,
2010). In brief, temporal factors related to dilemmas, although not studied in this thesis,
could have the potential to interfere with mood eﬀect on dilemma decision making.
In the present thesis, we adopted two experimental paradigms, namely, the “mini-ultimatum
game” (Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2003) and the trolley-problem-like moral dilemma paradigm
(Thomson, 1985), to represent emotion/deliberation dilemmas. To examine the hypothesised
eﬀect of mood, we conducted mood induction using the movie-watching (e.g., Gross & Lev-
enson, 1995) or emotional-experience-writing techniques (e.g., Small & Lerner, 2008).
Regarding the two experimental paradigms, the mini-ultimatum game pertains to a socio-
economic interaction between two people. The two players are faced with the task of splitting
a certain amount of money, say, 10 tokens: one player (the proposer) first makes an oﬀer
by choosing from two already-set options and the other (the responder) decides to accept
or reject the oﬀer. In the case of acceptance, both players receive their shares, but in the
case of rejection, both receive nothing. Importantly, in cases where both options available
to the proposer are disadvantageous for the responder, e.g., 8 for the proposer and 2 for the
responder (8:2), the mini-ultimatum game can incorporate an emotion/deliberation dilemma
for the responder: Whereas the disadvantage inequality prompts a sense of seeming unfairness,
a more objective, comprehensive processing of the situation would take into consideration the
situational constraint on the proposer and the implied lack of unfair intention behind the oﬀer.
Thus, emotion- and reasoning-based decisions diverge in this scenario: An aversive emotion
in response to the disadvantageous inequality would drive the decision of rejection, as a form
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of punishment, whereas more deliberative, cognitively controlled processing would give rise to
the decision to accept.
The moral dilemma paradigm can be illustrated by the trolley problem (Thomson, 1985),
where saving five people comes at the cost of killing an innocent person. This scenario thus
perceptually presents a dilemma between the welfare of the majority and that of the minority.
We adopted a dual-process approach for moral judgement that was developed by Greene and
his colleagues (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Greene, Nystrom,
Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). The
dual-process model posits that deontological/non-utilitarian choices (e.g., not killing the single
person, resulting in five people dead) are driven by emotional distress in the face of harmful
action, whereas utilitarian choices (e.g., saving the five while killing the one) are encouraged
by more cognitively controlled processing (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). Thus, the moral
dilemma setting and the mini-ultimatum game analogously incorporate emotion/deliberation
tension.
The rest of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature review on
the influence of aﬀect on JDM; this discusses research on the role of emotion in JDM, on
dual-process theoretical frameworks that diﬀerentiate between emotion-driven and cognitively
controlled judgements and decisions in social preference contexts, and on the influence of
mood on JDM. Chapter 3 describes an experiment that examined the thesis hypothesis by
looking at the eﬀect of negative mood on socio-economic decisions in the mini-ultimatum
game (Study 1). Chapters 4 and 5 describe two experiments that explored the influences of
positive and negative moods on moral judgement in the moral dilemma paradigm as described
above (Studies 2 & 3). Chapter 6 discusses the empirical findings in relation to interplays
between mood and dispositional and contextual factors, and to the influence of mood on the
exertion of willpower and on processing scope. It then concludes with thoughts of practical
implications and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter presents reviews of research demonstrating the influence of aﬀect on JDM. For
the purpose of this thesis, it focuses on two types of aﬀect, emotion and mood. Section 2.1
provides definitions of key terms that are used in this line of research as well as the current
thesis. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 review research illustrating an informative, guiding role of emotion
in JDM; the latter focuses on “dual-process” perspectives that integrate emotional processing
with slower, more deliberative processing. Section 2.4 presents how such dual-process models
are employed in the social preference contexts that are our central interest. Section 2.5
introduces how moods impact evaluative judgement and information processing, and reviews
studies suggesting mood aﬀects reliance on emotional versus deliberative processing.
2.1 Definitions of key terms
Emotion In the current thesis, the definition of emotion adopts a “social-function”
approach (Frijda, 1986, 2008; Lerner & Kelter, 2000; Parkinson, 1996, 1997). Specifically,
emotions are defined as aﬀective responses that represent stimuli with respect to well-being
and give rise to certain behaviour (tendencies). Anger arises when perceiving injustice, and
may provoke punishment; fear is felt in the presence of risk and leads to avoidance of potential
harm. As such, the definition of emotion is consistent with appraisal theories of emotion,
according to which emotions are consequent to appraisal processes that make stimuli be
perceived with special meaning regarding value (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991).
Emotions discussed in this thesis are mostly pertaining to aﬀective responses evoked more
immediately than slowly upon confrontation of a JDM problem. This is because of the
dilemma contexts of our primary interest, in which emotion is more like a “hot” response
triggering an impulsive, aﬀect-laden judgement or decision. However, as I noted earlier, this
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is not intended to draw an unconditional link between emotion and immediate, automatic
processing.
Appraisal theories of emotion have claimed that emotions, defined as aﬀective responses to
stimuli representing an organism-environment relationship with respect to wellbeing, can be
proceded with both rapidly and slowly generated appraisals (Clore & Ortony, 2008; Ellsworth
& Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 1998; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Zajonc, 1980). Giner-
Sorolla (1999), in a chapter attempting to draw a distinction between what he calls “immediate
aﬀect” and “deliberative aﬀect”, also highlighted an inessential link between emotion and
automaticity.
In particular, Giner-Sorolla argued that emotions, when characterised as being immediate,
can be led by automatic appraisals of the current situation that is “deemed self-relevant” (e.g.,
anger triggered when a person is treated unfairly); or more directly, immediate emotions can
be evoked through associations with previous emotional experience (e.g., fear upon seeing
an image of snake; Giner-Sorolla, 1999). On the other hand, emotions are likely to arise
through deliberative, relatively slower processes. Representative emotions of this kind include
those led by self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Giner-Sorolla, 1999). For example,
a new, self-enforced vegetarian may deliberatively think of healthy/ethical issues regarding
eating meat to overcome the craving, which then triggers disgust as an emotional outcome.
It should be noted, though, such self-regulating emotions that are initially consequent on
intentional control can evolve into immediate emotions (e.g., a long-term vegetarian feels
disgust upon the perception of meat), as a result of the regulation being automatised after
its frequent utilisation (Giner-Sorolla, 1999).
Mood In contrast to emotions, which in a more ordinary sense are “intense” and
“short-lived” aﬀective reactions to specific causal object (Forgas & George, 2001), moods
refer to relatively less intense and long-lasting aﬀective states for which the exact cause has
become “diﬀuse” (Clore et al., 2001; Forgas, 2001). This contrast can be illustrated in ordinary
language: a person points out that he is angry with someone at the moment but would express
that he is in a bad mood after a while.
Aﬀect In this thesis, aﬀect is used as a general term for emotion and mood. But
by definition, aﬀect is a concept also covering lower-level driving states and visceral factors,
such as pain and lust (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007).
Integral aﬀect, Incidental aﬀect Aﬀect can be classified as integral or incidental
when considered with respect to its genuine relevance to the judgement or decision at hand
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). Integral aﬀect arises during the
course of JDM (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). A person who sees the stock he bought declin-
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ing sharply in price may experience fear for future downturn and in turn decide to sell the
present shares. In this example, fear is an integral aﬀect, or, more specifically, an integral
emotion, with respect to the stock investment decision. Incidental aﬀect refers to aﬀect that
is experienced when making judgements or decisions but which is nevertheless “objectively”
irrelevant to the task at hand (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008). In other words, incidental aﬀect
is embedded into the course of JDM due to a temporal proximation. According to this def-
inition, mood is incidental aﬀect.2 Emotion can also be incidental aﬀect when it is carried
over to a subsequent instance that is unrelated to the one in which the emotion is elicited.
Fear caused by watching a horror movie, for example, is an incidental emotion to the stock
investment decision making.
2.2 Emotion as informational input in judgement and decision
making
Classical theories of JDM, adopting a logic-based approach, assume that people behave con-
stantly in a “rational” manner. By rationality, they mean that people make optimal choices
on the basis of computational rules (see Baron, 2004 for an overview). These models are thus
“consequential” in nature (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008, p. 138). For example, the expected
utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) assumes that people make choices by as-
sessing both the desirability and likelihood of the outcome of option. Such “normative” models
were soon criticised for unrealistic assumptions. Simon (1955), for example, compellingly em-
phasised that human rationality is “bounded” in that it is subject to people’s motivations
and capacity as well as information availability. While a great deal of research has advanced
the bounded-rationality perspective (see Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), much of this
research had not addressed the role of emotion in JDM until the role was highlighted by
Damasio (1994). Scholars since have emphasised the importance of emotion with respect to
JDM from an “informational input” perspective (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).
Damasio (1994), for example, proposes a “somatic marker hypothesis”, positing that de-
cision are directed by emotional signals — “somatic markers”. This hypothesis has been
supported by neurological and behavioural studies. Bechara et al. (1997), for example, exam-
ined decisions in a gambling task among both normal participants and patients with damage
in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; a region that functions in the process of encod-
2See Martin (2001) for an alternative standard upon which mood is thought to be relevant or irrelevant
to JDM.
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ing emotion; Damasio, 1994). The gambling task, known later as the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT; Pham, 2007), requires players to sample from four decks of cards. From each deck,
clicking a card would result in a positive (gain) or negative (loss) monetary reward. Two
decks of cards correspond to a larger payoﬀ ($100) but also occasional, unpredictable, much
larger losses, thus resulting in an ultimately net loss. These two decks are featured as the
“disadvantageous decks”. The other two decks correspond to a relative smaller payoﬀ ($ 50)
without randomly substantial loss, featured as the “advantageous decks”. In Bechara et al.’s
(1997) study, participants started sampling without being explicitly instructed about these
traits, and had no knowledge of how many trials would be included. According to the somatic
marker hypothesis, the VMPFC patients, due to their deficit in emotional processing, would
be expected to behave worse than normal participants. This was exactly what Bechara et
al. (1997) found. The results showed that both the normal participants and the VMPFC pa-
tients rapidly avoided the disadvantageous decks after receiving a substantial lose; however,
the VMPFC patient went back to those decks much more quickly (revealed by the propor-
tion of participants reaching the final stage defined by the researchers), resulting in a faster
“bankruptcy” (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
Physiological data in the same study showed that both groups of participants did not
generate galvanic skin conductance (GSC) before encountering the first huge loss. After the
first occurrence of such penalty, whereas normal participants generated GSC right before they
drew a card from the disadvantageous decks, the patients with prefrontal damage did not.
This result was interpreted as patients with prefrontal damage appearing more inclined to
the disadvantageous decks due to their incapability of encoding the feeling of fear that would
otherwise be experienced when encountering a negative payoﬀ. This finding is taken as ev-
idence of the essential role of emotion as an informational input into decision making under
risk (Bechara et al., 1997; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007). In
support of this emotion-signal notion , Peters and Slovic (2000) showed that participants who
self-reported lower emotional reactivity were more likely to draw cards from the disadvanta-
geous decks in the IGT; in contrast, those reporting higher emotional reactivity were more
likely to draw cards from the advantageous decks. Similarly, Shiv et al. (2005) showed that
patients with damage in emotional-processing associated regions were less risk-aversive than
normal participants.
Very similar to the somatic marker hypothesis is the concept of “aﬀect heuristic” proposed
by Slovic et al. (2002), which highlights a guiding role of aﬀect in JDM. The term aﬀect
heuristic is inherently related to the concept of heuristic introduced by Kahneman and col-
laborators, who proposed that one’s judgement is “mediated” by heuristic when the person
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assesses a judged object according to some attribute that “comes more readily to mind” than
the attribute in question (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Central to the aﬀect heuristic ap-
proach is that aﬀect can be used as such a heuristic attribute. When aﬀect refers to integral
emotional reactions, the theorisation points out the role of emotion in JDM.
Evidence comes from research on risk perception. In exploring attributes contributing
to lay people’s risk perception, Slovic and other researchers identified one of the primary
evaluative factors to be dread: the extent to which a hazard activity is perceived as risky
is strongly associated with the degree to which it elicits a feeling of dread (e.g., Fischhoﬀ,
Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Mullet, Duquesnoy, Raiﬀ, Fahrasmane, & Namur,
1993; Peters & Slovie, 1996; Slovic, 1987). This finding suggests that people’s assessment of a
risky activity is, at least in part, determined by their emotional reaction towards the activity.
Additional support is derived from the insensibility to change in probability; that is, relative
to variation in consequence, changes in probability have a much smaller influence on final risk
decisions (Loewenstein et al., 2001). This asymmetry is attributed to the ineﬃciency of a
change in probability to elicit intensive emotional reactions. In support to this interpretation,
Bankart and Elliott (1974) found that, whereas imaging receiving an electric shocks has an
obvious eﬀect on the level of arousal, being explicitly informed of the probability of receiving
the shock did not show such an eﬀect. Similarly, a more recent study by Weber and Hsee
(1998) showed that participants’ feeling of worry were independent of the probability of gain
or loss associated with a risky investment (not reported by the authors, but statistical results
were quoted in Loewenstein et al., 2001). Finally, the aﬀect heuristic is also evidenced in
other types of social decisions. For example, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) found that implicit
emotional evaluation better explains willingness to pay for public goods than does “ economic
valuation”. Similarly, Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998) showed that jurors’ punitive
intent is strongly associated with the degree of outrage.
Summary Contemporary theorising emphasises an informational role fo emotion in
JDM. Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis posits that emotions act as informational
input indirectly by encoding consequences of alternative options. Similarly, Slovie et al. (2002)
propose that emotion can be implemented to guide judgements and decisions by being used
as an aﬀective heuristic.
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2.3 Incorporating emotion into dual-process models
The influence of emotion in JDM has been modelled using a dual-process approach that
is widely accepted in contemporary psychology (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008;
Kahneman, 2003; Sloman, 1996, 2000 ). Dual-process models are embraced in many ways
(see, e.g., Evans, 2008), but they all rely on the idea that there are two diﬀerent types
of processing responsible for people’s behaviour (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Among
diﬀerent names proposed for these two types of cognitive operations, the generic labels are
“System 1” and “System 2” (Stanovich & West, 2002; Sloman, 1996, 2002). System 1 is often
characterised as being rapid, automatic, intuitive, heuristic and aﬀectively compelling; System
2, by comparison, is often characterised as being slow, deliberative, analytic, systematic and
reasoning-based (Evans, 2008). According to dual-process models, people’s behaviour is a
joint product of the two cognitive operations (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
In dual-process theories that explicitly or implicitly deal with emotional basis for human
behaviour, the distinction between System 1 and System 2 is drawn between an aﬀect-laden
process and a colder, more deliberative process, whereby emotion is placed in the class of
System 1 (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Lieberman, 2003; Loewentein et al., 2001; Loewenstein &
O’Donoghue, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Epstein (1994) , for example, distinguished
an “experiential system” from a “rational system” with respect to informational processing.
The experiential system is “intimately associated” with emotion, representing stimuli in an
automatic and sensual manner. In contrast, the rational system is “relatively aﬀect free”,
operating in a way consisten with logical rules.
Research in JDM, in a range of fields, proposes an idea that a hot, emotional and a colder,
more deliberative process, often in conflict and working towards diﬀerent outcomes, interact to
form judgements and decisions (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999).
For JDM under risk, for example, emotional reaction and cognitive evaluation appear to result
in contrary outcomes, partly because they respond to diﬀerent factors associated with focal
objects (see Loewenstein et al., 2001). For example, as mentioned earlier, whereas cognitive
evaluations consider both consequence and corresponding probability, emotional feelings are
far less sensitive to probability than to consequence. As a result, a huge lottery win would
not seem much diﬀerent whether the probability is 1￿10,000 or 1￿10,000,000 (Loewenstein et
al., 2001).
Another context in which emotional and cognitively controlled processes appear to operate
in conflict is that of intertemporal choice; that is, choice among “alternatives whose costs and
benefits are distributed over time” (Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008), e.g., choosing between
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a small immediate and a larger delayed reward. Relevant theorising suggests that emotion
tends to stimulate short-term choices, whereas more deliberative, cognitively controlled pro-
cessing gives rise to long-term choices (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007;
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). In support of this emotion/cognitive control distinction for in-
tertemporal choice, McClure et al. (2004) showed that, whereas brain regions associated with
higher cognitive functions (i.e., fronto-parietal regions) were activated (compared with a base-
line measure) for both immediate and delayed payoﬀs, aﬀect-associated regions (i.e., limbic
and paralimbic cortical structures) were selectively activated when an immediate payoﬀ was
available. Further, a great activity in limbic regions than in fronto-parietal regions was pre-
dictive of the selection of small proximate rewards. In the same vein, Hariri et al. (2006)
found that neural activity in the ventral striatum, an index of emotional reaction, was posi-
tively correlated with a tendency to pursue small, immediate rewards. These results suggest
that, whereas emotional processing prefers present gain, deliberative processing seems to take
both current and future value into consideration. Finally, the emotion/deliberation conflict is
evidenced by the engagement of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a conflict monitor area
(Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004), during intertemporal choice tasks (McClure et al., 2004;
Pine et al., 2009).
Most relevant to our purpose are emotion/deliberation conflicts in social preference con-
texts. For the two experimental paradigms used in this thesis, i.e., the mini-ultimatum game
and the moral dilemma paradigm, research in three domains is of importance, namely, socio-
economic decision making, negotiation and moral judgement. As we will see below, judge-
ments or decisions in the three domains, similar to those in the intertemporal-choice context,
involve disagreement between emotional and more cognitively controlled responses. But, dif-
ferent from judgements or decisions in the intertemporal-choice context, those in the social
preference contexts are not only self-related but also other-regarding. Given the importance
of theses contexts in relation to our research, a review of relevant literature appears separately
in the following section.
2.4 Emotion/deliberation conflicts in social judgement and de-
cision making
2.4.1 Socio-economic decision making
The consequentialist assumption of classical decision making theories was primarily devel-
oped by early economic scholars, who saw the human being as a cold-minded creature that
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constantly maintains the goal of utility maximisation, and even bounded utility to material
gain (see von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). According to the standard view, people will
always make decisions in order to achieve the greatest material benefit. However, not only
does everyday life exhibit a diﬀerent scene, e.g., many people are willing to do volunteer work,
but research in recent decades also provides evidence violating the material maximisation hy-
pothesis. An indication is that people not only care for self-centred material gain but also
carry a strong sense of fairness.
2.4.1.1 The “ultimatum game” and concern for fairness
Highly representative data come from studies using the “ultimatum game” (UG; Güth, Schmit-
tberger, & Schwarze, 1982). The UG is an economic game in which two players, who are
anonymous to each other, are dividing an amount of money. One player, called the proposer,
is in the position of deciding the division. The other, called the responder, has the right to
accept or reject his opponent’s oﬀer. In the case of acceptance, both sides collect their shares
as divided by the proposer, whereas in the case of rejection both sides receive nothing. The
UG is quite simple and often played only once between the two players. Since there is no
straightforward interaction between the players, the standard economic model would predict
self-interested behaviours for both of them. That is, the proposer should always oﬀer the
least amount and the responder should accept any oﬀer. However, results from the initial
study by Güth et al. (1982) clearly violated this standard solution: proposers oﬀered 40% of
the original pie on average, and most responder rejected oﬀers of 20% (i.e., an 8:2 oﬀer, with
8 for the proposer and 2 for the responder) or less. This result pattern is widely replicated
(see Camerer, 2003), even when the original stake is as large as one month’s wages (Cameron,
1999). Such an ultimate rejection of an unequal oﬀer is taken as an indication of people’s
concern of fairness (Camerer, 2003).
2.4.1.2 Relativity of fairness
Speaking of fairness leads quite naturally to a more complex question: we mind not only
ostensible unfairness, but also why perceived unfairness occurs in the first place (Camerer,
2003). There is plentiful evidence that causes for inequality play an essential role in societal
economic decision making. For example, it is evident that the responder rejects stingy allo-
cations less when the proposer is under “competitive pressure” (e.g., obliged to be financially
competent to keep playing in a multi-trial UG; Schotter, Weiss, & Zapater, 1996). In a simi-
lar vein, it is repeated found that unfair oﬀers are more likely to be accepted when they are
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generated by a random device (e.g., computer) instead of a human proposer (e.g., Blount,
1995; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom,
& Cohen, 2003; van’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey, & Aleman, 2006). In parallel, some studies show
that unfair oﬀers are less often rejected when options of monetary division are constrained for
the proposer (Falk et al., 2003; Sutter, 2007). As illustrated by these findings, unfair oﬀers are
more likely to be accepted when the proposer has some plausible excuse, when the oﬀer are
not deliberatively issued, or when the proposer does not have total control over the allocation
(Camerer, 2003) — in brief, when the oﬀers are justifiable. Thus, fairness interpretation is
not entirely governed by the distribution of an outcome, but rather is context-dependent and
sensitive to the cause of the outcome.
2.4.1.3 Incorporating fairness and emotion into behavioural economic models
To account for the above observations, theoretical models eventually incorporate the idea of
fairness. These models can be classified into two types. One type of models are inequity
aversion models that have a special emphasis on outcome (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr
& Schmidt, 1999). The core idea of inequity aversion models is that people’s punishing be-
haviour, e.g., rejection of unfair oﬀers in the UG, is motivated to counter inequity in outcome.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, define inequity aversion as an individual’s dislike of the
diﬀerence in payoﬀ between himself and the others. They further argued that people are more
aversive to negative inequity (i.e., own payoﬀ is less than others’) compared to positive inequity
(i.e., own payoﬀ is more than others’). Another type of models are reciprocity models that,
beyond the outcome-focus line, emphasises the role of intention behind a decision. Diﬀerently
from inequity aversion models, reciprocity models define fairness as self-centred reciprocity
(e.g., Rabin, 1993). That is, people respond to deliberative kindness with kindness (positive
reciprocity), and deliberative unkindness with unkindness (negative reciprocity; Rabin, 1993).
Thus, inequity aversion models suggest that one’s utility is aﬀected by the diﬀerence between
one’s own and a counterpart’s payoﬀ, whereas reciprocity models suggest that one’s utility is
aﬀected by one’s perception of an opponent’s motive.The latter then seem to better explain
the foregoing findings that show the eﬀect of manipulating circumstances under which the
proposer makes an oﬀer. Nevertheless, in both types of models, and more explicitly in the
reciprocity-based one, emotion is regarded as an incentive for people to behave in a way that
counters short-term material benefit. Thereby, emotion is included into the idea of utility and
ultimately involved in shaping people’s decisions in economic strategic interactions.
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2.4.1.4 An emotion/deliberation conflict in the UG
A body of UG literature provides evidence that rejection of a perceived unfair oﬀer is emotion-
evoked, whereas accepting the oﬀer — the rational choice from the standard perspective —
is subject to cognitive control. An early study by Pillutla & Murnighan (1996) showed that
self-reported anger felt by a responder in response to an oﬀer as correlated with the degree
to which he perceived the oﬀer as unfair. Further, the degree of anger was more predictive of
the final rejection than was the degree of perceived unfairness. This, consistent with the idea
that decision making is guided by emotion (Damasio, 1994), leads to the idea that a person’s
negative emotion in response to an unfair oﬀer drives him to make a financially sacrifice in
order to punish the opponent (Sanfey & Chang, 2008). In support of this notion, O’Connor
et al. (2002) showed that responders characterised their rejections in the UG as “hot-headed”,
“impulsive”, but regarded acceptance as “cold-headed”, “thoughtful”.
Additional evidence comes from a set of brain imaging studies. In Sanfey et al.’s (2003)
study using the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technique, participants playing
the responder were scanned while receiving fair and unfair oﬀers from human proposers or
as a result of allocation by the computer. One brain region showing great activation for the
comparison between fair and unfair oﬀers was the anterior insula (AI), an area found to be
selectively implemented into negative emotion, such as anger and disgust (e.g., Phan, Wager,
Taylor, & Liberzon, 2004; Phillips et al., 1997). The results from Sanfey et al.’s study showed
that the activity in the AI was greater in response to unfair than fair oﬀers, and in response to
unfair oﬀers from human proposers than those from computers, suggesting a stronger aversive
emotional response to deliberative than non-deliberative oﬀense (Sanfey & Chang, 2008).
Moreover, the AI was sensitive to the unfairness degree of an oﬀer (e.g., activation in AI
was greater for a 9:1 oﬀer than an 8:2 oﬀer), and notably, its activation was predictive of
final rejection of an unfair oﬀer. Thus, the insula findings suggest not only an association of
negative emotion with perception of unfairness, but also with final punishment.
Another region among those showing greatest activities for the fair/unfair oﬀers com-
parison was the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), an area typically involved in
cognitive control (Miller & Cohen, 2001). An important result with respect to the right
DLPFC is that its relative activation to the AI in response to an unfair oﬀer was associated
with the final decision to the oﬀer. Specifically, an unfair oﬀer was rejected when activation
in the AI was greater than that in the right DLPFC; in contrast, an unfair oﬀer was ac-
cepted when activation in the right DLPFC was greater than that in the AI. This result hints
at dissociation between emotion-based and deliberative decisions within economic strategic
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interactions.
A set of subsequent studies also revealed the link between cognitive control and acceptance
of unfair oﬀers, or the link between emotion and the rejection of unfair oﬀers. van’t Wout
et al. (2005) ran a study in which participants played the UG under two conditions. In one
condition participants received repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over the
right DLPFC, facilitating the right DLPFC; in the other condition they did not receive the
stimulation (the “sham” condition). The authors hypothesised that facilitating the DLPFC
would increase the acceptance of unfair oﬀers. This was exactly what they found. Moreover,
the results showed that for ultimately rejected unfair oﬀers, response time was significantly
higher in the rTMS than in the sham condition. Thus, the facilitation of the right DLPFC
makes it more diﬃcult to reject an unfair oﬀer, which gives rise to the likelihood of acceptance.3
In another study, van’t Wout et al. (2006) replicated Sanfey et al.’s (2003) design and
used skin conductance (SC) as a relatively direct measure of emotional response. Likewise,
the authors found that the level of SC was higher in response to unfair than fair oﬀers, and
that SC level was predictive of rejection of unfair oﬀers. Koenigs and Tranel (2007), using a
lesion method, provided evidence for a causal relationship between emotion and the decision
of rejection. Specifically, they found that patients with bilateral damage in the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPC), as compared to ordinary participants, were more severe in response
to unfair oﬀers. Earlier clinical work has associated VMPC damage with a deficit in regulation
of emotion, especially for emotions provoked under somehow “frustrating” circumstances, for
example, anger and irritation (Anderson, Barrash, Bechara, & Tranel, 2006; Barrash, Tranel,
& Anderson, 2000). Thus, the more “irrational” decisions by the VMPC patients (Koenigs &
Tranel, 2007) can be taken as evidence for the idea that aversive emotion elicited by oﬀensive
oﬀers “spoils” the ultimate rejection (Frith & Singer, 2008).
3Evidence from rTMS studies is mixed in this regard. According to van’t Wout et al.’s (2005) findings,
deactivating the right DLPFC should result in fewer acceptances of unfair oﬀers. Contrary to this prediction,
Knoch et al. (2006) found that “disrupting” the right DLPFC by rTMS increased the likelihood of unfair oﬀers
to be accepted. Moreover, although participants receiving rTMS over (and thus deactivating) the right DLPFC
were more likely to accept unfair oﬀers than their counterparts receiving rTMS over the left DLPFC or those
receiving a sham stimulation, their judged degree of the unfairness of the oﬀers was no lower than the latter two
groups. The authors thus concluded that the right DLPFC functions to overwhelm one’s impulsive response
by material-gain-focused self-interest rather than that by fairness consideration, which is in contrast to what
Sanfey et al. (2003) proposed. However, it should be noted that the eﬀect of rTMS needs to be explained with
caution. This is due to the limitation of the rTMS technique, e.g., a limited “ability to spatially localize the
stimulation” (Sanfey & Chang, 2008; van’t Wout et al., 2005) and the simultaneous simulation of non-targeted
regions (Loewenstein et al., 2008).
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Summary In sum, a large set of UG literature demonstrates that people have a strong
sense of fairness even at a financial cost. The idea of fairness is then incorporated into recent
behavioural economic models, in which fairness is defined in terms of inequity aversion or
reciprocity. Both types of models imply the involvement of emotion in socio-economic decision
making, with the latter making it more explicit. A body of evidence, largely from neurological
research, exhibits an emotion/deliberation conflict in UG decision making by showing that
rejecting unfair oﬀers in the UG is triggered by negative emotion (e.g., anger) in response to
the unfavourable stimuli, whereas accepting unfair oﬀers is encouraged by cognitive control
that can overcome the tempered response.
2.4.2 Negotiation
Psychology research on negotiation is closely related to behavioural economic research, in
which negotiation is more routinely called “bargaining” (see Camerer, 2003). The UG de-
scribed above, for example, can be seen as a negotiation in a take-it-or-leave manner.
2.4.2.1 The “self-serving” bias in perception of fairness
Fairness perception is crucial for forming the outcome of negotiation (Leung, Tong, & Ho,
2004). Research shows that negotiators often perform a “self- serving” evaluation of fair-
ness (e.g., Babcock, Loewenstein, & Issacharoﬀ, 1997; Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ, &
Camerer, 1995; Loewenstein, Issacharoﬀ, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993; Thompson & Loewen-
stein, 1992). That is, when faced with two standards, an individual is inclined to the one
serving his interest better (Xiao & Bicchieri, 2010). This leads to the self-serving bias in
fairness perception such that when there is disagreement between disputants, each party con-
founds what is fair with what is beneficial for himself (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997). This
self-serving bias has been shown to be disruptive to negotiations (Knez & Camerer, 1995;
Messick & Sentis, 1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992).
In an early study, Messick and Sentis (1979) told participants that they and another person
had supposedly independently worked on the same task. The design of this study involved
two conditions: in one condition, participants were told they spent 10 hours completing the
task and the other had spent 7 hours; in the other condition, this time-input information
was reversed. The results showed that when participants were paid $25 for their own 7-hour
work, they indicated that a fair payment to the other who spent 10 hours would be $30.29
on average. However, when participants were told that the other person was paid $25 for 7
hours’ work, they thought they should be paid $35.24. This $4.95 (35.24 − 30.29) diﬀerence
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was taken as evidence of an “egocentric” evaluation of fairness (Messick & Sentis, 1979).
In a similar vein, Knez and Camerer (1995) showed that multiple “focal points” created
in a UG increased the likelihood of rejection. A focal point refers to a standout solution
to a coordination problem or bargaining process (Schelling, 1960; Thompson & Loewenstein,
1992). For example, in a one-shot standard UG as mentioned above, an equal split is one focal
point. Knez and Camerer modified the standard UG by replacing the neither-win result from
rejection with an “outside option”: $3 for the responder and $2 for the proposer (the original
pie was $10). This outside option led to three focal points: the equal-split one (i.e., $5:$5),
an oﬀer making the responder earn at least more than the outside payoﬀ (e.g., $3.5 for the
responder), and an oﬀer making both sides earn equally more than their outside payoﬀ (i.e.,
$5.5 for the responder and $4.5 for the proposer). The result exhibited a markedly higher rate
of rejection in this modified UG than the standard UG (50% vs. ∼10-15%). This increased
discrepancy is indicative of the egocentric assessment of fairness: whereas proposers thought
$5 and such oﬀers as $3.5 were fair enough, responders would be most likely to overweight
the $5.5 oﬀer (Camerer, 2003).
Thompson and Loewenstein (1992) also demonstrated the self-serving bias in fairness
perception with discrepancy in expected wages between union and board members, showing
that each side had a better recall for information favouring themselves. Along the same line,
Babcock and collaborators demonstrated the self-serving bias in a court-trial scenario where
participants were paired and assigned the role of plaintiﬀ or defendant (Babcock et al., 1995,
1997; Loewenstein et al., 1993; see Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997, for a review). In such a
setting, the two sides were required to achieve a settlement as to the compensation to the
plaintiﬀ within 30 minutes; delay or failure would be financially costly. The researchers found
that plaintiﬀs both indicated a higher settlement price than did defendants, and had a higher
estimation of a judge’s decision than defendants (Babcock et al., 1995, 1997; Loewenstein
et al., 1993). In addition, each side overweighted arguments favouring their own position
(Babcock et al., 1995). Moreover, Babcock et al. (1995) showed that a successful settlement
was much more likely when participants were informed of their role after assessing the case,
as compared to before doing it. This finding further suggests a causal link between the
self-serving bias and impasse.
2.4.2.2 The mini-ultimatum game
One paradigm we employed in this thesis is the “mini-ultimatum game” (mini-UG; Falk et al.,
2013), which is an adapted version of the UG. In a mini-UG, a proposer can only choose from
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two already-set oﬀers instead of making any oﬀer freely as in the UG. Table 2.1 presents the
four games used in Falk et al.’s and their experimental results (to avoid confusion, hereafter
we call it the mini-UG when referring to the paradigm, and game when referring to a single
interaction between two players). Each game included two options of dividing 10 monetary
points between the proposer and responder. One option (Option 1) was an 8:2 oﬀer, keeping
eight points for the proposer and oﬀering two points to the responder. This option was
included in all four games. The other option (Option 2) varied across games. Each game was
named according to the alternative option (shown in Column 1). Proportions of 8:2 oﬀers
rejected in the four games are shown in the rightmost column of Table 2.1.
An important feature of the mini-UG is that evaluation of the same ostensibly unfair
oﬀer can be diﬀerent, depending on the alternative option paring it. An 8:2 oﬀer in the Fair
game is indisputably unfair given the availability of a fair oﬀer. But it could be somewhat
understandable in the Hyper-fair game, since no one wants to be the victim. The same move
is completely compulsory in the No-alternative game and is even optimal in the Hyper-unfair
game. In short, the intention 4 behind an 8:2 oﬀer is evaluated diﬀerently (Camerer, 2003;
Falk et al., 2003). Consistent with this notion, Falk et al. (2003) showed that the rejection
rate of an 8:2 oﬀer was higher in the Fair game than in the other three games.
With respect to rejection, two diﬀerent motives are possible among the four games: in-
equality aversion and negative reciprocity. The former is purely outcome-based whereas the
latter considers intention. The positive value of rejection rate in the No-alternative game
revealed an inequality aversion motive. For the Fair and Hyper-fair games, both motives are
possibly included, although the degree of negative reciprocity can be lower in the Hyper-fair
game than in the Fair game. The fact that 8:2 oﬀers were more likely to be rejected in these
two games than in the No-alternative game provides support for the inclusion of the negative
reciprocity. There are mixed motives in the Hyper-unfair game as, on the one hand, the
inequality aversion motive gives rise to rejection, while on the other hand, positive reciprocity
4Intention in the mini-UG is defined from a strategy perspective. That is, a proposer’s motive is inferred
based on the strategic space he allowed. A chosen oﬀer can be reasonable or not, depending on the alternative.
Thus, in the mini-UG, saying that a proposer has good or bad intentions when making an 8:2 oﬀer is justifiable
or indefensible. This way of inferring intention is not the same as the way we infer intentions when a person
has “free will” (Stanca, Bruni, & Corazzini, 2009). The eﬀect of the latter kind of intention on reciprocity
behaviour, as reviewed earlier, is evidenced by greater acceptance of unfair oﬀers when they result from a
computer’s random than a human proposer’s allocation (Blount, 1995; Rilling et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003;
van’t Wout et al., 2006). Presumably, the free-will-based path draws more heavily on agency, and the other
path draws more heavily on situational constraints. To avoid confusion, hereafter we refer to intentionality
when speaking of the former inferential path, and intention when speaking of the latter.
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Table 2.1: Mini-UG used by Falk et al. (2013).
Game Option 1 Option 2 8:2 oﬀers rejected
Fair 8:2 5:5 44%
Hyper-fair 8:2 2:8 27%
No-alternative 8:2 8:2 18%
Hyper-unfair 8:2 10:0 9%
gives rise to acceptance. Falk et al. (2003) found that the rejection rate was indistinguishable
between the Hyper-Fair and No-alternative games, suggesting that rejection in the former is
also caused by inequality aversion.
Acceptance of 8:2 oﬀers can also be caused by two motives: monetary self-interest (i.e.,
maximising monetary gain) and positive reciprocity. In theory, self-interest should entirely
determine acceptance in the Fair game and to a less extent contribute to acceptance in other
games. In the Hyper-unfair game, positive reciprocity may also have been involved.
The current thesis makes an extension by contending that the rejection in contexts like the
above 8:2/10:0 condition is a manifestation of the self-serving mannered perception of fairness.
In such a context, fairness assessment based on the outcome, and that taking situational forces
into consideration, are in tension. The former is self-serving or egocentric because it only cares
for the distributive disadvantage. It thus leads to aversion, and the decision based on it is
emotion- loaded. In contrast, the context-minded assessment of fairness is more objective,
giving rise to a more reasoning-based decision. Following this rationale, we propose that the
contrast between the egocentric bias and the situational ascription is a form of dissociation
between emotion and cognition. That is, a person’s self-serving biased perception of unfairness
is associated with a negative emotion arising from unfavourable oﬀers. The negative emotion
can be anger when the opponent is fully responsible for his oﬀensiveness, as suggested by UG
studies; or, it can be discomfort or frustration in cases where the other party does not have
complete control. In contrast, taking account of external constraints on the opponent’s choice
is a cognitively controlled process.
This perspective is highly related to theories mapping the contrast between self-serving be-
haviour and corresponding adjustment onto that between automatic and controlled processing.
For example, Messick & Sentis (1979) claimed that preference comes first whereas assessment
of fairness may come at a later step. Related to this, Epley and Caruso (2004) suggested that
self-biased understanding of an event is automatic, but correction for it requires additional
eﬀort. Similarly, Moore and Loewenstein (2004) and Lowenstein and O’Donoghue (2007) alike
proposed that self-protective interest comes automatically and is often emotionally compelled,
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whereas consideration of fairness needs to be evoked by more controlled processing.
In addition to these theoretical positions, three lines of empirical work lend support to
the proposition that the egocentric biased perception of unfairness is associated with negative
emotion whereas assessment of external force requires cognitively controlled processing. These
include: (1) research on emotion and fairness perception in negotiation (e.g., Hegtvedt &
Killian, 1999; O’Connor & Arnold, 2001); (2) research on de-biasing technique aimed at
the egocentric assessment of fairness (e.g., Babcock et al., 1995); and (3) research on the
“correspondence bias” in attribution (e.g., Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull,
1988; Jones & Harris, 1967; Lupfer, Clark, & Hutcherson, 1988).
2.4.2.3 Research on emotion and fairness perception in negotiation
As seen from the UG literature, perception of unfairness is associated with negative emotion,
such as anger. The more one sees an oﬀer as unfair, the more likely that feels angry in
response to it and rejects it. This source of evidence provides partial support for the notion
that egocentric perception of unfairness is related to negative emotion. More convincing
evidence comes from a recent study by Guroglu et al. (2010), who examined neural correlates
of the responder’s decision in the mini-ultimatum game. Because the No-alternative game
includes two identical highly unfair oﬀers (i.e., 8:2), it makes the unfair oﬀer purely result
from an external force on the proposer. The brain imaging data showed that the decision
of rejection in this mini-UG, as compared to that of acceptance, was associated with greater
activity in the AI. Guroglu et al. (2010) took this result as support for the notion that a
rejection showed greater activity in the AI because it signalled a violation of social norm (i.e.,
in the No-alternative situation, accepting the oﬀer complies with a reciprocity-based social
norm, while rejecting it violates it). However, given that the AI is especially activated when
experiencing negative emotions such as anger and disgust (e.g., Phan et al., 2004; Phillips et
al., 1997), the result of Guroglu et al.’s (2010) research is plausibly suggestive of an emotional
drive to reject an objectively acceptable but subjectively disadvantageous oﬀer.
Additional evidence comes from a study by Hegtvedt and Killian (1999), who used a more
natural negotiation paradigm (i.e., bargaining is instigated by disagreement in initial oﬀers).
In this study, participants worked in pairs on a task of solving five-letter anagrams within 15
minutes (though ostensibly they were told to be working in a three-member group, which is
aimed to mimic real life multi-member groups in negotiation). Each group was paid according
to its overall performance that was assessed by summing up the performance of each member,
who performed at a diﬀerent level. Participants then reached a settlement through negotia-
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tion on how to divide the group’s earnings. Once a settlement was achieved, the experimenter
measured (by questionnaire), among others items, participants’ negative emotional experi-
ence (i.e., how much they felt, e.g., angry, agitated and resentful) and their perception of the
fairness of the final division for themselves and for their partners. One important result was
that whereas perception of unfairness regarding the earning of self reliably predicted intensity
of negative emotion, that regarding the earnings of others had no relationship with emo-
tional experience. This finding implies that, whereas perception of self-regarding unfairness
is emotion-laden, a more comprehensive evaluation, such as the perception of other-regarding
unfairness, has no additional eﬀect on emotional experience. It thus suggests an association
between the egocentric assessment of fairness and emotional reaction.
2.4.2.4 Research on de-biasing technique for the self-serving bias
Few published work exploring de-biasing technique provides an insight that situational ascrip-
tion can attenuate the self-serving bias in fairness assessment. Babcock et al. (1997) found
that asking participants to reflect on their own weakness eliminated the otherwise systematic
discrepancy between plaintiﬀs and defendants. While not explicitly tested, it is plausible that
the self-questioning reflection involves inspection of external factors, making the opponent de-
fendable. Another line of (indirect) evidence comes from a study by Leung et al. (2004), which
showed that situational ascription attenuated perceived interpersonal injustice. Interpersonal
injustice is the opposite of interpersonal justice, which refers to fairness at the level of “inter-
personal treatment” (Leung et al., 2004; Colquitt, 2001). That is, one perceives interpersonal
justice when e.g., the opponent expresses willingness to listen and provide explanations if
requested, and shows understanding (Leung et al., 2004), whereas one perceives interpersonal
injustice when the opposite behaviour is shown. Interpersonal justice has been suggested as
an “interactional” aspect of distributive fairness by directing people’s response to the final
outcome (Greenberg, 1993). There is also evidence that the two sub-categories of fairness are
positively correlated (Colquitt, 2001). Thus, although Leung et al.’s work does not directly
test for the eﬀect of situational ascription on the self-biased perception of fairness, it does
suggest that situational attribution should reduce the egocentric bias in fairness perception.
2.4.2.5 Research on the “correspondence bias” in attribution
Research on causal attribution indicates that when assigning attribution for an actor’s be-
haviour, people tend to overweight internal factors and underestimate the eﬀect of external
factors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). Researchers refer to this systematic tendency
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as the “fundamental attribution error” (Ross, 1977) or the “correspondence bias” (Gilbert &
Malone, 1995). Given that it is debatable whether the tendency qualifies as a fundamental
error (see, e.g., Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981), the latter label is used here.
The correspondence bias is illustrated particularly well by the observation that people
attribute an actor’s behaviour to his predisposition in the presence of a situational force or
an environmentally induced disadvantage to the behaviour. In a now classic study, Jones and
Harris (1967) found that participants inferred a pro- or anti-Castro (ex-president of Cuba)
attitude of a hypothetical essayist from an essay supporting or not supporting Castro; and
this happened whether the essayist was under the guidance of his debate coach or was free
from influence. Similarly, Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977) showed that participants rated
their own level of general knowledge according to their performance in answering a inconclusive
questionnaire — a questionnaire created by a “questioner” who purposely involved items that
were based on his own general knowledge and that were expected to be very unlikely to be
solved. Such a questionnaire was not representative of a commonly accepted test of general
knowledge because it was prepared using individual-specific expertise. However, although
contestants in Ross et al.’s study were informed of this limitation, they still attributed their
performance to personal capacity.
A bias-then-correction interpretation Some researchers suggested that the corre-
spondence bias is due to people’s unawareness of external factors (e.g., McArthur & Baron,
1983). However, it is found that people still draw overly dispositional inferences even when
they are aware of situational forces (e.g., Quattrone, 1982). In a related vein, research sug-
gests that people often attribute behaviour to traits in an automatic, intentional manner (e.g.,
Lupfer et al., 1990; Winter & Uleman, 1984; Winter, Uleman, & Cunniﬀ, 1985; but see Bassili
& Smith, 1986). Drawing on these findings, Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988) proposed a
framework according to which people make dispositional attributions spontaneously when
explaining others’ behaviour; only after this step may they correct for the initial judgement
by assessing external factors that may also contribute to the observed behaviour. When this
correction is absent or attenuated, the tendency for people to draw dispositional inferences
would be stronger.
Gilbert et al. (1988) demonstrated this notion in a cognitive-load study, in which partici-
pants watched via video a woman who looked very nervous when talking with a stranger (Ex-
periment 1). Participants knew from subtitles that the conversation was about the woman’s
hobbies (neutral topic) or sexual activity (anxiety-evoking topic). Some participants watched
the video whilst being required to remember some word strings and were thus cognitively
loaded (cognitively loaded participants); and some participants did not receive this manip-
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ulation (control participants). The results showed that whereas control participants judged
the woman as less characteristically anxious when the topic was about personal hobbies than
when it was about sexual activity, cognitively loaded participants did not diﬀerentially rate
the woman as characteristically anxious for the two topics. A similar result was obtained in
the follow-up study that ruled out an artifactual explanation that cognitively loaded partic-
ipants were too busy remembering the words to attend to the subtitles (see, Gilbert et al.,
1988; Experiment 2). In support of the correction model, Lupfer et al. (1990) showed that,
whereas the facilitating eﬀect of dispositional information on recall of trait was independent of
cognitive busyness, that of situational informational on situation-relevant recall was interfered
with when cognitive capacity was limited.
Summary We proposed that when egocentric, payoﬀ-distribution-based decisions and
more objective, situation-considered decisions are in conflict, the former are emotionally com-
pelled whereas the latter are subject to cognitive control. Three lines of research provide
support to this proposition. First, research on emotion and fairness perception suggests that
the self-serving bias in fairness assessment is closely related to emotional reaction such that
egocentric perception of unfairness is associated with negative emotion (e.g., anger and re-
sentfulness). Second, research on de-biasing technique for the self-serving bias suggests that
situational ascription can reduce the bias in fairness perception. Finally, research on attribu-
tion demonstrates situational ascription is subject to controlled processing that enables the
correction for the correspondence bias.
2.4.3 Moral judgement
Like the classical view of economic decision making, the tradition of moral psychology also
took a rationalist perspective, proposing that people base their moral judgements chiefly
on reasoning by which they reach arguments supporting their judgements (see Kurtines &
Gewirtz, 1991). From this perspective, making a moral judgement is a conscious process of
analysis (Kohlberg, 1981). Thus, one would not disapprove of a morally relevant decision or
behaviour until opposing arguments are made apparent (Haidt, 2001).
Moral psychologists of the rationalist school often make reference to the observation that
people provide justifications for their moral judgements in a judgement-consistent fashion (see
Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1991). For example, people who judge abortion as wrong quote harmful
instances consequent to abortion, whereas those who do not disapprove of abortion quote
harmless consequences (Turiel, Hildebrandt, & Wainryb, 1991). However, this approach has
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been criticised as being invalid to draw a causal arrow from reasoning to moral judgement
(e.g., Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). A concurrence of judgement and evaluative reasoning is
no more than a correlation. Thus, it is equally plausible to say that one’s quoted reasons are
prompted by one’s manifest judgement; for example, a “gut feeling” that abortion is just not
right gives consideration to reasons defending this proposition (Haidt, 2001).
2.4.3.1 The social intuitionist model
Haidt (2001), by extension, proposed what he called the social intuitionist model (SIM), ac-
cording to which moral judgements are mainly driven by moral intuition rather than reasoning.
In the SIM, moral intuition is defined as a process producing an immediate moral judgement
“without any conscious awareness” of having searched through inferential steps that lead to
the judgement; reasoning is by contrast a process that runs in a slow, cognitively controlled,
accessible and intentional pattern. Building on Zajonc’s (1980) demonstration that aﬀective
evaluations occur speedily and prevalently, Haidt (2001) explicitly states that moral intuition
includes aﬀective valence, i.e., a positive/negative evaluation; it can be a judgement of, for
example, good/bad, like/dislike, or appropriate/inappropriate.
Support for this perspective comes (partly) from a series of studies by Haidt and colleagues.
Haidt et al. (1993) conducted one study in which participants made judgements on “oﬀensive”
yet “harmless” morally relevant activities (e.g., a woman used a national flag to wash a home
toilet; a family ate their own dog that was already dead). While not causing objective
harm, these activities are “aﬀectively loaded” (Haidt et al., 1993). One important finding
from this study is that a participant’s aversive emotional response to an activity (i.e., the
extent to which he would be “bothered” to watch it) predicted his moral judgement (i.e.,
whether the activity was wrong) better than did the participant’s evaluation of consequential
harmfulness. Haidt and Hersh (2001) obtained a similar result regarding moral judgement
on sexual morality issues (e.g., insect). Moreover, this latter study showed that participants
often failed to provide explanations for their moral judgements, challenging Kolhberg’s (1971)
claim that people are often capable of articulating reasons for their moral choices. As Haidt et
al. (2000) observed, participants were “morally dumbfounded”; that is, they were themselves
astonished by their inability to explain their own judgements. In brief, these studies suggest
that people’s moral judgements emerge as a result of moral intuition that comes in the form
of emotion, instead of an analytic, reasoning-focus process.
Note that SIM does not entirely deny the role of reasoning in forming moral judgements
but accounts it to be limited. Specifically, the SIM posits that the causal link from reasoning
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to moral judgement is rare and that reasoning is mostly established according to already-
expressed opinions. As Haidt (2001) states, it happens more often to a certain population,
such as philosophers, who have been trained to engage in analysis and habitually rely on
reasoning-based conclusions. However, most of the time, reasoning comes after, and forms
justifications for, already-stated moral judgements. The fact that such justifications are post
hoc raises the problem that they are possibly arguments for which people search to support
their voiced opinions, rather than real causes for their judgements. This is consistent with
the argumentative theory (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), according to which people’s everyday
reasoning is strongly intended to defend their standpoints. Thus, when pressed to explain why
they report what they report, people probably search for plausible points that are nevertheless
not the real reasons (Haidt, 2001; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
2.4.3.2 A dual-process model for moral judgement
Although the SIM is influential in framing emotion into the process of making moral judge-
ments, it is criticised for overemphasising the role of emotion as a form of moral intuition
and understating the role of reasoning in making moral judgements (see Paxton & Greene,
2010). There is now mainstream acceptance of a “dual-process” model for moral judgement,
according to which both an intuitive, automatic, often emotionally impulsive process and
an analytic, deliberate, more cognitively controlled process are involved in making moral
judgements (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Valdesolo
& DeSteno, 2008). Thus, the dual-process model is a synthesised form of the traditional
rationalist and modern intuitionist accounts (Greene et al., 2008).
The “trolley problem” The dual-process model for moral judgement is primarily
developed by Greene et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) using hypothetical moral dilemmas characterised
by tension between group and individual well-being. This can be exemplified by the “trolley
problem” (Thomson, 1985). The trolley problem has two versions. One is called the switch
dilemma and the other the footbridge dilemma. In both dilemmas, a trolley is heading towards
five workmen who will be killed if the trolley is not stopped in time. In the switch dilemma,
one can save those workmen only by pressing a switch to divert the trolley onto another track
where one workman will be killed. In the footbridge dilemma, one can save the five workmen
only by pushing a giant person oﬀ a footbridge and onto the track to stop the trolley, killing
the huge person. In both versions, a dilemma is posited: either sacrificing one to save another
five, or protecting an innocent despite five deaths. If one approves of sacrificing one to save
five, the person’s solution is referred to as a “utilitarian” judgement; disapproving of this
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solution is referred to as a “non-utilitarian” or “deontological” judgement (Greene et al., 2001,
2008). It is widely found that people are more likely to provide a utilitarian judgement in the
switch dilemma than in the footbridge dilemma (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al.,
2001; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Petrinovich, O’Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993).
A personal/impersonal distinction To explain this finding, Greene et al. (2001)
proposed, from a psychological perspective, that the diﬀerence in moral judgement is a result
of the diﬀerence in the extent to which individuals are engaged in “emotional processing”.
Specifically, whereas the killing in the switch dilemma stems from “deflecting an existing
threat” (Greene, 2009), in the footbridge dilemma it appears to be more personally involved.
Due to this diﬀerence in vividness with which the hostility is imaged, the footbridge dilemma
elicits a more negative emotion than does the switch dilemma. As a result, people are less likely
to make a utilitarian judgement in the former dilemma than in the latter. Building on this
rationale, Greene et al. (2001) raised a “personal/impersonal” distinction according to which
the footbridge dilemma exemplifies personal dilemmas and the switch dilemma exemplifies
impersonal dilemmas. Further, it is suggested that while pertaining to the same harmful
consequence, a personal dilemma is more emotion-loaded than its impersonal counterpart.
Two clarifications are needed here before going further. First, both terms — personal and
impersonal — concern the killing of a minority (e.g., the single victim in the footbridge or
switch dilemma). Although it is also plausible to say, for example, that one can cause the death
of the five workmen impersonally by doing nothing, such and other alternative understandings
are not taken here. Second, the personal/impersonal distinction is apparently not the only
way to diﬀerentiate the switch and footbridge dilemmas. Greene et al. (2001) used it as a
“shortcut” to explore the idea that the footbridge dilemma elicits fewer utilitarian judgements
because it is more emotionally loaded. The researchers stress it as a preliminary concept
while maintaining diverse attributes upon which the two dilemmas can be distinguished.
These include the involvement of intent (Cushman et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2008; Schaich
Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), the involvement of “personal
force” (Greene et al., 2009) and the “locus of intervention” (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007).
Our studies (Studies 2 & 3) adopted the moral dilemma paradigm. We also borrow Greene et
al.’s simplicity without looking into radical causes for the diﬀerence in emotional cost. Hence,
the following review will focus on evidence showing how the dual-process model is developed
using the moral dilemma context with the personal/impersonal approach.
An emotion/deliberation conflict in moral judgement Initial evidence for the notion
that moral judgement in personal and impersonal dilemmas involves emotional processing to
diﬀerent extents comes from the pioneering fMRI study by Greene et al. (2001). The authors
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created two sets of moral dilemmas based on the personal/impersonal distinction (including
the footbridge and switch dilemmas) and also involved a set of morally neutral judgement
questions called “non-moral dilemmas”. Participants were scanned while being presented with
all three types of dilemmas and providing moral judgements to the dilemmas (i.e., responding
to the question “is it appropriate to x”, where x stands for, in a moral dilemma, an action sim-
ilar to the killing in the trolley problem). The imaging data (Experiment 1) showed that brain
regions implicated in emotional processing (e.g., the angular gyrus) showed greater activation
for moral personal dilemmas, as compared to moral impersonal and non-moral dilemmas.
In contrast, brain regions involved in cognitively controlled processing (e.g., middle frontal
gyrus) were less active for moral personal dilemmas than for the other two types. And moral
impersonal and non-moral dilemmas were not significantly diﬀerent in prompting activation
of both emotional and cognitive processing related regions. These results suggest that moral
personal dilemmas, compared to moral impersonal (and non-moral) dilemmas, involve an
engagement in emotional processing to a larger extent but an engagement in cognitively con-
trolled processing to a smaller extent.
In addition, response time (RT) data in the same study exhibited a Stroop-like behavioural
pattern: for moral personal dilemmas, utilitarian judgements took longer than non-utilitarian
judgements. This eﬀect of judgement pattern was, however, not observed for moral imper-
sonal dilemmas. Combined with the imaging data, the researchers proposed a “behavioural
interference” pattern that can be described as follows. A non-utilitarian judgement for a moral
personal dilemma is impulsive due to a salient negative emotional response to the dilemma;
on the other hand, an eﬀortful, cognitively controlled process can overcome the prepotent
response and reach a non-utilitarian judgement. However, there is no such intensive emo-
tional response to moral impersonal dilemmas, making the emotion/deliberation conflict less
likely (Greene et al., 2001). Thus, it is more diﬃcult and takes longer to make a utilitarian
judgement for a moral personal dilemma.5
A subsequent brain imaging study by Greene et al. (2004) further suggests a link between
judgment pattern and emotional versus cognitive processing. Building on the notion that
moral personal dilemmas elicit intense conflict, the study specifically compared utilitarian
and non-utilitarian judgements within moral personal dilemmas. The results showed that
5McGuire et al. (2009) re-analysed these RT data and found that the interaction reported by Greene et
al. (2001) was driven by a small set of stimuli that nevertheless largely skew the data. However, as argued
by Greene (2009) in his reply to McGuire et al., this is not suﬃcient to deny the dual-process model given
supportive evidence from other studies that do not rely on the personal/impersonal distinction (e.g., Greene
et al., 2004, 2008).
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utilitarian judgements, as compared to non-utilitarian ones, were associated with greater
activity in the DLPFC, suggesting the involvement of cognitive control in shaping utilitarian
judgements for moral personal dilemmas. Based on these results, Greene and colleagues
(2004, 2008) proposed a dual-process model for moral judgement, according to which non-
utilitarian judgements result from salient emotional response, whereas utilitarian judgements
are encouraged by cognitively controlled processing (Greene et al., 2008).
The dual-process model for moral judgement is supported by a body of evidence beyond
correlation revealed by the above fMRI studies. For example, Mendez et al. (2005) found that
patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD), who typically lose empathy, had an impaired
ability to make a non-utilitarian judgement for the footbridge dilemma. Similarly, Koenigs et
al. (2007) found that patients with focal bilateral damage in the VMPC (as mentioned earlier,
VMPC is an area that is crucial for generating social emotion; Anderson et al., 2006) were
much more inclined to make a utilitarian judgement for the footbridge dilemma than normal
participants. These neuropsychological findings suggest that emotional processing is essential
in making non-utilitarian judgements. In a similar vein, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) showed
that inducing a happy mood in participants before they made moral judgements increased
the likelihood of utilitarian judgements for the footbridge dilemma, supposedly because the
positive aﬀect weakened the negative emotion elicited by the dilemma.
Other studies also support the dual-process model by implicating cognitive processing
in utilitarian judgements. Greene et al. (2008) conducted a cognitive-load study in which
participants were presented with moral personal dilemmas while under cognitive load (load
condition) or not (control condition). Consistent with the dual-process model, whereas re-
sponse time for a non-utilitarian judgement was not diﬀerent between the two conditions,
that for a utilitarian judgement was longer in the load condition than in the control one. The
fact that cognitive load “selectively” interrupts utilitarian judgements suggests that eﬀortful,
cognitive processing is implemented in making utilitarian judgements. Consistently, Paxton,
Ungar, and Greene (2012) obtained increased ratings of “moral acceptability” for personal
killing by inducing prior reflection using a non-moral task. Along the same line, Moore et al.
(2008) found that working memory ability was positively predictive of utilitarian judgements.
Finally, Bartle (2008) demonstrated that a higher “need for cognition” gave rise to utilitarian
judgements.
Summary Based on a series of studies using the moral dilemma context, Greene and
colleagues developed a dual-process model for moral judgement (Greene et al., 2001, 2004,
2008). According to the model, utilitarian judgements are driven by impulsive emotion,
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whereas non-utilitarian judgements are fostered by cognitive control. Substantial evidence
is supportive of the dual-process model by implicating the emotional path in non-utilitarian
judgements or by implicating the cognitively control path in utilitarian judgements.
2.4.4 Bridging the paradigms
As the above review suggests, the two paradigms used in the current thesis, i.e., the mini-
ultimatum game and the trolley-problem-like moral dilemma paradigm, are analogous on the
grounds of a dual-process account of JDM. Both paradigms incorporate an emotion/deliberation
dilemma such that emotion-driven, impulsive, and reasoning-based, cognitively controlled,
judgements and decisions appear to conflict. Specifically, in the mini-ultimatum game, where
a disadvantageous oﬀer is caused by situational force, emotional distress in response to the
oﬀer would lead to rejection of it, whereas a more objective, context-responsive process would
increase the likelihood of acceptance. In the moral dilemma paradigm, where the welfare of
the majority is at odds with that of the minority, emotional aversion to sacrificing the mi-
nority would prompt deontological/non-utilitarian judgements, whereas cognitively controlled
processing would encourage utilitarian judgements.
2.5 Influence of mood on judgement and decision making
2.5.1 A mood-congruent pattern of judgement
Numerous studies in the aﬀect literature have found a mood-congruent pattern of judgement:
people in a positive mood tend to make positive judgements on an evaluated object whereas
those in a negative mood show the opposite. Research along this line shows that people in
a positive mood, compared to their negative-mood or/and neutral-mood counterparts, rate
blind date partners as more attractive (Clark & Waddell, 1983), form a better impression of a
person described with mixed information (Forgas & Bower, 1987; Erber, 1991), rate their life
in general as more satisfying (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), show a decreased estimation of
risk (Johnson & Tversky, 1983) and have a more optimistic perception of their health (Salovey
& Birnbaum, 1989). Two theoretical approaches are raised to explain such mood-congruent
judgements — one conceptualises mood as a node within an associative network and one
focuses on experiential aspect of mood.
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2.5.1.1 The state-dependent-priming approach
According to the state-dependent-priming approach (Bower, 1981, 1991; Forgas, 1995; Isen,
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978), a person’s mood facilitates his encoding or retrieval of mood-
congruent information, giving rise to mood-congruent judgements. From this perspective,
mood aﬀects judgement indirectly by facilitating mood-congruent recall. A body of studies
provides support for this account (e.g., Erber, 1991; Forgas, 1992; Forgas & Bower, 1987;
Forgas & Moylan, 1991). For example, Forgas and Bower (1987) showed that happy-mood
participants, compared to sad-mood participants, formed a better impression of an evaluated
person after reading both positive and negative information about the person. Moreover, the
authors found that whereas happy-mood participants learned more slowly and had a better,
faster recall of the positive versus negative information, sad-mood participants showed the
opposite. This interaction between mood and information valance was thought to evidence
the mood-dependent-recall notion. Similarly, Erber (1991) found that positive mood not only
increased the estimation of a person’s engagement in behaviour consistent with his positive
traits, but also increased the accessibility of the positive traits; in contrast, negative mood
increased the estimation of negative-trait-consistent behaviour and the accessibility of negative
traits.
On the other hand, some studies suggest that mood-congruent judgements are subject
to contexts. Specifically, it shows that the mood-congruent eﬀect disappears when people
are quite familiar with the object (e.g., Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987) and
when they are highly motivated to achieve a certain goal (e.g., mood repair; Erber & Erber,
1994), but is stronger when people are faced with unfamiliar tasks that presumably require
“substantive” processing (e.g., Forgas, 1992; see Forgas, 1995 for a comprehensive review).
Drawing on these findings, Forgas (1995) proposed the “aﬀect infusion model” (AIM), which
highlights a moderating role of mental processing style in mood eﬀect on judgment. According
to the AIM, judgements are particularly likely to be aﬀected by mood-congruent information
retention when people are faced with unfamiliar, complex tasks; this is because people would
engage in substantive processing, which allows mood-facilitated retrieval and encoding to
come into the process of shaping the final judgement. In contrast, this eﬀect would be absent
when people are highly familiar with the judged object because relevant information or criteria
would be spontaneously retrieved. Also, mood is quite unlikely to influence judgements when
people are highly motivated to reach a goal (unless mood itself is relevant to the goal, e.g.,
mood repair) because their information processing would be highly goal-oriented.
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2.5.1.2 The “aﬀect-as-information” approach
Unlike the state-dependent-priming approach, which conceptualises mood as a node linking to
relevant mood-congruent information within an associative work, the “aﬀect-as-information”
(AAI) approach (Clore et al., 2001; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988, 2007)
focuses on the experiential aspect and informational value of mood. The central assumption
of the AAI model is that peoples aﬀect can provide information about the object they are
dealing with. In this theorisation, the information is conveyed by the feeling of aﬀect, which
is defined as an “experiential representation of value” (Clore et al., 2001). For example, when
one feels that he likes another person, this aﬀective reaction can provide inner feedback that
the perceived person is valuable; as a result, the simple liking can generate a quite positive
evaluation of the person (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). This notion is quite similar to Damasio’s
(1994) somatic marker hypothesis and Slovic et al.’s (2002) aﬀective heuristic mentioned
earlier.
The above example is about integral aﬀect, that is, the liking reaction is evoked by the
evaluated subject. For incidental aﬀect, e.g., mood, the AAI model proposes that it can work
in the same way by being erroneously perceived to inform about the present object. Based
on the “aboutness principle” (Higgins, 1998), i.e., people often perceive experience as being
about what is within focus, Schwarz and Clore (1993) argued that the feeling of mood can
easily be “misattributed” as feedback with respect to what people are focused on, and it is
this misattribution that contributes to the mood-congruent judgements.
In support of this perspective, research shows that when the misattribution is avoided,
mood would not exert the mood-congruent eﬀect on judgement (see Schwarz & Clore, 2007 for
a review). For example, in their well-known “weather” study, Schwarz and Clore (1983) found
that weather, an external factor presumably aﬀecting people’s mood, aﬀected judgement
on satisfaction with life in general. Relative to those interviewed on a rainy day, people
interviewed on a sunny day reported higher levels of satisfaction with life. However, the results
in the same study also showed that the eﬀect of weather disappeared when the experimenter
mentioned weather before the life-satisfaction question and thus reminded the interviewees
of the real source of their feelings. A subsequent work (Schwarz et al., 1987) showed that
whereas mood aﬀected judgement on satisfaction with life in general, it did not aﬀect that
on satisfaction with a specific life domain (i.e., income). As the authors reasoned, when
considering a specific domain of life, information regarding the domain would be relatively
more accessible, discounting the use of the momentary feeling as information. Along the same
line, it is evident that mood-congruent judgements are much less likely among experts in the
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field of judgement (Ottati & Isbell, 1996), presumably because experts are highly eﬃcient
in distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant information with respect to the question at
hand.
Closer analyses of present evidence, though limited, provide support to the AAI versus
the mood-priming approach. First, research shows that mood-congruent recall does not nec-
essarily occur when mood has an eﬀect on judgement (e.g., Fiedler, Pampe, & Scherf, 1986).
Second, Johnson and Tversky (1983) showed that inducing a negative mood by reading about
cancer aﬀected judgements on the risk of cancer, accident and divorce at the same level,
suggesting a generalised mood eﬀect on evaluative judgement, regardless of topic (see also
Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992). This is contradictory to the mood-congruent-
recall model. As Schwarz and Clore (2007) argued, the recall-based model would predict a
stronger eﬀect of mood when concepts activated through mood induction are related to the
topic of judgement. Accordingly, a negative mood induced by reading about cancer should
have exerted a stronger eﬀect on judgement on risk of cancer.
Summary Mood can influence judgements in a mood-congruent pattern. The state-
dependent-priming approach proposes it as a result of mood-congruent information retrieval
(Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995). This approach is further modified into the AIM (Forgas, 1995),
which integrates a boundary condition for the mood- congruent priming. An alternative
approach, the AAI model focuses on the experiential component of mood, i.e., feeling, and
its informational value, suggesting that mood sparks mood-congruent judgements by being
regarded as feedback about the evaluated object. Little evidence suggests that the mood
eﬀect on judgement is due to the informative role of feeling but not mood-congruent recall.
2.5.2 Influence of mood on information processing
Most relevant for our purpose is the influence of mood on information processing. Research in a
variety of domains shows that positive mood is associated with heuristic, top-down, relational
processing, and in contrast, negative mood is associated with systematic, bottom-up, detail-
oriented processing (see Clore & Huntsinger, 2009 for a review). For example, the persuasion
literature shows that people in a positive mood, relative to those in a neutral or negative
mood, rely more on “peripheral cues” such as expertise (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack,
1990) and are less aﬀected by the quality of arguments (e.g., Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992;
Mackie & Worth, 1989; Worth & Mackie, 1987). Analogously, when in the position of per-
suader, sad-mood people produce stronger and more eﬀective arguments than do happy-mood
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counterparts (Forgas, 2007). Research on personal perception provides converging evidence
that happy-mood people tend to rely on more category-reflected (e.g., stereotypic, trait) in-
formation whereas sad-mood people rely on more individual-specific information (Bless &
Fiedler, 1995; Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Bo-
denhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994; Isbell, 2004; Isbell et al., 2005; see Bless, Schwarz,
& Kemmelmeier, 1996 for a review). Similarly, Bless et al. (1996a) found that happy-mood
participants focused mainly on scripted information whereas sad-mood ones also carefully
processed more detailed information. Finally, research on forensic psychology demonstrates
that people in a good mood are gullible whereas those in a sad mood are more sensitive to
false information; as a result, sad people showed a higher accuracy of witness memory (Forgas,
Laham, & Vargas, 2005).
For the influence of mood on processing, three theoretical assumptions have been raised
with respect to the mediating process: (1) a deficit in processing capacity when in a positive
mood(Mackie & Worth, 1989); (2) a deficit in motivation when in a positive mood (Boden-
hausen et al., 1994a; Schwarz, 1990; Wegener, Petty, & Smith, 1995) and (3) a “cognitive
tuning” function by mood (Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
2.5.2.1 The deficit-in-capacity assumption
The deficit-in-capacity assumption holds that the influence of positive mood on information
processing is due to a deficit in processing capacity (Mackie & Worth, 1989). The underlying
rationale is that positive events happen more frequently in everyday life than negative ones,
thus there are more positive materials than negative materials in one’s memory store. Further,
due to mood-congruent recall (Bower, 1981; Isen et al., 1978), people in a positive mood
would have a higher cognitive load than those in a negative mood; as a result, positive mood
would limit the capacity of processing in a careful manner. In support of this view, Mackie
and Worth (1989) showed that happy-mood participants were less sensitive to the quality
of persuasive arguments than were neutral-mood ones when time to process the arguments
was limited. In the absence of this limitation, however, happy-mood participants processed
the information no less thoroughly than the neutral-mood ones; but notably, happy-mood
participants spent more time on the task. The authors took this result as evidence for the
deficit-in-capacity hypothesis, interpreting the extra processing time as compensation for the
deteriorated processing ability. Another source of evidence comes from a study by Bless et al.
(1990; Experiment 2), who showed that the eﬀect of strong versus weak persuasive arguments
on attitude change under negative mood was removed when negative-mood participants were
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doing another task while processing the arguments.
2.5.2.2 The deficit-in-motivation assumption
The deficit-in-motivation assumption holds that positive mood makes people less motivated
to process carefully. This notion, however, is suggested by two diﬀerent approaches. One
approach focuses on the hedonic consequence of diﬀerent processing strategies (“hedonic-
contingence”; Wegener et al., 1995; Wegener & Petty, 1994; see also Isen, 1984 for a similar
perspective). According to the hedonic-contingence view, people are often concerned about
maintaining a positive aﬀective state. For positive-mood people, engaging in other activities is
risky due to the potential of feeling down; in contrast, for negative-mood ones, doing so is likely
to uplift their aﬀective states. Therefore, negative-mood people tend to process a given task
in a systematic and careful manner whereas positive-mood people do the opposite. Support
for this view comes from a study by Wegener et al. (1995; Experiment 2). In this study,
participants, most of whom were university students, were induced into a happy or sad mood
before being presented with strong or weak arguments regarding joining a certain university-
related programme. One programme was about reducing tuition and another programme was
about increasing tuition. The hedonic-contingence assumption implies that if engaging in a
task can be aﬀectively rewarding, people in a happy mood would be motivated to do so. Thus,
happy-mood participants should process the arguments carefully when faced with the tuition-
reduction programme but not the tuition-increase one. Consistent with this prediction, happy
participants were persuaded more by strong arguments than weak ones in the tuition-decrease
case, but were equally influenced by both types of arguments in the tuition-increase case. In
contrast, for negative-mood participants, the advantage of strong versus weak arguments was
independent of which programme participants were subject to.
Another approach that likewise assumes a shortfall in motivation is based on the AAI ap-
proach. As seen earlier, the AAI approach holds that aﬀective feeling can provide information
about an evaluated target. Beyond this, and at a more general level, it also assumes that
aﬀect, via its feeling, can provide information about the current situation (Schwarz, 1990).
This is building on the common view in aﬀect research that “emotions exist for the sake of
signalling states of the world that have to be responded to, or that no longer need response
and action” (Frijda, 1988, p. 354). Accordingly, it is assumed that negative mood signals that
there is something wrong with the surroundings; people then realise that they need to be
careful before making a judgement or decision and thus are motivated to process information
in a systematic, analytic and careful fashion. In contrast, positive mood suggests the current
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situation is benign; people then see their ongoing thoughts or actions as reliable and thus are
less motivated to process information carefully (Schwarz, 1990). The informational value of
mood is also subject to the misattribution principle mentioned earlier. Thus, when the real
source of mood is made salient, the mood eﬀect disappeared (e.g., Sinclair, Mark, & Clore,
1994).
Consistent with this AAI-approach-based motivation notion, Bless et al. (1990, Exper-
iment 1) showed that an explicit requirement for attending to argument quality led happy
participants, like sad ones, to be diﬀerently aﬀected by strong and weak arguments. This
suggests a functional equivalence of being in a negative mood to being motivated to care-
fully process information (Schwarz, Bless, & Bohner, 1991). Note that this result is against
the deficit-in-ability assumption because in the absence of capacity, the external requirement
would not show the overriding eﬀect. Similarly, in a personal perception study, Bodenhausen
et al. (1994a) found that, whereas happy-mood participants made more stereotypic judgements
than did neutral-mood ones when only information about the target object was presented,
this diﬀerence was eliminated when participants received external instructions emphasising
the accountability of their judgements. Note that these studies, on the other hand, imply
a more flexible processing strategy by happy participants than sad ones. In fact, the AAI
approach to the influence of mood on information processing is modified later and does not
assume a general deficit in motivation when being in a positive mood. I will return to the
revised theorisation later.
2.5.2.3 Evaluation of the ability- and motivation-deficit assumptions
Closer analyses of the available evidence and further research show that neither the ability
nor the motivation notion is suﬃcient to explain the commonly observed mood eﬀect on in-
formation processing. For example, the persuasion study by Bless et al. (1990; Experiment 1)
showed that mood manipulation had an eﬀect on attitude change such that sad-mood partici-
pants’ attitudes were aﬀected more by strong than weak arguments whereas happy-mood ones’
attitudes were not aﬀected by argument strength. However, from the same study, data of ar-
gument quality rating showed that happy participants diﬀerentiated between strong and weak
arguments no worse than their sad counterparts. Thus, it seemed that happy participants paid
attention to the strength of arguments at least when encoding information. Similarly, Bless
et al. (1996a; Experiment 1) found that although happy participants’ judgements reflected
a higher reliance on stereotypic than individuating information, their recall of the two types
of information was not quantitatively diﬀerent from that by sad participants. Apart from
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these ambiguous results, Bless et al. (1996c; Experiment 1) also found that the commonly
observed more stereotypic judgements by happy-mood participants than sad-mood ones were
eliminated when a large portion of the given information was stereotype-inconsistent. This
contradicts the deficit-in-ability or -motivation assumption because if there was any deficit,
it would block the eﬀect of the information extremity.
Contradicting evidence also comes from Bless et al.’s (1996a) studies on how mood aﬀects
the use of scripted information. In their first experiment, the researchers induced participants
into happy, sad or neutral moods and then asked them to listen to a “going-out-for-dinner”
story that included behaviours consistent or inconsistent with a “restaurant script”. After
a filler task, participants did a recognition task in which they were presented with script-
consistent and - inconsistent items and indicated whether each item was heard in the story.
The results showed that happy-mood participants more frequently misidentified unheard but
script-consistent items than did neutral-mood and sad ones, thus suggesting an increased
reliance on scripts when in a positive mood. In the second experiment, the procedure was
the same except that participants were asked to do a concentration-test task while listening
to the story. This was aimed to test for the deficit-in-ability or -motivation assumption. The
logic is that if either of the two assumptions was valid, the deficit should also be seen in the
“secondary” task and thus happy participants should perform worse than neutral and sad ones
(Bless et al., 1996a). However, the results exhibited the opposite result.
Taken together, the research suggests that the influence of mood on information processing
cannot be simply attributed to a deficit in ability or motivation that was assumed to be
consequent to positive mood. Rather, as seen in Bless et al.’s (1996c) study that involves an
extremity of stereotype-inconsistent information, people in a positive mood would not rely
on a heuristic solution when it is obviously inappropriate in the current situation. Such an
interplay of mood and situation leads to a “cognitive tuning” theorising.
2.5.2.4 A cognitive-tuning perspective
The cognitive-tuning theory (Schwarz, 2000, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) is based on the
AAI approach. Like the deficit-in-motivation assumption based on the AAI approach, the
cognitive-tuning theory also holds that mood can “tune” cognitive processes to match the
situation it has picked up on (Schwarz, 1990; 2002). However, unlike the old theorising, it
does not assume any lack of ability or motivation in general as a result of being in a positive
mood. Rather, it points out that mood per se would not decide the final processing strategy
people use. Moods provide cues about the situation, giving rise to certain processing strategies
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whose appropriateness is nevertheless subject to an overall examination of the task at hand.
This is particularly the case for positive moods. Thus, when the inclined processing strategy
and task requirement are not found incompatible, as is the case in most studies without
manipulation of task requirement, people in a positive mood rely on heuristic processing. On
the other hand, when they are found incompatible, as seen in the above studies involving
manipulation of task requirement — explicit demand of noticing the quality of arguments
(Bless et al., 1990), presenting participants with mostly non-stereotypic information (Bless
et al., 1996c), informing participants that they would be held accountable for judgement
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994a) — positive-mood people also adopt an analytic, detail-oriented
processing strategy. From this perspective, positive mood engenders a flexible processing
style (see Fredrickson, 2001 and Isen, 2008 for similar perspectives). In contrast, people in a
negative mood would tend to adopt an analytic, careful processing strategy in a less flexible
way because the warning signal provided by a negative mood is not limited to the presently
perceived scope (Schwarz, 2000, 2002).
This conceptualisation is evidenced in the finding that, whereas negative mood is advanta-
geous for analytic tasks, positive mood appears so for eliciting creative solutions (see Schwarz
& Skurnik, 2003, for a review). With respect to analytic tasks, because negative mood tunes
systematic, analytic processing, it should improve performance in such tasks. On the contrary,
unless the importance of analytic processing is made salient, positive mood should decrease
performance in analytic tasks because it fosters a less careful processing strategy. Consistent
with this prediction, Sinclair and Mark (1995) showed in covariation-detection tasks that rela-
tive to participants in a neutral mood, those in a sad mood used more digits from scatterplots
and showed more accurate estimations of correlation coeﬃcients, whereas those in a happy
mood showed the opposite. Further, whereas happy participants were self-reported to con-
centrate less on the task and wrote less comprehensive explanations for coeﬃcient estimation
than neutral-mood participants, sad participants outperformed neutral-mood ones in both
regards (Sinclair & Mark, 1995; Experiment 2). Similarly, Melton (1995) found that happy-
mood participants performed worse in syllogism tasks than neutral-mood ones. Moreover, the
happy participants tended to spend less time, suggesting that they adopted a less eﬀortful
processing strategy when solving the tasks. Thus, consistent with the cognitive-tuning the-
ory, negative or positive mood is advantageous or disadvantageous for analytic tasks because
it tunes a processing strategy that is compatible or incompatible with the requirements to
achieve good performances in this type of task.
On the other hand, for creative tasks or tasks for which solutions can be assessed in terms of
innovation, less systematic and detail-focused processing should help in that it can facilitate
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some “unusual” association between given items (Isen, 2008). In light of this, a top-down,
relational processing style fostered by positive mood is expected to facilitate performance in
creative tasks. In support of this notion, Isen, Daubman, and Nowicki (1987) showed that
participants in a positive mood, compared to those in a neutral or negative mood, were more
likely to successfully solve the Duncker’s (1945) candle problem, a creative task in which given
items need to be used in an unusual way to solve the problem. Similarly, Isen and Daubman
(1984) found that, relative to neutral-mood participants, happy participants were more likely
to draw some innovative categorical link, e.g., placing “foot” and “camel” into a group of
vehicles.
The cognitive-tuning theory also explains the aforementioned finding that although happy
participants relied more on scripts when encoding information than did sad participants, they
outperformed the latter in a meantime concentration test (Bless et al., 1996a). According to
the cognitive-tuning theory, because happy participants adopted a less detail-oriented pro-
cessing strategy for one task than did sad participants, they had more available cognitive
eﬀort for the secondary task, and consequently outperformed their sad counterparts in the
task.
Similar perspectives The “tuning” function of mood is similarly seen in some other
AAI-approach-based theories. One theory is the rely-on-general-knowledge-structures theory
proposed by Bless and colleagues (Bless et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Isbell, 2004; Isbell et al.,
2005; Ruder & Bless, 2003; see Bless, 2001 for a review). It posits that people in positive aﬀect
perceive the current situation as non-problematic and thus see general knowledge structures
as adaptive, whereas those in negative aﬀect do the opposite. Consequently, positive mood
increases reliance on general knowledge structures whereas negative mood decreases reliance
on them. Likewise, the rely-on-general-knowledge-structure theory states that moods do not
necessarily alter the quality of processing. By reading heuristic processing as adopting general
knowledge structures into a specific case, the rely-on-general-knowledge-structures theory fits
the empirical findings discussed above (Bless, 2001). Additional evidence comes from the
literature of perception and processing scope. Research on visual perception shows that
global-scoped attention is dominant over local-scoped attention (e.g., forest versus tree; cf.
Navon, 1977). Thus, according to the rely-on-general-knowledge-structures theory, positive
mood should prompt reliance on global versus local perception whereas negative mood should
decrease it. In support of this prediction, Gasper and Clore (2002; Experiment 2) showed
that when figures can be matched in terms of either structural element or overall shape (e.g.,
three squares are structured into a triangle), participants in a positive mood made the match
more on the former standard whereas those in a negative mood more on the latter. Similarly,
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Storbeck and Clore (2005) showed that positive mood encourages global, relational processing
whereas negative mood encourages item-focused processing; as a result, participants in a
positive mood made more relation-lured mistakes than those in a negative mood.
Another theory is the “aﬀective immediacy principle” raised by Clore and colleagues (Clore
& Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; see also Clore et al., 2001). According to the aﬀective immedi-
acy principle, the aﬀective feeling of mood conveys information about the value of ongoing
thoughts; because what the ongoing thoughts are depends on what comes to mind when faced
with a given task, positive mood entails a “go” signal and negative mood a “stop” signal to
thoughts or tendencies that are most accessible at the moment (Clore et al., 2001). In sup-
port of this perspective, a great deal of research shows that the often observed diﬀerential
eﬀects of positive and negative moods on processing are reversed when incoming thoughts
are inconsistent with assumed general knowledge or default beliefs (see Clore & Huntsinger,
2007, 2009 for reviews). For example, Huntsinger et al. (2010) found that for people who
are disposed toward “egalitarian” responses, positive mood decreases but negative mood in-
creases stereotypic judgements. Similarly, Briñol, Petty, and Barden (2007) showed that in
the condition where participants thought about the quality of arguments before experienc-
ing mood induction, the advantage of strong versus weak arguments was more profound for
positive-mood participants than negative-mood ones. These results are nicely illustrative of
the idea that positive mood validates while negative mood invalidates the most accessible
thoughts when responding to tasks. The aﬀective immediacy principle is thus consistent with
the rely-on-general-knowledge-structures position most of the time when general knowledge
structures or heuristics are most accessible.
In their later articles, Clore and Huntsinger (2007, 2009) claimed that the mood eﬀect
on most accessible cognitive responses is direct, through conferring valence-congruent value,
rather than indirect, through providing information about the current situation. However, the
above empirical evidence is not necessarily incompatible with the information-about-situation
idea: A feeling led by a positive/negative mood can serve as an experiential signal of the
fit/not-fit between initial thoughts or action tendency and the current situational require-
ment (de Vires et al., 2008a, 2012). Also, it should be noted that the most-accessible-thought
approach is criticised for its invalidity when easily accessible answers are not available, as
was the case in the covariation-estimation study where the solution relied on computation
(Schwarz, 2001).
Summary A great deal of research has shown that where positive mood tends to
be associated more with a heuristic, top-down, relational processing strategy, negative mood
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tends to be associated with a systematic, bottom-up, detailed-focused processing strategy
(Bless, 1990; Bless et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Bodenhausen et al.,
1994a, 1994b; Forgas et al., 2005; Isbell, 2004; Isbell et al., 2005; Mackie & Worth, 1989;
Sinclair & Mark, 1995). Early theorisations attributed such mood eﬀects on information
processing to either a deficit of ability (Mackie & Worth, 1989) or a deficit of motivation
(Wegener et al., 1995; Wegener & Petty, 1994; Schwarz, 1990) in systematic processing when
in a positive mood. However, a more careful analysis of empirical evidence suggests that both
accounts inadequately explain the processing eﬀect of mood. A more advanced idea, adopting
an aﬀect-as-information approach, is that mood encourages the use of a certain processing
style by tuning about the current situation, whilst not aﬀecting motivation or ability to process
carefully in general (Schwarz, 2000, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). More recent theories, such
as the rely-on-general-knowledge-structures theory (Bless, 2001) and the aﬀective-immediacy-
principle theory (Clore & Huntsinger, 2009), also emphasised an interaction between the
tuning eﬀect of mood and the most accessible thought.
2.5.3 Mood and intuitive versus deliberative decision making
Research has tracked the influence of mood on JDM in a variety of contexts. As reviewed
above, a number of studies have illustrated mood-congruent judgements in evaluative judge-
ment settings (e.g., Clark & Waddell, 1983; Erber, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987; Johnson
& Tversky, 1983; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Empirical evidence also shows an information-
processing eﬀect of mood on judgement formation in the contexts of personal perception
(Bodenhausen et al., 1994a) and persuasion (Bless et al., 1990, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1989),
suggesting that positive mood encourages the use of a heuristic, top-down processing strategy
whereas negative mood encourages the use of a systematic, bottom-up processing strategy.
Such informational-processing eﬀects of moods are also shown to be implemented in decision
making in diﬀerent contexts. Forgas (1991), for example, showed that when choosing working
partners, sad participants’ decisions were more reflective of a fit between individual feature
and situational requirement than happy participants’ decisions. Hertel et al. (2000) also
demonstrated a more deliberative decision pattern under a negative than positive mood in a
social allocation setting: Whereas happy participants tended to simply go along with others’
choices, sad participants made decisions based more on careful analyses of the situation.
Most relevant to the current thesis, de Vries and colleagues (de Vries, Holland, Corneille,
Rondeel, & Witteman, 2012; de Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008a, 2008b; Holland, de Vries,
Hermsen, & van Knippenberg, 2012) showed in a series of studies that, whereas positive mood
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gives rise to intuitive decisions, negative mood gives rise to more deliberative decisions. In one
of these studies, de Vries et al. (2008b) used the IGT, where players can distinguish between
advantageous and disadvantageous decks by a “gut feeling” in the early stage of the game.
Based on the AAI framework and the cognitive-tuning theory regarding moods’ processing
eﬀects, de Vries et al. (2008a) reasoned that happy-mood participants should outperform sad-
mood participants in the early stage of the gambling game because the former would rely
more on emotional, less deliberative processing than the latter. This is exactly what they
found. Consistent with this finding and the cognitive-tuning rationale, de Vries et al. also
showed, in another study (de Vries et al., 2012), that, in a gambling task where a rule-based,
more deliberative strategy is advantageous, sad-mood participants outperformed happy-mood
ones. Similarly, in another recent study, Holland et al. (2012) found that even for simple
decisions such as choosing a snack, happy-mood participants appeared to go with their implicit
preference, whereas sad-mood participants tended to rely on their explicit belief.
The idea that positive mood gives rise to intuitive decisions whereas negative mood gives
rise to deliberative decisions is also illustrated by de Vries et al. (2008b) using a “fit” approach
(Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2004). According to the “fit” approach,
consistency or inconsistency between initial thought/action tendency and explicitly required
decision strategy increases or decreases the subject value of the final decision (Avnet & Higgins,
2003). De Vries et al. (2008a) reasoned that, given the association between positive/negative
mood and intuitive/deliberative decisions, participants’ subjective valuation of their decisions
should be greater when their mood fit the instructed decision strategy. Results in the study
met this prediction: Happy-mood participants rated their chosen flasks as more monetarily
valuable when asked to make choices based on their “first feelings” than when asked to make
choices after a careful comparison between options; in contrast, sad-mood participants rated
their choice as more valuable following the careful-decision instruction (de Vries et al., 2008a).
Taken together, de Vries et al.’s research informs our studies by suggesting that positive mood
gives rise to emotion-based processing whereas negative mood gives rise to more deliberative
processing.
2.6 Chapter summary
Research on JDM shows that emotion can guide JDM by acting as an information input
(Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2002). Contemporary theories inte-
grate emotion into a dual-process framework, according to which an emotion-loaded process
and a more cognitively controlled process, often in conflict, can lead to diverging judge-
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ments and decisions (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Loewenstein
& O’Donoghue, 2007). This position is evidenced in a variety of contexts, including decision
making under risk (Loewenstein, 2001), intertemporal choice (e.g., Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999;
McClure et al., 2004) and, more importantly for the current thesis, socio-economic decision
making (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2003), negotiation (e.g., Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999) and moral
judgement (e.g., Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008). Conflicts between emotion-based and more
cognitively controlled judgements and decisions in the three social preference contexts inform
the use of two experimental paradigms in our studies, i.e., the mini-ultimatum game and the
moral dilemma paradigm. In the mini-ultimatum game, emotionally compelled decisions fo-
cus on outcome in socio-economic exchanges, whereas more deliberative, cognitively controlled
decisions take into consideration the intentions of other individuals. For moral judgement in
moral dilemmas relevant to others’ welfare, non-utilitarian judgements are primarily driven
by emotion, whereas utilitarian judgements are encouraged by cognitive control (Greene et
al., 2001, 2004, 2008). These two paradigms are thus assumed to similarly incorporate other-
regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas.
Meanwhile, research shows that mood, as an incidental aﬀect that is thought to be objec-
tively irrelevant to JDM tasks at hand, can also influence JDM. Mood can aﬀect evaluative
judgements in a mood-congruent pattern (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1983; Schwarz & Clore,
1983, 1988). It can also aﬀect judgement formation by encouraging use of diﬀerent processing
strategies (e.g., Bless, 1990; Bless & Fiedler, 1995; Bodenhausen et al., 1994a, 1994b; Isbell,
2004; Isbell et al., 2005; Mackie & Worth, 1989). The AAI theoretical framework (Clore et al.,
2001; Clore & Schwarz, 2007) suggests that mood encourages the use of a certain processing
style by providing information about the current situation. Whereas positive mood signals
that the current situation is non-problematic and gives rise to a heuristic, top-down, reflexive
processing style, negative mood signals that the current situation is problematic and gives rise
to a more systematic, bottom-up, analytic processing style (Clore & Schwarz, 2007). This po-
sition is also evidenced in decision making in diﬀerent contexts, such as working-partner-choice
(Forgas, 1991), social resource allocation (Hertel et al., 2000), and — most importantly for
our purpose — intuitive versus deliberative decision making under risk (de Vries et al., 2008a,
2008b, 2012; Holland et al., 2012). Essentially, de Vries et al.’s studies demonstrate that
whereas positive mood gives rise to intuitive, emotion-based decisions, negative mood gives
rise to more deliberative, reflective decisions. This research, along with the AAI theoretical
framework, in particular informs the central idea of this thesis, that positive mood would give
rise to emotionally compelled judgement and decisions, whereas negative mood would give rise
to more deliberative, cognitively controlled decisions in other-regarding emotion/deliberation
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dilemmas.
43
Chapter 3
Exploring the Influence of Sad Mood
on Socio-economic Decision Making
(Study 1)
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 An emotion/deliberation conflict perspective on the mini-ultimatum
game
Study 1 aimed to explore the influence of a sad mood on economic decision making in an
emotion/deliberation dilemma context. We used the mini-ultimatum game (mini-UG; Falk
et al., 2003) as the decision making paradigm. As introduced in Chapter 2 the mini-UG
allows for diﬀerent evaluations of the same oﬀer in terms of the intention behind it. Using the
paradigm, Falk et al. (2003) showed that an 8:2 oﬀer was more likely to be rejected when it is
paired with an absolutely fair oﬀer (refer back to Table 2.1 for the structure of the mini-UG).
Another notable observation from Falk et al.’s (2003) results is that there were still rejec-
tions of 8:2 oﬀers in the No-alternative and Hyper-unfair games, even though it was the only
or a better choice. Falk et al. took this as evidence of an eﬀect outcome, i.e., the distribu-
tion of a payoﬀ. Following this rational, as introduced in Chapter 2, we proposed that such
rejections, as opposed to objective evaluations of the situation, manifest the self-serving bias
in fairness perception (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997).
In particular, two opposing forces appear in the No-alternative, Hyper-fair and Hyper-
unfair games: aversion towards disadvantageous inequality and taking into account external
constraints on the proposer. We argued that the two forces provoke an emotion/deliberation
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conflict in the mini-UG. Specifically, disadvantageous inequality, which is emotionally salient,
makes the egocentric assessment of fairness impulsive and drives the decision of rejection.
In contrast, considering situational force for an 8:2 oﬀer is a cognitively controlled process
that gives rise to the decision to accept. As analysed in previously, three lines of research
in combination provide support for this proposition. First, research examining the role of
emotion in fairness perception suggests an association between negative emotion and self-
serving biased assessment of fairness (e.g., Guroglu et al., 2010; Hegtvedt & Killian, 1999).
Second, research on de-biasing techniques suggests that situational attribution can attenuate
the egocentric bias in fairness perception (Babcock et al., 1997; Leung et al., 2004). Third,
research on attribution shows that situational attribution is an eﬀortful, cognitively controlled
process (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1998; Lupfer et al., 1990). Building on these streams of research,
we proposed that the mini-UG paradigm involves an emotion/deliberation tension as described
above.
3.1.2 Mood and decision making in the mini-UG — the present study
The present study aimed to explore the influence of a sad mood on the responder’s decision
making in the mini-UG. As reviewed in Chapter 2, research has revealed a reliable link between
mood and processing style. Whereas positive mood associates with more heuristic, intuitive
processing, negative mood gives rise to more systematic, deliberative processing (e.g., Bless
et al., 1990, 1992, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Bodenhausen et al., 1994a; Forgas, 1991, 1998, 2007;
Forgas et al., ,2005; Isbell, 2004; Isbell et al., 2005; Mackie & Worth, 1989; de Vries et al.,
2008a, 2008b, 2012; Holland et al., 2012). The AAI approach posits that the diﬀerential eﬀects
of positive and negative moods on processing style are rooted in their informational value
regarding the current situation. Whereas positive mood signals that the current situation is
agreeable, negative mood informs that the surroundings are problematic; in turn, positive and
negative moods exert contrasting eﬀects on information processing (Schwarz & Clore, 2007).
As reviewed in Chapter 2, research on aﬀect and decision making has shown mood eﬀects
that are consistent with the AAI account (e.g., Bless et al., 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; Forgas,
1995, 2005; Isbell, 2004). Especially related to the present study, for decision making where
intuitive, emotion-driven responses and deliberative, thoughtful processing lead to contrasting
outcomes, a happy mood increases people’s reliance on intuitive, emotional responses whereas
a sad mood gives rise to deliberative decisions (de Vries et al., 2008b, 2012). This line of
research suggests that in the mini-UG, a sad mood would encourage the responder to think
more carefully before making decisions, and be less tempted to follow spontaneous, emotional
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responses. As a result, responders in a sad mood prior to the mini-UG should be less likely
to reject an 8:2 oﬀer in the Hyper-fair, No- alternative and Hyper-unfair games (referred to
as non-Fair games hereafter), where there are situational forces acting on the proposer.
This prediction also draws support from evidence of an enhancing eﬀect of sad mood on
situational attribution (Forgas, 1998b). Forgas (1998b) reasoned that because overcoming
the correspondence bias (i.e., the propensity to dispositional inference whilst insuﬃciently
attending to situational causes) demands eﬀortful processing (Gilbert et al., 1988; Gilbert &
Malone, 1995) and because negative mood makes people tend to rely on systematic, careful
processing, negative mood should reduce the extent of the correspondence bias; in contrast,
positive mood should heighten the extent of the correspondence bias because it makes people
rely more on heuristic and less attentive processing. Consistent with this prediction, Forgas
(1998b) found that, relative to neutral-mood participants, sad-mood ones showed the cor-
respondence bias to a lower degree, whereas happy-mood ones showed the bias to a higher
degree.6 This advanced influence of sad mood on situational attribution suggests that a sad
mood would promote responders’ consideration of external restraints and in turn reduce the
likelihood of rejecting 8:2 oﬀers in non-Fair games.
Evidence also comes from research on mood and JDM concerning justice (e.g., Inness,
Desmarais, & Day, 2005; Sinclair & Mark, 1991). Sinclair and Mark (1991) assessed partici-
pants’ attitudes to statements that embody a distribution- based (“equality”) principle (e.g.,
“there should be a minimum income guaranteed for everyone”) or a more individual-specific
(“equity”) principle (e.g., “each person’s income should be based on how hard he or she works
relative to others”). Results from the study showed that participants in a negative mood,
relative to those in an elated mood, were less subject to the equality principle. Inness et
al. (2005) obtained similar results while having participants make real allocations between
themselves and a working partner. Participants were informed about their contribution to the
task relative to their partner’s. Whereas a majority of neutral- or positive-mood participants
made equality-based allocations, most negative-mood participants made equity-based alloca-
tions, i.e., according to each person’s contribution. As argued by Sinclair and Mark (1991;
also quoted in Inness et al., 2005), the endorsement of the equity versus equality principle by
sad-mood participants could be attributed to the influence of negative mood on processing
6Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards (1993) also showed that a sadness induction led to a stronger situational
than individual attribution (Experiment 2), though it should be noted that this research was based on appraisal
theories of emotion. Specifically, the authors argued that because sadness is associated with the appraisal that
certain undesired results are caused by external factors beyond control, this emotion should lead to judgements
representing more weight on situational versus personal attribution.
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style. People in a negative mood are prompted to adopt a systematic, deliberative processing
style, thus focusing more on individuating but less on aggregate-level information (Isbell, 2004;
Isbell et al., 2005; Sinclair & Mark, 1991). In turn, those in a negative mood are prone to
making equity-based judgements and decisions. Following this rationale, a sad mood should
promote consideration of circumstantial information in the mini-UG. Hence, responders in
a sad mood, relative to those in a neutral aﬀective state, should be more attentive to the
justifiability of an 8:2 oﬀer in diﬀerent games, which also suggests fewer rejections of 8:2 oﬀers
in non-Fair games.
Moreover, in support of the idea that mood can aﬀect decision making in economic in-
teractions, recent research shows that incidental aﬀect can influence responders’ decisions in
the UG, although existing work mainly concerns specific emotions. For example, Harlé and
Sanfey (2007) showed that responders induced into sadness were more likely to reject unfair
oﬀers in the UG than those induced into a neutral aﬀective state. Moretti and di Pellegrino
(2010) found that, relative to participants exposed to neutral pictures, those exposed to dis-
gusting pictures showed a higher rejection rate for unfair oﬀers in the UG (but see Bonini
et al., 2011). According to these results that negative emotion inductions made responders’
decisions more severe in the UG, one might expect that negative mood could have a similar
eﬀect in the mini-UG. However, we reason that this prediction was not supported if taking
the inter-paradigm diﬀerence into account. The essential diﬀerence between the mini-UG and
UG is in light of whether there are conflicting factors in the game which aﬀect the responder’s
perception of an oﬀer. While the actual allocation in an oﬀer in the UG reveals the motive of
the proposer, there are cases in the mini-UG where evaluation of fairness cannot be entirely
based on the distribution. Thus, whereas the eﬀect of incidental aﬀect on responders’ decisions
in the UG can be argued to happen through modulating the emotional processing (Moretti
& di Pellegrino, 2010), the hypothesised eﬀect of a sad mood on responders’ decisions in the
mini-UG considers a trade-oﬀ between emotional and more cognitively controlled processing.
In summary, the AAI theorising (Schwarz, 2000, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) suggests
that responders in a sad mood tend to make more comprehensive decisions in the mini-UG.
Supportive evidence comes from empirical work showing the advanced eﬀect of a sad mood on
deliberative versus intuitive decision making (de Vries et al., 2012), on situational ascription
(Forgas, 1998b) and on equity versus equality endorsement (Inness et al., 2005; Sinclair &
Mark, 1991). Meanwhile, there is evidence that incidental aﬀect can influence socio-economic
decisions (Harlé & Sanfey, 2007; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010). Building on this theoretical
implication and empirical evidence, we predict that a sad mood in responders in the mini-
UG should be associated with a more comprehensive decision making pattern; specifically,
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responders in a sad mood should be less likely to reject 8:2 oﬀers in non-Fair games in the
mini-UG.
3.2 Study overview
Study 1 used a 2 (mood: neutral, sad) × 4 (game type: Fair, Hyper-fair, No-alternative,
Hyper-unfair) × 2 (split: 8:2, 6:4) factorial design. Mood was a between-subject variable and
game type a within-subject variable. The third variable, split, referred to the degree to which
the oﬀer was unfair, maintained across games. Split was a within-subject variable and had
two levels, 8:2 and 6:4 (8 or 6 for the proposer). The four game types were tested at each
level of split. Thus, two mini-UGs, i.e., the 8:2 mini-UG and 6:4 mini-UG, were tested (eight
game in total). We induced moods using movie clips and measured mood by assessing change
in general feeling after watching the movie clip and by using a 16-item mood questionnaire.
The 6:4 mini-UG was included as a control for responders’ intensive emotion in response
to an disadvantageous inequality, and thus a control for an emotion/deliberation conflict.
Existing data show that 5:5 and 6:4 oﬀers are almost evenly likely to be accepted in the UG
(Dunn, Makarova, Evan, & Clark, 2010; Ma et al., 2012; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010).7 It
thus seems that, when faced with such minor inequality, people might not feel emotionally
compelled to reject the oﬀer. This presumed absence of intense emotion suggests no or a very
low emotion/deliberation conflict when confronted with a 6:4 oﬀer. Accordingly, we predicted
that there would be no mood eﬀect on responders’ decisions in the 6:4 mini-UG.
3.3 Experimental hypotheses
Two predictions were most important for the purpose of Study 1. First, we predicted an inter-
action between game type and mood for responders’ decisions in the 8:2 mini-UG. Specifically,
we expected that the neutral and sad mood conditions would not diﬀer in response to an 8:2
oﬀer in the Fair game, given the salience of selfishness implied by the oﬀer. In contrast,
based on the rationale mentioned earlier, we expected that the sad mood induction would be
associated with fewer rejections of an 8:2 oﬀer than the neutral mood induction. Second, we
7To our knowledge, there has been no study purposely investigating the comparable likelihood of accept-
ing 5:5 and 6:4 oﬀers, presumably because most people have implicitly agree with this judgement. This is
manifested by such designs that 5:5 and 6:4 oﬀers were both treated as fair oﬀers (Harlé & Sanfey, 2007).
The studies we refer to here did no explicitly compare the two oﬀers either; however, the comparability of
acceptance rate can be easily derived from their published data.
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predicted that for all types of games in the 6:4 mini-UG, mood induction would not influence
the likelihood of rejecting a 6:4 oﬀer, because the slightly unequal split was not expected to
posit an intense emotion/deliberation conflict. The two predictions, in combination, predicted
a three-way (i.e., game type × mood × split ) interaction.
In addition, while less important for our purpose, we expected an eﬀect of game type that
was consistent with previous research results (Falk et al., 2003), such that the likelihood of
rejecting an 8:2 or 6:4 oﬀer would be higher in a Fair game than in non-Fair games. Finally,
we expected a split eﬀect such that the likelihood of rejecting 8:2 oﬀers would be higher than
that of rejecting 6:4 oﬀers.
3.4 Method
3.4.1 Participants
Twenty-three volunteers (11 females, 12 males; aged 9 to 44) participated in the experiment.
Nineteen of the 23 participants were students at the University of Glasgow. Participants were
recruited through posters across the university campus, an email list from the lab subject pool
or word of mouth. Because other studies in our lab involved strategic economic games (e.g.,
the UG and mini-UG), each participant was confirmed as not having participated in such
experiments run in the lab before (based on the lab database record). Each participant was
paid £1 as a show-up fee, and, on the top of this, received money earned from the mini-UGs.
One participant played the role of the proposer and 22 played the role of the responder. Of
the responders, 12 were randomly allocated into the neutral mood condition and 10 into the
sad mood condition.
3.4.2 Materials
3.4.2.1 Mood manipulation (mood induction and check of manipulation)
The movie clip used to induce a negative mood was edited from the movie “Sophie’s Choice”
(the length of the clip was 3 minutes, 38 seconds). The movie clip used to induce a neutral
mood was either a segment from a documentary about the history of the Christmas holiday
(5 minutes, 30 seconds) or a segment form a documentary about Roman history (5 minutes,
25 seconds).8
8We switched to Roman history clip after finding that the Christmas-history clip induced a slightly high
level of happiness (instead of a neutral mood) in the first six participants.
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The three clips were originally downloaded from the public video website Youtube and
were edited by the movie editing software MediaEdit. Participants wore headphones when
watching the movie clip.
To check the eﬀectiveness of the mood induction, we measured change in feeling after
watching the movie clip compared to before it, using an 11-point (from -5 to 5) scale. The
change-in-general-feeling questionnaire was as follows:
• On a scale from -5 to 5, please indicate how you felt after watching the movie clip:
-5 – The clip made me feel much worse than before watching it.
0 – There was no change in my mood.
5 – The clip made me feel much better than before watching it.
We also measured mood using a 16-item mood questionnaire; each emotional item was
measured on a 0-8 scale. The questionnaire asked participants how strongly they felt each
emotion when watching the movie clip:
• On a scale from 0 to 8, please indicate how strongly you felt x (x represented an
emotional item)
0 – Did not feel this emotion at all.
8 – Felt this emotion very strongly.
Of the 16 emotional items, two (sadness, pain) measured a sad mood and three (happi-
ness, amusement, contentment) measured a relative positive mood. Anger and disgust, as two
discrete emotions related to moral decisions, were also included because they are known to
influence economic decisions involving a concern for fairness (e.g., Chapman, Kim, Susskind,
& Anderson, 2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003). The remaining nine
emotions named in the questionnaire were: interest, fear, tension, relief, contempt, embarrass-
ment, confusion, surprise and arousal. These diverse emotions were involved to make it less
obvious to participants that the movie clips were intended to induce certain aﬀective states.
This questionnaire was based on that used by Gross and Levenson (1995).
3.4.2.2 The mini-UG stimuli
Table 3.1 shows the eight games included in the experiment. In each game, the amount to be
divided between the proposer and responder was £1. Allocations were made in 10p increments.
For example, an 8:2 oﬀer meant 80 pence for the proposer and 20 pence for the responder.
The 2nd and 3rd columns in the table correspond to the 8:2 mini-UG. In each of the four
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games, one option was an 8:2 oﬀer. The alternative options in the 8:2-Fair, -Hyper-fair and
-No-alternative games were the same as those in Falk et al. (2003). In the 8:2-Hyper-unfair
game, we used a 9:1 oﬀer instead of the 10:0 oﬀer in Falk et al.’s study. This was to ensure that
the comparison between options in each game was subject to the fact that the responder could
receive money from either option. If the alternative option in the 8:2-Hyper-unfair game was
10:0 oﬀer, due to the extremity of unfairness, the comparison between options in this game
could be more sensitive than that in other games. The two rightmost columns correspond to
the 6:4 mini-UG, in which the same option across games was a 6:4 oﬀer. Alternative oﬀers in
the 6:4-Fair, -Hyper-fair, -No-alternative and -Hyper-unfair games were 5:5, 4:6, 6:4 and 8:2.
Table 3.1: The 8:2 and 6:4 mini-UGs in the experiment.
Game Type
8:2 mini-UG 6:4 mini-UG
8:2 oﬀer The alternative option 6:4 oﬀer The alternative option
Fair 8:2 5:5 6:4 5:5
Hyper-fair 8:2 2:8 6:4 4:6
No-alternative 8:2 8:2 6:4 6:4
Hyper-unfair 8:2 9:1 6:4 8:2
Figure 3.1 shows the appearance of a game displayed on the computer screen during the
experiment. The two options available to the proposer were shown as Options A and B.
To minimise demand characteristics of the game, we described the roles of proposers and
responders as Participant 1 and Participant 2 ; we showed the label “Amount for Participant
1 (2)” on the left (right) top of the option rows. Option A was an 8:2 or 6:4 oﬀer in each
game (depending on the split version); thus, the value of x (shown in the Option A panel)
was 80 or 60. The value of y depended on both split version and game type. For example,
in the 8:2-Fair game, x was 80 and y was 50; in the 6:4-Hyper-fair game, x was 60 and y was 40.
Figure 3.1: Diagram of the appearance of one game displayed on the computer.
51
3.4.3 Procedure
Each participant was tested in an individual experiment booth. During the experiment,
participants were seated in front of an iMac computer terminal in the booth. On the wall inside
the booth, there was a switch button controlling a light in the room where the experimenter
stayed. Participants could call the experimenter for help using this equipment throughout the
experiment.
After arriving in the experiment booth, participants read a content form that stated that
the whole session included two “unrelated” experiments because the duration of each was short.
They were informed that “Experiment 1” investigated memory for feelings and “Experiment
2” involved several decision making tasks. The “first” and “second” experiments were in fact
the mood induction and mini-UG procedures. This guise was intended to reduce the demand
eﬀect of knowing that the experiment examined mood eﬀect on decision making. After signing
the consent form, participants read an instruction form explaining the whole procedure. They
were told that the task of Experiment 1 was to remember their feelings evoked by a movie clip
after 15 minutes, and that during this interval they would take part in Experiment 2. They
were told that doing Experiment 2 also ensured that all participants were occupied with the
same task while trying to remember their feelings. Participants were then instructed to learn
the mini-UG whilst being told that this prior learning was to ensure that they could finish
Experiment 2 within the 15-minute time window.
At the learning session, the mini-UG was described as a task of dividing Âč1 between
two participants. Participants were presented with the diagram as shown in Fig 3.1 as well
as details and rules of the mini-UG on the instruction form. At this learning stage, the dia-
gram showed only “x”, “100-x”, “y” and “100-y” to represent possible values instead of showing
specific numbers. This was to avoid participants making decisions prior to the mini-UG pro-
cedure. Participants were told that they had been randomly assigned as Participant 1 or 2.
They were told that they would perform the division task eight times and each time they
would be partnered with a diﬀerent person. After reading these instructions, participants an-
swered four questions on the computer (shown below) to check whether they had understood
the mini-UG properly. The four questions and correct answers (in parentheses) were as follows:
What is the least you can earn in one round? (0)
What is the least the other participant can earn in one round? (0)
What is the most you can earn in one round? (100 pence)
What is the most the other participant can earn in one round? (100 pence)
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Note that the above instruction was an attempt to ensure that participants’ decisions
were not aﬀected by the concern that they were repeatedly interacting with the same player.
Also, when playing the games within the following experimental session, participants were
not really playing with another person (which was explained during the debriefing session at
the end of the experiment).
Before participants started to watch the movie clip, they were reminded that after the
15-minute period they would be answering questions about their feelings when watching the
movie clip. Participants in the role of the responder watched either the negative- or neutral-
mood induction movie clip. The participant in the role of the proposer was randomly allocated
into the sad mood condition and watched the sad-mood movie clip.
The mini-UG procedure started immediately after the movie clip finished playing. The
eight games were presented in a random order. For the presentation of each game, the game
diagram was shown in the middle of the page, with x and y being specific values, according
to the game. On the top of the diagram were instructions for submitting responses. The
participant in the role of the proposer was asked to press “A” or “B” on the keyboard to
choose Option A or B. Participants in the role of the responder were asked to indicate their
decisions regarding both options in each game before learning the final oﬀers. Specifically,
they could chose Option A or B by pressing the “A” or “B” key, and could accept either
option by pressing “C” or reject both by pressing “D”. This strategic method prevented us
from missing small-likelihood events (e.g., an 8:2 oﬀer in the Fair game) and guaranteed the
collection of responders’ decisions to 8:2 or 6:4 oﬀers in all types of game. Previous research
indicates that responders’ decision patterns in the mini-UG did not diﬀer between such a
strategic data collection method and a sequential-response method (Ohmura & Yamagishi,
2005). Upon completion of the eighth (last) game, participants answered the change-in-
general-feeling question and the 16-item mood questionnaire in sequence. At the end of the
experiment, participants completed a questionnaire asking for demographic information (age,
nationality, profession). Finally, participants were carefully debriefed (both verbally and with
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a debriefing form) and paid.9
3.5 Results
Because the experiment purpose was to examine mood’s influence on responders’ decisions,
results were on data from the 22 participants in the role of the responder in the mini-UG.
3.5.1 Results for mood manipulation
3.5.1.1 Changes in general feeling
Figure 3.2 shows the change in general feeling after watching the movie clip. A positive value
shows the extent of feeling better, and a negative value the extent of feeling worse; the value
of zero means no change. The black and grey bars correspond to the sad and neutral mood
conditions. On average, participants in the sad mood condition felt worse (M = −2.60) after
watching the sad movie clip, whereas those in the neutral mood condition felt no diﬀerent
after watching the neutral mood clip (indicated by the error bars overlapping with zero).
Qualifying this observation, one-sample t-test revealed that change in general feeling was
significantly diﬀerent from zero in the sad mood condition (t(9) = 3.62, p = .006) but not
in the neutral mood condition (t(11) = 1.91, p = .082). In addition, Welch t-test revealed
that the sad movie clip induced a worse feeling than the neutral movie clip (t(17.12) = 4.05,
p < .001). Thus, the mood manipulation procedure had the desired eﬀect, as measured on the
change-in-general-feeling scale.
3.5.1.2 Emotion ratings
Figure 3.3 shows mean values on the positive and negative emotions rated in the mood ques-
tionnaire. The grey and white bars correspond to the neutral and sad mood conditions. For
the three emotions measuring a positive mood (happiness, amusement, contentment ; the left-
most three groups of bars), ratings were above zero but at levels lower than the midpoint
9Decision binding and earning calculation in the mini-UG: For each game, the proposer and responder’s
decisions were binding. That is, if the proposer chose, e.g., Option A, and the responder had previously
indicated he would accept the oﬀer, both sides received money as divided in Option A; otherwise, both
received nothing. Each party’s final payment from the mini-UGs was the sum of earnings from the eight
games. The one participant playing the role of the proposer was recruited later than those playing the role
of the responder; he was thus paired randomly with eight responders. Participants playing the role of the
responder were all paired with the same proposer. This was diﬀerent from the experimental instructions and
was thus explained in the debriefing.
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Figure 3.2: Mean values of change in general
feeling after the mood induction in the sad and
neutral mood conditions. The hash-markded
bars represent 95% confidence intervals (CIs).
of the scale in the neutral mood condition; they were non-significantly diﬀerent from zero in
the sad mood condition, as indicated by the zero-overlapping 95% CIs. Welch t-test showed
that all three positive emotions were significantly diﬀerent between the two mood conditions
(ps < .018), suggesting that participants in the sad mood condition felt less positive than
those in the neutral mood condition.
Of the eight negative emotions (see the rightmost eight groups of bars), six were rated
above the scale midpoint in the sad mood condition, whereas in the neutral mood condi-
tion, they were either undiﬀerentiated from zero or rated below the midpoint of the scale.
Welch t-test revealed that except for contempt and embarrassment (p = .218 and .444, re-
spectively), the negative emotions were rated significantly higher in the sad mood condition
than in the neutral mood condition (ps < .032). Despite the desirable eﬀect on the scales
of the two emotions measuring a sad mood (i.e., sadness and pain), the induction of a sad
mood lacked discreteness given the similar intensity reported for other negative emotions by
sad-mood-condition participants. Specifically, of the six negative emotions diﬀerentiated be-
tween the two mood conditions, sadness, pain, anger, disgust and tension were induced at an
indistinguishable level within the sad mood condition (one-way repeated measures ANOVA:
F (5,45) = 2.89, p = .024; ⌘2 = .05; pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed
only a marginally significant diﬀerence between sadness and fear, p = .057). These results
indicate that the worse feeling reported after watching the sad movie clip was induced by
multiple negative emotions, including both sadness and those that are qualitatively diﬀerent
from sadness. More importantly, this leads to the issue that qualitatively diﬀerent negative
emotions might have counteracted in aﬀecting responders’ decisions in the mini-UG. I will
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address this problem later.
Figure 3.3: Mean ratings on the postive and negative emotions. The hash-marked bars represent 95%
CIs. Emotions labeled on the x-axis, from left to right, are: happiness, amusement, contentment,
sadness, pain, anger, disgust, contempt, embarrassment, fear and tension.
3.5.2 Results for decisions in the mini-UGs
Figure 3.4 shows the proportions of 8:2 (left panel) or 6:4 (right panel) oﬀers rejected in the
four types of game in the two mood conditions. The dark and light grey bars correspond
to the neutral and sad mood conditions. In each panel, the bar groups, from left to right,
correspond to the Fair, Hyper-fair, No- alternative and Hyper-unfair games (labelled on the
figure as “F”, “HF”, “NA” and “NU”). Comparison of the two panels shows the expected pattern
that rejection rate was on average lower for 6:4 than 8:2 oﬀers (20% vs. 49%). Also, in both
mini-UGs, the rejection rate was highest in the Fair game, where a 5:5 oﬀer was available,
and was lower in non-Fair games, where there were situational forces. This is consistent
with previous research (Falk et al., 2003; Sutter, 2007). It is also notable that the diﬀerence
between the 6:4 non-Fair games and the 6:4-Fair game (45% vs. 12%) was greater than that
between the 8:2 non-Fair games and the 8:2- Fair game (63% vs. 43%). This comparison
indirectly but essentially suggests an eﬀect of outcome, i.e., distribution of a payoﬀ. That
is, in comparable conditions in terms of situational force, a seemingly unfair oﬀer was more
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likely to be accepted when the disadvantage was smaller.
More important for our purpose is the comparison between the two mood conditions across
game types in each mini-UG. We first look at the 8:2 mini-UG panel. Based on research
showing a facilitating eﬀect of negative mood on deliberative processing, we predicted that
the likelihood of rejecting an 8:2 oﬀer in the non-Fair games would be smaller among sad- than
neutral-mood participants. However, the present data show quite the opposite. It seems that
a greater proportion of sad-mood than neutral-mood participants rejected an 8:2 oﬀer in the
Fair, Hyper-fair and No-alternative games, and the two mood conditions were similar in term
of the proportion of rejecting an 8:2 oﬀer in the Hyper-unfair game. A very similar pattern
was observed for the 6:4 mini-UG (right panel). Considering the diminishing eﬀect shown by
the 6:4 versus 8:2 split, this higher proportion of sad-mood participants rejecting 6:4 oﬀers
implies that sad-mood participants might be more sensitive to inequality than neutral-mood
ones. In this respect, the sad mood condition shows an overall more dominant outcome eﬀect
than the neutral mood condition.
Figure 3.4: Proportion of 8:2 oﬀers rejected as a function of game type and mood condition
Participants in both mood conditions responded to all games; thus, decision data were
both binary and within-subject correlated. Also, none of those in the neutral mood condition
made a rejection decision in the 6:4 Hyper-fair game. This means we had a “quasicomplete”
issue (Albert & Anderson, 1984): there would be an empty cell if we drew a three-way
table implied by the three experimental factors (i.e., split, game type and mood). Since the
three-way interaction was within our interest, the separation caused a problem in parameter
estimation using archetypical logistic regression: the coeﬃcient for the three-way interaction
and its standard error would be infinite. Considering this technical problem as well as the
feature of data, we conducted Bayesian generalised linear mixed model analysis using a Markov
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Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling method. Generally, this approach follows the rationale
of Bayesian estimation, whereby a parameter in a model is given its prior distribution first,
representing a prior belief of the parameters. With data at hand, a posterior distribution of the
parameter is then obtained through computation following Bayes’ rule (for a comprehensive
introduction, see, e.g., Kruschke, 2011). The posterior represents an updated belief about
the parameter given the evidence (i.e., data). Thus, the Bayesian estimation of a parameter
upon its posterior is assessed in terms of credibility instead of significance in the conventional
“null hypothesis significance testing” (NHST; Kruschke, 2011, 2012). The MCMC sampling
is performed to generate a large representative sample of the posterior distribution, given the
prior and the available data.10
Our model was a binomial mixed-eﬀect model, including split, game type and mood as
fixed factors, and participants as a random factor. All the three fixed factors were set as cate-
gorical variables, with 8:2 split, Fair game and neutral mood condition as reference categories,
respectively. The model estimated coeﬃcients for the three fixed factors and all implied in-
teractions. It used the logit link function. For each fixed eﬀect, the prior distribution was a
normal distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of (1+⇡2￿3); this variance was chosen
to ensure the prior distribution was flat on the probability scale (Hadfiled, 2010). The prior
distribution for the variance-covariance matrix of residuals and that for random eﬀect were
inverse-Wishart distributions (V = 1, nu = .002). The MCMC sampling was with 30,000
burn-in steps,11 1,000,000 iteration steps and a thin rate of 10 (i.e., one of every ten steps
was saved). So, for each fixed eﬀect, we obtained a 100,000 sized sample of its posterior
distribution. The analysis was conducted using the MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield,
2010)
Figure 3.5 shows posterior distributions of coeﬃcients tested in the model above. The
coeﬃcients were in terms of log odds ratio and were relative to a certain reference level (or a
combination of reference levels). Thus, the top left panel, showing the intercept, corresponds
to the 8:2 Fair game in the neutral mood condition. The “Hyper-fair” panel (Row 2, Column
1) corresponds to the eﬀect of the 8:2 Hyper-fair game relative to the 8:2 Fair game in the
neutral mood condition. The “6:4 Game” panel (Row 1, Column 2) corresponds to the eﬀect
of the 6:4 Fair game relative to the 8:2 Fair game in the neutral mood condition. The “Sad”
10Introduction of the technique is far beyond the scope of the thesis. See Gelman, Carlin, Stern & Rubin
(2004) and Kruschke (2011) for comprehensive introductions.
11Initial steps of an MCMC sampling chain are usually not stable. Burn-in refers to discarding these initial
steps.
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panel (Row 1, Column 3) corresponds to the eﬀect of the 8:2 Fair game in the sad mood
condition relative to the 8:2 Fair game in the neutral mood condition. The remaining panels
correspond to non-additive (i.e., interactive) eﬀects of factors concerned.
In each panel, the mean of the distribution is shown at the top of the histogram. The
green text below shows the proportion of the distribution that was smaller or larger than
zero. The bold line at the bottom shows the 95% High Density Interval (HDI), with its range
labeled at each end of the line. The 95% HDI is an interval of the distribution in which
each point has a credibility level higher than 5%. If the 95% HDI contains zero, it means
that zero is more than 5% believable and is counted as a credible value of the estimate. This
is shown to be the case in all panels in Fig 3.5, suggesting that for all these coeﬃcients,
zero cannot be excluded as an incredible estimate. However, for  64Split (Row 1, Column
2) and  No−alternative (Row 3, Column 1), zero can be considered as an incredible estimate
if one slightly increased the credibility level to 6% (corresponding ranges of 94% HDI were[−4.78,−.027] and [−4.65,−.028] for  64Split and  No−alternative, respectively).
Figure 3.5: Posterior distributions of coeﬃcients in the binomial mixed-eﬀect model for decision data.
The above results suggest 1) that the likelihood of rejecting unfair oﬀers in Hyper-fair and
Hyper-unfair games was not credibly diﬀerent from that in the Fair game, and 2) that, more
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importantly for our purpose, the likelihood of rejection was not credibly diﬀerent between
the sad and neutral mood conditions in any tested game. Figure 3.6 demonstrates the latter
point more directly. The figure shows the posterior distributions of the diﬀerences in rejec-
tion likelihood between sad and neutral mood conditions in the eight games. The top and
bottom panels correspond to 8:2 and 6:4 games. Each panel presents a 95% HDI including
zero, suggesting, again, the two mood conditions were not credibly diﬀerent in terms of the
likelihood of rejecting an unfair oﬀer. (a same pattern was revealed by Fisher Exact Test on
each game; see Table 3.2). While the results for the 8:2 Fair game and the 6:4 mini-UG were
consistent with our initial hypotheses, those for the 8:2 non-Fair games were not.
Figure 3.6: Posterior distributions of the diﬀerence in rejection likelihood between the sad and neutral
mood conditions.
Nevertheless, for the 8:2 non-Fair games, the posterior distributions show a trend that
rejection of unfair oﬀer was more likely in the sad mood condition than in the neutral one.
Considering the small sample size, we conducted a power analysis with respect to the hy-
potheses that rejection was more likely in the sad than neutral mood condition in the 8:2
Hyper-unfair, 8:2 No-alternative and 8:2 Hyper-unfair games, respectively. The power analy-
sis used the method proposed by Kruschke (2011, 2012) in the Bayesian framework, by which
the power was approximated from the posterior distribution of parameters rather than from
point estimates as in NHST. The procedure was as follows: 1) data simulation based on the
posterior estimates, with a planned number of subjects; 2) running the Bayesian binomial
regression, as above, on the simulated data; 3) assessing whether the hypothesis was met;
statistically, the hypothesis would be that the smaller end of the 95% HDI was larger than
zero; 4) repeat steps 1-3 many times (Nt = 200 in our analysis). Using this method, power
referred to the proportion of times the hypothesis was met. When the planned sample size
in Step 2 imitated the actual sample size in this experiment (Nneutral = 12, Nsad = 10), the
power was zero for the 8:2 Hyper-fair and Hyper-unfair games, and the power for the 8:2
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Table 3.2: Results of Fisher Exact Test (two-tailed) on comparisons of proportion of 8:2 or 6:4 oﬀers
rejected between the neutral and sad mood conditions.
Game Type 8:2 mini-UG 6:4 mini-UG
Fair .675 .691
Hyper-fair .691 .195
No-alternative .378 .571
Hyper-unfair 1 .571
No-alternative game was rather low (0.5%, i.e., only 1 of the 200 simulations achieved the
hypothesis). Simulating data with a large sample size (Nneutral = 200, Nsad = 200) did not
increase the power of the experiment for any of the three games. This extremely low/zero
power of the experiment gives consideration to problems of both the initial hypothesis of
Study 1 and the experimental design. I will discuss the two aspects in the discussion section
and the thesis discussion chapter.
Despite the above results, the sad mood condition shows an overall higher rejection rate
than the neutral mood condition (40% (32￿80) vs. 30% (29￿96)), giving rise to the idea that
the sad mood induction increased one’s sensitivity to distributional inequality. A straightfor-
ward implication would be that sad-mood responders’ decisions were relatively insensitive to
intention variation across diﬀerent types of games. Broadly, this had been met by the above
results of non-significant eﬀects of game type and mood-game interaction.
To further test for the proposed insensitivity to intention, we performed Cochran Q test
on decisions to 8:2 oﬀers in the 8:2 mini-UG and on 6:4 oﬀers in the 6:4 mini-UG. The null
hypothesis was that rejection likelihood was the same across diﬀerent types of games. Analyses
were performed for each mood condition. In the neutral mood condition, only for the 6:4
mini-UG was there a statistically reliable diﬀerence in rejection likelihood across game types
(Q(3) = 12.00, p = .007). Pairwise comparison showed the rejection rate was lower in each of
the 6:5 non-Fair games than in the 6:4-Fair game (ps < .032). In contrast, the likelihood of
rejecting an 8:2 oﬀer did not diﬀer between games in the 8:2 mini-UG (Q(3) = 3.75, p = .273).
In the sad mood condition, responders’ decisions were insensitive to intention in both mini-
UGs (8:2 mini- UG: Q(3) = 3.74, p = .290; 6:4 mini-UG: Q(3) = 3.6, p = .308).
These results have two important implications. First, the disparity between the two mini-
UGs in the neutral mood condition essentially suggests a dominant role of payoﬀ distribution
in responders’ decisions. In other words, responders might not be as concerned with the
varying justifiability of an oﬀer as presumed. In this respect, responders’ decisions could have
been chiefly based on emotional processing. Second, and accordingly, sad-mood participants’
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indistinguishable decisions among 6:4 games are in line with research illustrating the influence
of negative aﬀect on strategic economic decision through modulating emotional processing
(Harlé & Sanfey, 2007; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010), suggesting an increased sensitivity to
distributional inequality. However, this pattern was possilbly due to that both sadness and
anger/disgust were induced by watching the “sad” movie clip.
3.5.3 Mediation analysis for an indirect eﬀect of mood induction
As seen in the results section for mood rating, six negative emotions, i.e., sadness, pain,
anger, disgust, fear and tension, were rated significantly higher in the sad mood condition
than in the neutral mood condition. Meanwhile, these six negative emotions were induced
indistinguishably within the sad mood condition. Although sadness was expected to decrease
rejections of (highly) unfair oﬀers, as in our initial hypothesis, anger and disgust would be
expected to have an opposite eﬀect, based on both the UG research and the “appraisal-
tendency” framework for the influence of incidental emotions on decision making (Han, Lerner,
& Keltner, 2007; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Both anger and disgust
have been shown to be associated with rejections in the archetypical UG (Chapman et al.,
2009; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Sanfey et al., 2003). Moreover, the “appraisal-tendency”
framework posits that an incidental emotion aﬀects subsequent decisions by carrying over
appraisals characterising the emotion. Anger is associated with the appraisal of certainty
and individual control over the situation (Han et al., 2007); it would in turn give rise to
dispositional attribution and punitive decisions (Small & Lerner, 2008). In support of the
proposition, research has shown that angry people tend to emphasise dispositional versus
situational factors when making responsibility attribution (Keltner et al., 1993; Small &
Lerner, 2008) and that preceding anger can lead to greater punitiveness in subsequent but
irrelevant scenarios (Goldberg, Lerner, & Tetlock, 1999). The contrast between sadness and
anger/disgust in terms of their influences on responders’ decisions suggests that these emotions
might have counteracted each other, which resulted in a null eﬀect of the mood induction.
To examine this possibility, we conducted a multiple mediation analysis in which the indirect
eﬀect of mood induction was modeled to be through the mediation of diﬀerent emotions
operating in parallel.
To begin with the emotion data, Table 3.3 shows pairwise correlations between the six
negative emotions that were reported higher in the sad mood condition than the neutral
mood condition. The star symbol indicates that bootstrap (resampling time: 25,000) 95% CI
of a correlation coeﬃcient does not contain zero, thus suggesting the statistical significance
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of the correlation (though this inference should still be taken with caution given the small
sample size). Sadness, pain, fear and tension were significantly correlated with each other
and the correlations were of at least moderate levels. We thus created a composite variable
by averaging the four items (called sad mood score).12 For anger and disgust, although
their correlation was not significant, given the sizeable coeﬃcient and their lexical closeness
(Marzillier & Davey, 2004; Nabi, 2002) when responding to moral issues,13 we also averaged
them into a single item (called averse). Sad mood score and averse were then entered into
the following mediation analysis.
Table 3.3: Intercorrelations between the six negative emotions being diﬀerentiated between the two
mood conditions.
sadness pain anger disgust fear
sadness
pain 0.69*
anger -0.03 0.19
disgust 0.00 0.16 0.70
fear 0.62* 0.75* 0.27 0.15
tension 0.58* 0.74* 0.20 0.44 0.58*
Figure 3.7 illustrates the model we proposed when running the mediation analysis. The
model integrated an indirect eﬀect of the sad (relative to neutral) mood induction on respon-
ders’ rejections through the elicitation of a sad mood and an emotion of aversion (correspond-
ing to the sad mood score and averse mentioned above), with the two mediatiors operating
in parallel. In addition, the model specified the path from elicited emotions to responders’
rejections as moderated by the extent of unfairness (i.e. split version). For the independent
variable (i.e., mood condition) and moderator, we set the neutral mood condition and the
6:4 split as the reference level, respectively. We used the bootstrapping method to do the
statistic test, with the bootstrap percentile 95% CI of an indirect eﬀect as the inferential
statistic (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; Hayes & Scharkow, in press). That is, if the bootstrap
95% CI does not overlap with zero, the indirect eﬀect was significant. We did the analysis
12Although fear and sadness are, strictly, qualitatively diﬀerent emotions, both of them are associated with
the appraisals of uncertainty and a lack of control over the current situation. Thus both sadness and fear
would be expected to decrease responders’ rejections and are comparable in terms of the direction of eﬀect.
13In the current experiment, anger and disgust were induced perhaps by the racist content contained in the
movie clip.
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with 5,000 resamples. The mediation analysis was done using the PROCESS macro written
by Hayes (2013) for the statistical analysis software SPSS.
Figure 3.7: Illustration of the moderated mediation model tested here.
Table 3.4 shows results from the multiple mediation analysis. In the upper panel, each
row corresponds to the eﬀect at a specific path in the model. As shown by the t/Z 14 column,
the paths from mood induction to a sad mood and an aversion emotion were significant, so
was the eﬀect of split version on the decision of rejection. No other paths were significant.
This is broadly consistent with the results from the hierarchical regression reported earlier.
The lower panel shows specific indirect eﬀects of mood induction through sad mood or
averse, for either 8:2 or 6:4 games. The rightmost columns show corresponding bootstrap
95% CIs. All these CIs contain zero, suggesting the none of these specific indirect eﬀects
was significant. Thus, although we suspected that the null eﬀect of the mood induction
was caused by counteractive operations of sadness and anger/disgust, the results from the
mediation analysis suggest that incidental aﬀect induced in the current study did not influence
responders’ decisions.
3.6 Discussion
Study 1 aimed at investigating the eﬀect of a sad mood on socio-economic decision making us-
ing the mini-UG setting. We reasoned that the mini-UG incorporates an emotion/deliberation
dilemma, such that rejecting a stingy oﬀer is emotion-laden, whereas accepting it, considering
the situational constraints, results from more cognitively controlled processing. Building on
14Z for the logistic regression model with the responder’s rejection as the dependent variable.
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Table 3.4: Output of the mediation analysis.
B SE t/Z
mood induction → sad mood 3.38 0.27 12.67***
mood induction → averse 3.44 0.33 10.51***
split → rejection 1.67 0.58 2.89**
sad mood → rejection 0.17 0.14 1.25
(sad mood × split) → rejection -0.22 0.17 -1.27
averse → rejection -0.08 0.12 -0.70
(averse × split) → rejection 0.13 0.16 0.81
mood induction → rejection (direct eﬀect) 0.36 0.49 0.73
Specific indirect eﬀects, conditional on split version
B CI low bound CI high bound
sad mood, 8:2 games -0.16 -0.97 0.61
sad mood, 6:4 games 0.59 -0.42 1.53
averse, 8:2 games 0.15 -0.46 0.89
averse, 6:4 games -0.29 -1.14 0.65
Note: *** p < .001; ** p < .01
the theoretical position and empirical evidence suggesting that a sad mood would promote
a more comprehensive evaluation of the situation, we hypothesised that the sad mood in-
duction would be associated with a lower rejection rate for an 8:2 oﬀer in non-Fair games of
the 8:2 mini-UG. Inconsistent with this prediction, there was no systematic diﬀerence in the
likelihood of rejecting an 8:2 oﬀer between mood induction conditions in non-Fair games. In
contrast, our data presented an overall stronger tendency for sad-mood-conditioned partici-
pants to reject 8:2 oﬀers. This descriptively noticeable pattern was then considered with the
deficiency of the mood manipulation: the “sad” movie clip also resulted a strong induction
of anger and disgust. Based on neuroeconomic evidence and the appraisal-tendency frame-
work for emotional eﬀect on decision making, we suspected that anger and disgust could have
counteracted sadness in terms of their eﬀects on responders’ decisions. However, the follow-
ing mediation analysis suggests that neither sadness nor anger/disgust influenced responders’
decisions in the mini-UG. These results are considered below in relation to outcome salience
in the mini-UG.
3.6.1 Re-examination of the mini-UG paradigm
More important for our purpose, the null eﬀect of a sad mood relative to a neutral mood runs
counter to the claim that a sad mood would promote responders’ consideration of the varying
intentions in the mini-UG. We think the indistinguishable decisions between neutral and sad
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mood inductions need to be considered with the lack of game type eﬀect in the 8:2 mini-UG.
A particularly noteworthy result was that, whereas neutral-mood participants rejected an
8:2 oﬀer with indistinguishable likelihood across diﬀerent types of game in the 8:2 mini-UG,
their rejection of a 6:4 oﬀer was significantly less likely in 6:4 non-Fair games than in the 6:4-
Fair game. Admittedly, the null eﬀect of game type in the 8:2 mini-UG might be due to the
small sample size and certain aspects of the experimental procedure. A possible problem was
that participants had learnt the game at the beginning of the experiment. Although at that
point games were presented using letters instead of exact numbers, so as to avoid participants’
encounters with the tested games, participants might still have made punitive decisions ahead
of time for unequal oﬀers. However, this intervention should be consistent for both the 8:2
and 6:4 mini-UGs and thus cannot be a plausible explanation for the discrepancy between
them in terms of the eﬀect of game type or intention. Rather, as noted earlier, this disparity
suggests an impressively dominant role of outcome relative to intention in directing decisions
within socio-economic interactions. Whereas an 8:2 oﬀer was uniformly rejected regardless
of positive intention, a 6:4 oﬀer was accepted in comparable situations but rejected only
when the fairest choice was accessible. Crucially, this calls into question whether the mini-
UG paradigm eﬀectively embraces an emotion/deliberation dilemma allowing for examining
mood eﬀect on the trade-oﬀ between emotional and cognitively controlled processing in making
socio-economic decisions.
Our initial construal of the mini-UG was that responders were faced with a dilemma in
that they perceived no bad intentions whilst receiving disadvantageous inequality. Implicit in
this construal are assumptions (1) that both payoﬀ distribution and intention matter for reci-
procity decisions, and (2) that both factors, when working divergently, influence the decisions
competitively. The first assumption, as noted earlier, is supported by substantial evidence
(e.g., Blount, 1995; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008; Falk et al., 2003; Ohmura & Yamagishi,
2005; Sutter, 2007). However, upon inspection, the second assumption is challenged by re-
search demonstrating a dominant role of payoﬀ distribution in reciprocity behaviour (Bolton,
Brandts, & Ockenfels, 1998; Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Stanca, 2010; Xiao &
Bicchieri, 2010), which suggests an issue regarding the appropriateness of the experimental
paradigm.
There is evidence that intention and intentionality, compared to payoﬀ distribution, barely
account for reciprocity behaviour. Bolton et al. (1998), for example, implemented a two-party
game similar to the mini-UG, where Player 1’s (in a similar role to the proposer) intention
could be inferred by comparing chosen options with alternative ones. The authors found that
Player 2’s (in a similar role to the responder) preference for payoﬀ distribution could explain
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the size of their reciprocity nearly perfectly, whereas Player 1’s intention had almost no eﬀect.
Stanca (2010) showed a dominant influence of outcome over intentionality on positive
reciprocity using a “gift-exchange game”. The gift-exchange game involved two players, each
of whom was endowed with 20 tokens. Player 1 (the first mover) chose A ∈ 0,1, . . . ,20 to
send to Player 2 (the second mover), who then received triple the amount of A (3A) and
chose B ∈ 0,1, ...,20 as a return; Player 1 was then reimbursed with 3B. Stanca’s design
implemented the gift-exchange game in four conditions that were diﬀerentiated in term of the
presence or absence of Player 1’s cost (his gifting amount could be reimbursed or not) and
Player 1’s intentionality (gifting amount was issued by himself or randomly). For example, in
the condition where Player 1’s gifting amount was chosen randomly and this amount was re-
imbursed to Player 1 after Player 2 received the gift, there was neither cost nor intentionality.
By examining the correlation between Player 1’s gifting and Player 2’s reciprocity amounts,
Stanca (2010) found that the extent to which Player 2 reciprocated Player 1’s gift was signif-
icantly higher in the condition involving only Player 1’s cost than in the condition involving
neither cost nor intentionality (“NO-CI” condition). In contrast, the correlations did not diﬀer
between the condition involving only Player 1’s intentionality and the NO-CI condition, thus
highlighting a primary role of outcome over intentionality in positive reciprocity.
Xiao and Bicchieri (2010) extended this line of research and examined relative eﬀects of
outcome and intentionality under circumstances where positive reciprocity runs counter to
equal allocation, which was also the case in the mini-UG. The authors employed two versions
of the “trust game”. In the baseline version, a truster and a trustee were both endowed with
40 tokens. The truster decided to send 0 or 10 tokens to the trustee, who then received triple
the sent amount. The trustee could in turn reimburse the truster B ∈ 0,5,10, . . . ,30. The
“asymmetry” version of the trust game was the same as the baseline game except that the
truster was endowed with 80 tokens, and the trustee with 40. Thus, in the asymmetry trust
game, if the truster sent 10 tokens to the trustee, any return would result in fewer earnings
for the trustee compared to the truster. In short, any degree of positive reciprocity would
cause disadvantageous inequality to the trustee (Xiao & Bicchieri, 2010). Data from both
trustees and trusters were illustrative of a central position of payoﬀ distribution in guiding
reciprocity behaviour. Whereas 55% of trustees in the baseline trust game returned no less
than 10 tokens, only 26% did so in the asymmetry condition. Meanwhile, whereas 77% of
trusters in the baseline condition expected that the trustee would return no less than 10
tokens, only 22% in the asymmetry-endowment condition reported the same expectation. In
line with Xiao and Bicchieri’s (2010) findings, Cushman et al. (2009) showed that generosity
does not matter in the presence of disadvantageous outcome.
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Taken together, the research discussed above suggests that responders in the mini-UG
might not, or might to a very low extent, take proposers’ intention into consideration at the
time of decision making. It is thus plausible that the presumed conflict between emotion-
compelling and more reasoning-based decisions in the mini-UG, even while indeed existing,
is not so intensive as to posit a dilemma at the moment. Rather, responders could have
made decisions largely based on the payoﬀ distribution. Therefore, it is very likely that we
encountered a floor eﬀect with respect to the extent to which a responder’s decision concerns
intention.
Taking into consideration the non-salient eﬀect of intention on positive reciprocity may
assist in reconciling the inconsistency of our results with those of Forgas (1998b), Sinclair
and Mark (1991) and Inness et al. (2005). In Forgas’ (1998b) study, participants received
information that an essay-writer argued for an unpopular position as an assignment (thus
doing so under situational force). Forgas (1998b) found that participants induced in a sad
mood, relative to those in a neutral or happy mood, were less likely to attribute the un-
popular position to the writer’s dispositional attitude, suggesting a diminishing eﬀect of sad
mood on dispositional versus situational attributions. Unlike responders in the mini-UG, who
needed to infer a situational force, participants in Forgas’ (1998b) study were explicitly in-
formed of the external constraint. In addition, as argued by Avramova et al. (2010), Forgas’
impression-making task itself might have facilitated the assessment of all given information.
Thus, Forgas’ (1998b) paradigm could have more easily activated the consideration of situ-
ational constraints than the mini-UG, leaving a space for mood to exert processing eﬀects
on attribution. Likewise, participants in Sinclair and Mark (1991) were presented with both
equality- and equity-based claims, and those in Inness et al. (2005) were informed of the exact
diﬀerence in performance between themselves and working partners. Both procedures could
have facilitated participants’ consideration of external factors. Thus, these studies might
better reflect the eﬀect of mood on the weight of situational information.
When considering the inconsistency between the current study and that by Harlé and
Sanfey (2007), we should take into account the inter-study diﬀerence in light of the presence
and quality of intentionality. Harlé and Sanfey (2007) measured the eﬀect of sadness on
responders’ decisions in the UG where the proposer’s oﬀer clearly revealed his intentionality.
As shown by Cushman et al. (2009), when payoﬀ distribution and intentionality converge,
intentionality matters only when both factors are of negative quality (though it has a smaller
eﬀect than payoﬀ distribution). Thus, whereas a responder’s rejection of an 8:2 oﬀers in
the mini-UG (non-Fair games) is in response to the disadvantageous inequality, the same
move in the UG is in response to a negative intentionality in addition to the inequality. This
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additional dimension in the UG may explain the increased rejection rate for unfair oﬀers in the
sadness condition reported by Harlé and Sanfey (2007). As also argued by the authors, selfish
intentionality conveyed by unfair oﬀers in the UG might be exacerbated for sad participants
who had a more “pessimistic” perception of the scenario (Harlé & Sanfey, 2007). Indeed,
research has suggested that people in a negative mood are more sensitive to oﬀensiveness
(Forgas, 1998a).
An additional question casting doubt on the validity of the mini-UG in presenting an
emotion/deliberation dilemma is the extent to which the first mover’s intention is perceived
as kind when his action is expected to be positively reciprocated. Stanca et al. (2009), in ad-
dressing this question, showed a negative eﬀect of strategic motivation on positive reciprocity.
The authors manipulated the involvement of strategic space in the gift-exchange game as
described above, where Player 1 can gift Player 2 tokens at Stage 1, and Player 2 can recip-
rocate the gift by sending back tokens at Stage 2. The study included two conditions. In the
standard condition, both players were fully informed of the exchange-procedure before Stage
1. In the “no-information” condition, both players were informed of Stage 2 only after Stage
1 was over. Thus, in the no-information condition, Player 1’s oﬀer revealed exclusively his
kind intentionality (Stanca et al., 2009). In contrast, in the standard condition, one cannot
rule out that, e.g., Player 1 purposely made a particular oﬀer in the hope of a higher return.
Stanca et al. (2009) showed that people are indeed sensitive to such a perception of strategic
motivation. In particular, when receiving the same amount of tokens, Player 2 gifted back
Player 1 more in the no-information condition than in the standard condition, suggesting a
negative eﬀect of strategic motivation on positive reciprocity.
Likewise, the responder in the mini-UG might also have perceived a strategic motivation
of the proposer, possibly in a worse way. The responder might construct the belief that the
proposer chose an 8:2 oﬀer with a positive anticipation. Further, given the advantageous
inequality for the proposer, the responder might even think that their opponent was more
empowered to achieve a self-desired outcome. As argued by Alicke (2000), when final outcome
can be perceived as being consistent with the actor’s desire, concerns for his lack of control over
the situation are discounted. In line with this argument, Leslie, Knobe, and Cohen (2006)
also showed that “foreseeable” bad side eﬀects could even be attributed to intentionality.
These possible complications concerning intention inference mean that the mini-UG might be
unreliable to represent the emotion/deliberation dilemma in the way we proposed.
In sum, closer inspection of the mini-UG suggests that this experimental paradigm, al-
though it conceptually incorporates an emotion/deliberation dilemma, may be unable to ef-
fectively do so when it involves real decision making. In the following studies in this thesis, we
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switched to the trolley-problem-like moral dilemma paradigm. The moral dilemma paradigm,
as seen in Chapter 2, posits a dilemma where the emotional cost of a situation-responsive
choice indeed has as material payoﬀ (i.e., the welfare of the majority); it is thus assumed to
more eﬀectively incorporate an emotional/deliberation dilemma.
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Chapter 4
Exploring the Influence of Mood on
Moral Judgement (Study 2)
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 The dual-process model for moral judgement
As reviewed in Chapter 2, Greene et al. (2001, 2004, 2008), building on their studies on moral
dilemmas exemplified by the trolley problem (Thompson, 1985), have developed a dual-process
model for moral judgement. This dual- process model posits two dissociative, conflicting types
of processing: the emotional processing that drives deontological/non-utilitarian judgements
(non-UJs) and the cognitively controlled processing that gives rise to utilitarian judgements
(UJs). Support for the model comes from, on the one hand, association between emotion and
non-UJs and, on the other hand, association between cognitive eﬀort and UJs. The former
is evidenced in such findings as that non-UJs show a greater activity in emotion-associative
brain regions than UJs (Greene et al., 2004), and that deficit in emotional processing results
in a higher likelihood of UJs (Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez et al., 2005). The latter is revealed
in studies showing that brain areas implemented in cognitive control are more activated for
UJs than non-UJs (Greene et al., 2004), that cognitive load selectively interrupts UJs (Greene
et al., 2008), that working memory ability is positively predictive of UJs (Moore et al., 2008),
and that experimentally induced or dispositional tendency of reflective processing increases
UJs (Paxton et al., 2012)
4.1.2 Influence of incidental aﬀect on moral judgement
The involvement of emotion in forming moral judgements inspires research that looks at and
also shows eﬀects of incidental aﬀect on moral judgement. Schnall et al. (2008), for example,
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found that extraneous disgust increased the likelihood of non-UJs in the footbridge dilemma.
In a similar vein, Wheatley and Haidt (2005) showed that “hypnotic” disgust (i.e., participants
were asked to generate a feeling of disgust when reading certain words embedded into moral-
related vignettes) made moral judgement more severe, although their stimuli were diﬀerent
from moral dilemmas exemplified by the trolley problem. More relevant to the current study
is that by Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006), who showed that a happy mood increased the rate of
UJs in the footbridge dilemma; however, no mood eﬀect was observed for the switch dilemma
(called the “trolley dilemma” in their study).
4.1.3 Mood and moral judgement — the present study
To explain this selective eﬀect of positive mood on UJs in the moral personal (MP) dilemma,
Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) provided the explanation that the temporary positive feeling
eliminated the otherwise strong aversion caused by the MP dilemma; on the other hand,
the moral impersonal (MI) dilemma, i.e., the switch dilemma, did not elicit a comparative
emotional negativity and thus was not influenced by the extraneous aﬀect. Implicit in this
interpretation is the assumption that mood aﬀects moral judgement by combining the feeling
of mood with the feeling of the integral emotion. The tested happy mood, specifically, acts as
an aﬀective “buﬀer” making people more tolerant of the negative emotion elicited by the MP
dilemma. We call this the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. The aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis seems
to be consistent with the direct mood eﬀect within the AAI theory; that is, a positive mood
aﬀects moral judgement by directly conveying a positive (or, less negative) view of the object
(dilemma) in question. In this view, negative mood would be expected to decrease UJs in
MP dilemmas.
The AAI theory also suggests a processing eﬀect of mood, which would predict the opposite
of the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. Positive mood would be expected to increase reliance on the
prepotent emotional response and thus decrease the likelihood of UJs, whereas negative mood
would be expected to make people think more carefully about the problem and thus give rise
to utilitarian judgements. Because such a processing eﬀect is based on how moods “tune”
processing style, we call it the aﬀective tuning hypothesis. Somewhat in line with this view,
Schnall et al. (2008) showed that inducing sadness resulted in less severe moral judgements
(though the dependent variable combined the judgement on the footbridge dilemma with that
on other types of moral problems).
Study 2, as a preliminary study, examined mood’s influence on moral judgement by testing
both positive and negative moods. This study included the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis and
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the aﬀective tuning hypothesis as two alternative hypotheses.
4.2 Study overview
Study 2 examined eﬀects of both positive and negative moods on moral judgements in the
moral dilemma paradigm. The experiment used a 3 x 3 factorial design: three mood conditions
(baseline, positive mood and negative mood) were tested for all dilemma types (MP, MI and
non-moral (NonM )). Both factors were varied within subjects across all three levels. The
baseline condition referred to the phase prior to mood induction. Mood and moral judgement
data collected at this point provided a baseline against which results from the same tasks after
mood induction were compared. We induced positive and negative moods using movie clips,
with the induction order counterbalanced (i.e., positive or negative mood was induced first).
We measured mood using a 0-5 scaled mood questionnaire. For dilemma type, we included
NonM as a control for moral relevance, and MI as a control for the intensive involvement of
(negative) emotion and thus an emotion/deliberation conflict in moral dilemmas.
We also measured the arousal of emotion in response to dilemmas, using galvanic skin
response (GSR; called skin conductance earlier in the review), as a potential useful variable
to test for the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. Emotions are typically thought to be composed
of at least three components: valenced feeling, physiological arousal and cognitive appraisal
(Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). There has been empirical evidence
suggesting a potential link between physiological arousal of emotion and behavioural response
triggered by emotion (e.g., Blanchette & Leese, 2011). Another example was van’t Wout et
al.’s (2006) study, which is important for our purpose. As reviewed earlier, van’t Wout et al.
(2006) showed a positive correlation between the rate of rejection of unfair oﬀers in the UG and
skin conductance. As discussed in Chapter 2, the rejection of unfair oﬀers, which is thought to
be consequent to “unpleasant” emotion in response to the oﬀer, conceptually matches non-UJs
in MP dilemmas. In addition, skin conductance is thought to be a direct measure of arousal
(Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989; van’t Wout et al., 2006). I will explain in the following
section how the physiological measure might inform the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis.
4.3 Experimental hypotheses
Both the aﬀective buﬀer and aﬀective tuning hypotheses would predict an interaction between
mood valence and moral dilemma type (personal versus impersonal), but in diﬀerent patterns.
According to the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, negative mood, contrary to positive mood, would
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lead to fewer utilitarian responses for MP dilemmas because it would be assumed to intensify
the negative feeling. In addition, it should not aﬀect moral judgements in MI dilemmas
because the judgements are not as driven by emotional impulse as in MP dilemmas. Just like
manipulation of cognitive load has no eﬀect on the latency for non-UJs in MP dilemmas that
are not governed by cognitively controlled processing (Greene et al., 2008), manipulation of
emotion would not aﬀect the likelihood of UJs in MI dilemmas that do not rely on emotional
processing.
On the other hand, the aﬀective tuning hypothesis would pose an opposite prediction
regarding moral judgements in MP dilemmas. Specifically, positive mood would increase the
reliance on emotional reaction to MP dilemmas and thus would raise the likelihood of non-
UJs in them; negative mood would show the opposite eﬀect. However, the aﬀective tuning
hypothesis would also predict no mood eﬀect on moral judgements in MI dilemmas, but
based on a diﬀerent rationale. MI dilemmas, relative to corresponding MP ones, evoke less
intensive emotion and thus less intense conflict between emotional and cognitively controlled
processing. Presumably, the feature that MI dilemmas are not very tensive makes UJs come
very straightforwardly. Support for this notion comes from the finding that the rate of UJs
in MI dilemmas is unaﬀected by such factors as self-involvement in danger and inevitability
of death, which would presumably boost UJs (Moore et al., 2008). Thus, the MI type itself
appears to generate a ceiling eﬀect. Accordingly, we expected that processing strategy altered
by positive or negative mood would not aﬀect moral judgements in MI dilemmas and thus
there would be no mood eﬀect.
Hypotheses regarding the measure of physiological arousal of emotion, i.e., GSR, are as
follows. As mentioned above, non-UJs in MP dilemmas and rejection of unfair oﬀers in
the UG are conceptually matched in terms of the involvement of emotion. Based on this
comparison and van’t Wout’s (2006) result that rejection of unfair oﬀers in the UG was
positively correlated with the measure of GSR, we expected non-UJs in MP dilemmas to be
linked with increased GSR. Assuming that this hypothesised relationship is confirmed, we
made a further experimental hypothesis regarding the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. Because
the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis suggests that positive mood attenuates the dilemma-triggered
negative emotion whereas negative mood enhances it, it would predict that GSR corresponding
to MP dilemmas would be highest in the negative mood condition, lowest in the positive mood
condition and in-between in the baseline condition.
Finally, with respect to dilemma type, we expected the likelihood of UJs to be highest
in NonM dilemmas, given the absence of moral issue in them (the concept “utilitarian” was
not applicable for NonM dilemmas; we used this descriptive term only for simplicity). The
74
proportion of UJs was expected to be lowest in MP dilemmas and in-between in MI dilemmas.
4.4 Method
4.4.1 Participants
Forty people (15 male and 25 female), the majority of whom were students at the University
of Glasgow, were recruited for the experiment for course credits or monetary reward.
4.4.2 Materials
4.4.2.1 Mood manipulation (mood induction and check of manipulation)
The movie clips used for mood induction were edited from the “Jurassic Bark” episode of
Futurama, an American science-fiction cartoon. The first half of the episode was purely
comedic and the second half led to a sad ending. We split the full-length cartoon into two
halves and used the first half to elevate mood and the second to depress mood. The length of
the first segment was 11 minutes, 21 seconds, and that of the second segment was 9 minutes,
9 seconds.
Mood was assessed using a 10-item questionnaire with a 0-5 scale for each item. The
10 emotional items were selected from the PANAS-X manual by Watson and Clark (1994).
Four items measured positive mood (happy, excited, delighted, cheerful) and four measured
negative mood (sad, blue, lonely, downhearted). We also included anger and disgust because
they are known to influence moral judgement (e.g., Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Schnall et
al., 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005); also, some parts of the Futurama episode might have
induced them. The six-point scale was based on the measure scale by Watson and Clark
(1994), ranging from 0 (emphnot at all) to 5 (extremely), and the intermediate steps were
labelled as “very slightly”, “a little”, “moderately” and “quite a bit”.15
4.4.2.2 Dilemmas
Moral dilemmas (MP and MI dilemmas) were selected from the 24 moral- related scenarios
used in Moore et al.’s (2008) work (see Appendix A). For each participant, nine moral-related
scenarios were randomly drawn from the entire 24. This design allowed for a variation in
15The initial scale by Watson and Clark (1994) ranges from one to five, with the minimum point labelled
as “not at all or very slight”. We included a zero point to appeal to the more intuitive association between a
rating of zero and the phrasing “not at all”.
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scenarios to control for specific content eﬀect. Both MP and MI dilemmas of each selected
scenario were presented to the participant. For example, if the trolley problem was chosen,
both the footbridge and switch dilemmas were presented. For NonM dilemmas, we took
the nine NonM dilemmas used by Greene et al. (2001), with the only modification in cases
involving money, where we switched US to UK currency (see Appendix B). All the dilemmas
(moral and non-moral) ended with the question “is it appropriate to x?”, where x represented a
utilitarian action in moral dilemmas and a moral-irrelevant choice in NonM dilemmas. Three
of each type of dilemma (MP, MI and NonM) were pseudo-randomly assigned to each mood
condition. The allocation was subject to the constraint that paired dilemmas (i.e., both MP
and MI dilemmas of the same scenario) were not presented within the same mood condition.
This was done to minimise the likelihood that participants would remember scenarios and
simply replicate responses.
4.4.2.3 Galvanic skin response (GSR)
The equipment used for GSR recording was a Biopac MP 150 system coupled with UIM100c,
STP100c and GSR100c. Electrodes attached to participants’ fingers were Ag-AgCl electrodes
(internal diameter = 6mm). The conductive medium was isotonic gel (0.5% saline in a neutral
base). Sampling frequency was set to 200Hz and recording was low-pass filtered at 1Hz at
the equipment.
4.4.3 Procedure
Participants were individually tested. In the experiment, participants were seated at a table
in front of an iMac computer terminal. The experimental room was divided by an oﬃce room
divider (1.57 meters high and 1.60 meters wide). Participants and the experimenter sat on
diﬀerent sides of the divider so that they could not have visual access to each other. After
signing a consent form, participants read an instruction form that explained the experiment as
a study of the influence of story presentation order on memory. Participants were instructed
that they would be watching two clips from a Futurama episode, either in the proper sequence
or not, and that each clip would be followed by some questions. They were also told that
their GSR would be recorded throughout the experiment. Electrodes were then attached to
participants’ distal phalanges of the index and middle fingers of their non-dominant hand.
They were asked to keep this hand stable throughout the experiment. The experimenter
checked the fidelity of the GSR signal before telling participants that they could initiate the
experiment following instructions shown on the computer screen. The experimenter then went
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the sequence of stimuli presentation.
back to sit on the opposite side of the divider. Participants were told that they could call the
experimenter if any problems arose and were otherwise left alone.
Figure 4.1 shows the full sequence of stimuli presentations faced by each participant. The
three phases correspond to the three mood conditions; the one before the first mood induction
is the baseline condition. Participants’ GSR was recorded throughout the experiment.
In each mood condition, each participant responded to nine dilemmas — three of each
dilemma type — that were shown in a random order. One dilemma at a time was presented
on the computer screen in the following way. The full text of each dilemma, including the
final question, and instructions for response submission (in red type and shown below the
question) were presented simultaneously on one page. Participants responded to each dilemma
by pressing the “Y” (representing “Yes”) or “N” (representing “No”) key on the keyboard.
In the baseline condition, participants responded to dilemmas after completing the mood
questionnaire by which they indicated to what extent they “presently” felt each emotion. They
then watched one of the two video clips and answered another nine dilemmas presented in the
fashion described above. Participants then answered the mood questionnaire asking how they
felt when watching the video clip. The same sequence was presented for the second induction
phase. We chose this dilemma-then-questionnaire order due to the concern that responding to
the mood questionnaire could aﬀect participants’ awareness of the mood induction and alter
the eﬀect of mood. To ensure a clear measure of GSR to participants’ response to each moral
dilemma, there was a five-second interval between each dilemma. For the same reason, there
was also a five-second delay between experimental tasks (i.e., mood questionnaire, video clip,
dilemmas).
After the third mood questionnaire, the end of the experiment was indicated to the par-
ticipant and the GSR recording stopped. The experimenter then verbally asked participants
what they thought the experimental purpose was and their answers were documented. Finally,
participants were carefully debriefed about the experimental purpose.
77
4.5 Results
Because we are primarily interested in the eﬀects of induced moods on moral judgements, it
is critical that our induction procedure had a measurable eﬀect on mood. We thus present
results from the mood rating measurements before presenting the moral judgement data. We
then present the GSR data analysis. For statistical analyses, unless mentioned, statistical
significance was tested at the .05 level.
4.5.1 Results for mood manipulation
Self-reported ratings on the items measuring the positive mood (happy, delighted, cheerful,
excited) and on the items measuring the negative mood (sad, blue, lonely, downhearted) were
both reliable (↵ = 0.81). Thus for both moods, a single score was created by averaging ratings
on corresponding items. We refer to the score for positive mood as positive mood rating and
that for negative mood as negative mood rating.
Half participants were induced with positive mood first and negative mood second and the
other half experienced the opposite order. We refer to them as the “positive-first” (PF) and
“negative-first” (NF) group, respectively. Considering the possibility that the order of mood
induction could have had an eﬀect, we visualised mood rating data from these two groups
separately. The left and right panels of Figure 4.2 show the results of positive mood rating
and negative mood rating, as a function of mood induction order. The baseline, positive
and negative mood conditions are shown by black asterisks, green squares and blue triangles,
respectively.
Figure 4.2: Mean value of mood rating as a function of mood induction order and mood condition.
Left and right panels correspond to results of the positive and negative mood ratings. Hash-marked
bars represent 95% CIs.
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Ratings were, on average higher for the positive mood scale (the left panel compared to
the right one), suggesting either a bias in response or that most participants were in a positive
mood. Importantly, there is an apparent interaction between mood induction order and mood
condition for positive mood ratings. Specifically, in the PF order, positive mood ratings were
higher in the positive mood condition than in the other two conditions (see the left group of
plots in the left panel). The fact that positive mood ratings did not change after the positive
mood induction in the NF group suggests that the negative mood induction had a lasting
eﬀect that was immune to the positive mood induction. Contrary to this, the positive mood
induction seemed to have the desired eﬀect in the PF group. Negative mood ratings (right
panel) on the other hand showed no such interaction with mood condition. It is clear however
that the negative mood induction had the desired eﬀect of increasing ratings on the negative
mood scale. The lack of interaction on the negative mood scale may be due to a floor eﬀect:
ratings on this scale were so low to begin with that there was not much room for them to
decrease with the positive mood induction. Overall, the pattern of mood rating data suggests
that the negative mood induction had more lasting eﬀects than the positive mood induction.
It seems that a depressed state induced by watching a sad segment endured through the
positive mood induction for the NF group, whereas in the PF order, the positive mood did
not endure through the negative mood induction. Because of this asymmetry, mood induction
order was included as a potentially important factor in analyses of moral judgement data.
To test for the eﬀects of induced moods on mood ratings, we ran a two-way mixed ANOVA.
Mood condition was treated as a within-subject factor and mood induction order as a between-
subject factor. Analyses were performed separately for the positive and negative mood ratings.
With respect to the positive mood rating, there was a marginal eﬀect of mood condition
(F (2,76) = 2.84, p = .065, ⌘2 = .069), and, consistent with the pattern observed in the left
panel of Figure 4.2, a significant interaction between mood condition and induction order
(F (2,76) = 6.09, p = .004, ⌘2 = .138). The main eﬀect of induction order was not statistically
significant (F (1,38) = .81, p = .373, ⌘2 = .021). Planned comparison indicated that in the PF
group, positive mood ratings after the positive mood induction was reliably higher than the
baseline measure (F (1,38) = 3.76, p = .060) and ratings after the negative mood induction
(F (1,38) = 8.09, p = .007). Contrary to this, in the NF group, positive mood ratings were lower
than the baseline measure after both the positive and negative mood inductions (F (1,38) =
9.02, p = .005; F (1,38) = 5.77, p = .021), and did not diﬀer between the two induction phases
(F (1,38) = .36, p = .552).
With respect to the negative mood rating, the main eﬀect of mood induction was significant
(F (1.43,54.20) = 9.93, p = .001, ⌘2 = .207). Neither induction order eﬀect nor the two-way
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interaction were significant (F (1,38) = 0, p = 1, ⌘2 = 0; F (1.43,54.20) = .24, p = .714, ⌘2 = .006,
respectively). It appeared that the negative mood induction increased negative mood ratings
regardless of induction order. Further comparison revealed that negative mood ratings for the
negative induction were reliably higher than baseline and post-positive induction measures
(F (1,78) = 16.89, p < .001; F (1,78) = 13.28, p < .001). Taken together, the results of mood
rating suggest a valid induction of negative mood regardless of the order of mood induction.
They also indicated an eﬀective positive mood induction when positive mood was induced
first. In addition, they revealed an asymmetric eﬀect of mood induction order. For this
reason, mood induction order was included as a factor in the following analyses.
4.5.2 Results for moral judgement
4.5.2.1 Primary analyses
Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of UJs as a function of dilemma type. The three colours
correspond to the mood conditions. The left panel corresponds to results from data pooled
across both of the two mood induction orders (all data). The middle and right panels cor-
respond to results from the PF and NF groups. When the induction order was disregarded,
as shown in the “All Data” (AD) panel, the proportion of UJs was lowest for MP dilemmas
(56%), second lowest for MI dilemmas (77%) and highest for NonM dilemmas (97%). This
pattern is consistent with most previous studies and met the prediction that likelihood of UJs
would be higher for MI dilemmas than for MP dilemmas. Contrary to this, there was no clear
eﬀect of induced mood on the likelihood of UJs.
Figure 4.3: Mean proportion of UJs as a function of dilemma type and mood condition. Hash-marked
bars represent 95% CIs. The left, middle and right panels correspond to results from aggregated data,
the PF and NF groups.
For the statistical analysis, we used a three-way mixed ANOVA and a full factorial model
was tested. The model treated mood condition and dilemma type as within-subject variables
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and treated mood induction order as a between-subject variable. It tested for main eﬀects
of dilemma type, mood induction and mood induction order, two-way interactions between
factors and a three-way interaction. The results revealed a significant eﬀect of dilemma type
(F (1.58,59.91) = 51.1016, p < .001, ⌘2 = .574). Neither mood induction nor mood induction
order were found to have statistically significant eﬀects (F (2,76) = 2.45, p = .093, ⌘2 = .06;
F (1,38) = .23, p = .634, ⌘2 = .006, respectively). The only statistically reliable interaction
among these variables was the three-way interaction between mood condition, induction order
and dilemma type (F (4,152) = 2.55, p = .042, ⌘2 = .063).
To explore this three-way interaction, we tested for the interaction between mood con-
dition and dilemma type by running a two-way repeated measure ANOVA at each level of
mood induction order. The results showed that, although the F statistic corresponding to the
two-way interaction was higher in the PF relative to the NF order, neither of them yielded
a significant interaction (F (4,76) = 1.71, p = .155, ⌘2 = .083; F (2.41,45.72) = .96, p = .405,
⌘2 = .048, respectively).
Given the order eﬀect of mood induction, we also analysed moral judgement by block, i.e.,
the baseline block and the 1st and 2nd mood blocks that were classified by time sequence.
Figure 4.4 shows proportions of UJs for the three type of dilemmas in the baseline and the
two mood blocks. On average, the three blocks look similar in the proportion of UJs. But for
MP dilemmas (red bars), there seems to be a small increase in UJ from the baseline block to
the first mood block, following which was a small decrease in UJ in the second mood block.
For statistical analysis, we used a generalised mixed-eﬀect model for logistic regression.
The model included participant as a random factor, and dilemma type and block as two fixed
factors. The model examined the eﬀects of dilemma type, block and their interaction. For the
two fixed factors, non-moral (NonM) type and the baseline block were treated as the reference
levels. The model was fitted by maximising the restricted log-likelihood. Wald Chi-square
was used as the statistic for overall eﬀects of the two fixed factors and and their interaction.
The results showed that significant eﬀects of dilemma type ( 2(2) = 50.20, p < .001) and the
interaction between dilemma type and block ( 2(4) = 15.5, p = .004). The eﬀect of block was
not significant ( 2(2) = 4.00, p = .14). To examine the interaction, we used a mixed-eﬀect
16Mauchly’s test indicated that the sphericity assumption was violated when testing for the dilemma type
eﬀect. The degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimate. In cases hereafter where
the sphericity assumption was violated, we also used the Greenhouse-Geisser correction and reported adjusted
degrees of freedom.
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model for logistic regression at each type of dilemma. The model included block as a fixed
factor and participant as a random factor, and assigned the baseline block as the reference
level. The model thus tests for the eﬀects of the first and second mood blocks relative to
the baseline block. Results revealed two significant diﬀerences: (1) an increase in UJ for MP
dilemmas from the baseline block to the first mood block (  = 1.03, z = 2.49, p = .012); and
2) a higher proportion of UJs for MI dilemmas in the second mood block compared to the
baseline block (  = 1.01, z = 2.39, p = .017).
Figure 4.4: Proportion of utilitarian judgements as a function of dilemma type and block. Hash-
marked bars represent 95% CIs.
To create a more complete picture of the eﬀect of mood induction on likelihood of UJs for the
three dilemma types, we considered shifts in the proportion of UJs. This analysis gave us a
greater insight into individual diﬀerences of the eﬀect of mood induction than the aggregate
data presented above. Recall that each participant responded to three of each type of dilemma
in each mood condition. Thus each participant could have provided 0, 1, 2 or 3 out of three
possible UJs for each type of dilemma in each mood condition. Specifically, we calculated
changes in the proportion of participants making each possible number of utilitarian judge-
ments from the baseline condition to the positive mood condition (ppositive−mood − pbaseline)
or to the negative mood condition (pnegative−mood − pbaseline). For example, if 10 of 20 (50%)
participants gave 2￿3 MP utilitarian judgements in the baseline condition and 12 of 20 (60%)
gave 2￿3 MP utilitarian judgements in the negative mood condition, the change would be
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2￿20 (10%). So, in this case, positive numbers represent an increase in the proportion of
participants providing 0, 1, 2 or 3 utilitarian judgements and negative numbers represent a
decrease. We will refer to the four points in the distributions as p(n￿3) where n is 0, 1, 2, or
3.
Figure 4.5 shows this change in the proportion of participants who provided 0, 1, 2 or 3
out of three UJs for the two mood conditions. The end points on the vertical bars are 95% CIs
and the hash marks on these bars are 68% CIs. CIs were determined using a bootstrapping
procedure. Red or yellow bars show proportion changes from the baseline condition to the
positive or negative mood condition.
Figure 4.5: Change in proportion of participants as a function of the number of UJ (out of three) and
mood condition contrast. The end points and hash marks on the vertical bars are 95% CIs and 68%
CIs. The top and bottoms panels correspond to the PF and NF mood induction orders. Columns
from left to right correspond to MP, MI and NonM dilemmas.
First we focus on the MP dilemma results for the PF and NF groups (two left most
panels). The changes in the distribution of participants were apparently more dramatic in
the NF group (bottom) than the PF group (top). The shifts were quite small in the PF group
and were similar in both mood condition (small decreases in the p(1￿3) were complemented by
small increases in p(2￿3)). Contrary to these small and similar shifts, there were larger shifts
in the NF group and they were more dramatic for the negative mood induction condition. In
this condition we see a clear increase in the proportion of participants providing utilitarian
responses to all three MP dilemmas. This was complemented by a decrease in p(2￿3). Changes
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in the distribution was much more modest in the positive mood condition. The shift from
p(2￿3) to p(3￿3) after negative mood induction is the only case where the 95% CIs do not
overlap with the zero point. This suggests that there might be a subpopulation of participants,
who were already biased towards UJs, becoming more so when in a depressed state. Next we
consider results for the MI dilemmas (middle panels). Again, we see only a very small shift
in the distribution that was similar for both mood conditions in the PF group but a more
dramatic shift in the NF group. Finally, for the NonM dilemmas (the two right most panels),
there was little eﬀect of mood condition or induction order on the distribution of responses.
Overall, for the MP and MI dilemma, the negative mood induction, relative to the positive
mood one, seemed to create more variance in the response distributions and this was primarily
observed in those participants with a bias towards UJs to begin with (moving from 2￿3 to 3￿3).
Also, where this shift was similar for the two mood inductions for the MI dilemmas, there was
a larger trend in this direction for the negative mood induction for the MP dilemmas. These
results suggest that there might be a subset of participants who responded in the negative
mood condition with an increase in proportion of UJs in the MP dilemmas. This runs counter
to the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis.
4.5.2.2 Examining the eﬀect of time
The experimental procedure made each participant responded to multiple dilemmas in one
mood condition. Generally, engaging in any repeated behaviour is likely to change the be-
haviour with time. Thus, time can be a confounding variable. Figure 4.6 shows the proportion
of participants making UJs for the three dilemmas of each type presented after the mood-
induction video. The three time points on the x-axis correspond to the first, second and third
dilemma of a particular type presented after the video. The three bar colours correspond
to mood conditions. The top and bottom panels correspond to the PF and NF orders, and
the three columns of panels to the MP, MI and NonM dilemmas. While there is no obvious
diﬀerence in the proportion of UJs at the three time points, there does seem to be fewer
utilitarian responses in the MP cases at the third time point; and this seems particularly so
in the PF order: the proportion of UJs at the first, second and third points were 60%, 73%,
and 43% (see the top left panel).
We used a generalised estimating equation (GEE) approach to binomial regression to test
for eﬀects of time on proportion of utilitarian judgements in the MP and MI dilemmas. Our
model tested for main eﬀects of MP and MI dilemma types (MP type was treated as the
reference category), trial order and an interaction term. Only the coeﬃcient of dilemma
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type was reliably diﬀerent from zero (  = 0.58, zRobust = 2.31, p = .011). There was no main
eﬀect of trial order (  = −0.01, zRobust = −0.91, p = .182) and while the interaction term was
marginally significant the eﬀect size was very small (  = 0.03; zRobust = 1.62, p = .052). This
marginal statistical significance of the interaction term is apparent given the reduction in the
proportion of UJs for MP cases in the third post-induction trial. The absence or at least
relatively minor eﬀect that trial order seems to have is shown more clearly in Figure 4.7.
The figure shows the proportion of UJs, for the three dilemma types, for each of the nine
trials throughout the experiment. Diﬀerent coloured symbols correspond to the three mood
conditions and the coloured lines indicate whether participants received positive or negative
mood induction first. In all cases, the proportion of UJs was relatively stable across trials.
Figure 4.6: Proportion of participants making a UJ to the 1st , 2nd and 3rd presented dilemma (of
a type) in each mood condition. The top and bottom panels correspond to the PF and NF groups.
The columns from left to right correspond to the MP, MI and NonM dilemmas. Diﬀerent colours of
bars correspond to the mood conditions.
4.5.2.3 Testing for an immediate eﬀect of mood
The primary aim of our study was to measure eﬀects of induced moods on moral judgement.
The mood scale measurements indicate that the video-based mood induction had the de-
sired eﬀect in some cases. Also, the above analysis shows that time did not systematically
aﬀect moral judgements in the experiment. However, the process of responding to multiple
dilemmas was also likely to alter mood. Any change in aﬀective state due to responding
to a moral dilemma would best be described as an eﬀect of integral aﬀect. On the other
hand, the emotional response to one moral dilemma is “incidental” with respect to a subse-
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Figure 4.7: Proportion of participants making a UJ plotted against trial numbers. The top, middle
and bottom panels correspond to the MP, MI and NonM dilemmas.
quent dilemma. This unknown eﬀect made it particularly important to examine the dilemma
responses occurring immediately after the mood induction procedure.
Because dilemmas were randomly ordered in each mood condition, there was no guarantee
of getting an MP dilemma immediately after the mood-induction phase. That is, the first
post-induction MP dilemma might be presented at, e.g. the 7th trial (of the total nine in one
mood condition). Thus, the first post-induction MP response shown in Figure 4.6 might not
be informative of an immediate mood eﬀect. Accordingly, we ran an analysis in which we
focused on responses to MP dilemmas that were presented at the early stage in each mood
condition. We defined the early stage to be within the first three dilemmas shown after the
mood induction. By this definition, we tentatively assumed that this time window would
allow for the immediate mood eﬀect if there was any. Thirty-one of the 40 participants were
exposed to at least one MP dilemma within the early stage of each mood condition; their data
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were used for this analysis. Also, for each of the 31 participants, in each mood condition, only
the MP dilemma presented at the earliest time was used. Thus, if a participant responded
to two MP dilemmas at the early stage in a mood condition, only the first shown one was
taken. This was done to maximise the likelihood of observing the immediate mood eﬀect, if
any, on moral judgement in MP dilemmas. For simplicity, we called this MP dilemma the
first presented MP dilemma.
Figure 4.8 shows the proportion of participants making a UJ in the first presented MP
dilemma. The three bar colours correspond to mood condition. The three groups of bars, from
left to right, correspond to the PF group, the NF group and data pooled across both groups
(labelled AD for aggregated data). For all the groups, the proportion of those approving of
an MP killing appears to be highest after the negative mood induction, lowest in the baseline
phase and second highest after the positive mood induction (except the NF group, where
the positive mood condition shows the same value as the baseline measure). This shows a
pattern that both positive and negative mood inductions increased the likelihood of utilitarian
judgements for the first presented MP dilemma. For the statistic analysis, we ran Cochran’s
Q Test to test for the mood eﬀect for each of the three groups. The results revealed that the
mood eﬀect reached statistical significance only for the AD group and between the baseline
and negative mood conditions (Q(1) = 4.50, p = .034). This suggests that the negative
mood induction increased the rate of utilitarian judgements at least for the first presented
MP dilemma. The result thus goes counter to the buﬀer hypothesis but may provide some
support for the aﬀective tuning hypothesis.
4.5.2.4 Relationship between moral judgement and mood rating
For additional insight into a potential relationship between induced aﬀect and moral judge-
ment, we examined the relationship between mood ratings and proportion of UJs more di-
rectly.
Figure 4.9 shows the proportion of UJs as a function of mood rating for the 10 individual
emotional items. The red and black points correspond to MP and MI dilemmas, respectively.
The scatter points at the top and bottom give an idea of how many trials there were in each
instance. The main eﬀect of dilemma type is evident in the upward shift of black points relative
to the red points. To analyse the relationship between mood ratings and UJs for MP and MI
dilemmas, we used a GEE approach to binomial regression. The model included coeﬃcients
for MP and MI types, mood ratings and an interaction term. Fits of these regression lines
are shown in the figure (black and red solid lines).
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Figure 4.8: Proportion of UJs in the first presented MP dilemma, as a function of mood condition
and data set.
Figure 4.9: Proportion of UJs plotted against mood rating. Each panel corresponds to an individual
emotional item. Red and black points correspond to MP and MI dilemmas, respectively. The scatter
points at the top and bottom correspond to actual responses to moral dilemmas (binary data) along
with each value of mood rating. The solid lines were fitted by the model tested above. Panels, from
top left to bottom right, correspond to the emotion items happy, delighted, cheerful, excited, sad, blue,
lonely, downhearted, angry and disgust.
To focus on mood eﬀects that might be noteworthy, we consider only items where the
regression coeﬃcients indicated either a change in proportion of UJs for both dilemma types
that was larger than 10%, or a diﬀerence in the change of utilitarian proportion between
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dilemma types that was greater than 10%. These cases are identified in Figure 4.10, where
the change in the proportion of UJs with maximum mood rating (six: from zero to five)
is shown for the two dilemma types and each emotional item. The red and black points
correspond to the MP and MI types, respectively. Each emotion item is represented by the
first two letters of it adjective (shown on the x-axis). The changes in the proportion of UJs
were predicted by the models tested above. Large eﬀects were observed for happy, delighted,
sad, blue, downhearted, angry and disgusted. While the increase in UJs with happiness ratings
is consistent with Valdesolo and DeSteno’s (2006) result and the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis,
the similar trend observed for sad is not.
Figure 4.10: Proportional change in UJs de-
termined by regression fits for each of the 10
emotions.
Results of statistical analyses of the regression on mood scales are shown in Figure 4.11.
Panels, from top left to bottom left, show coeﬃcient estimates for the main eﬀects of mood,
dilemma type and their interaction. The grey points correspond to a fit that assumes indepen-
dence between observations and the black points are estimates using generalised estimating
equations. Hash-marked bars are 95% CIs. In the case of GEE parameters, these are con-
structed using methods that are robust against inaccurate assumptions of the covariance
matrix. Thus, we can only be confident in eﬀects for cases where error bars do not overlap
with zero (indicated by the dashed line). Figure 4.11 indicates that while dilemma type had a
large and statistically significant eﬀect on the proportion of utilitarian judgements, the eﬀect
of mood ratings and its interactions with dilemma type were relatively small and not statisti-
cally reliable. The interaction trends noted in figure 4.10 are however potentially interesting
and suggest that there may be some validity to the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. Also, for both
MP and MI dilemmas, UJs tended to increase with disgust; this is in line with Schnall et
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al.’s (2008) finding that induction of disgust leads to more severe moral judgement. It also
seems interesting that MP utilitarian judgements tended to decrease with anger; I will return
to these observations in the discussion section of this chapter.
Figure 4.11: Results of statistical analyses of the
regression on mood scales. The top left, top right
and bottom left panels show coeﬃcient estimates
for the main eﬀects of mood, dilemma type and
their interaction. The grey points are estimates
based on the assumption of independence between
observations. The black points are estimates us-
ing generalised estimating equations. Hash-marked
bars indicate 95% CIs.
4.5.2.5 Examining the eﬀect of dilemma presentation order
Because dilemmas were presented in a random order, each moral-issue scenario had two pos-
sible orders of presenting its MP and MI dilemmas: the MP dilemma was shown earlier than
the MI (MP-first) or the opposite (MI-first). Participants’ responses might be sensitive to this
contingent variation. That is, they made the same judgement on paired MP and MI dilem-
mas, depending on which type was shown first (Lanteri, Chelini, & Rizzello, 2008). As shown
in Figure 4.3, MI dilemmas were more likely to receive UJs. Thus, if there was an eﬀect of
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dilemma presentation order, we should expect a higher likelihood of UJs for an MP dilemma
when it followed the MI-first order than when it followed the MP-first order. Similarly, an
MI dilemma would be expected to receive fewer utilitarian judgements when it was presented
later than its paired MP version. The following analysis aimed to test if there was an order
eﬀect working in this way. This analysis is important because, if there was such an eﬀect, we
should then focus on MP dilemmas that were shown prior to their paired MI types.
In our experiment, 22 of the 24 moral-related scenarios from Moore et al. (2008) were
tested as a result of the random selection. Eight of these 22 scenarios received only one
dilemma presentation order and were thus excluded from the analysis. Another five of the
22 scenarios were also excluded because their sample size was too small (no more than five
participants). Thus, the analysis used data from the remained nine scenarios. Figure 4.12
shows the proportion of UJs for the nine individual scenarios. The light grey and dark grey
bars correspond to the MP-first and MI-first orders, respectively. In each panel, the left and
right groups of bars show the likelihood of UJs in the MP and MI dilemmas of a scenario,
respectively. The title of each scenario (named by Moore et al. (2008)) is shown on the top
of each panel.
As seen in Figure 4.12, most scenarios show similar rates of UJs in the two presentation
orders, for both the MP and MI dilemmas. Two scenarios give a relatively obvious indication of
the order eﬀect described above. The “Preventing Ebola” scenario (middle left panel) presents
a clearly higher utilitarian proportion for its MP dilemmas in the MI-first order (82%) than
the MP-first one (33%), suggesting that encountering its MI dilemma earlier increased the
likelihood of UJs for the paired MP dilemma. Likewise, for the “Shark Attack” scenario (top
right panel), the utilitarian rate for the MI dilemma was lower in the MP-first order than in
the MI-first one.
We ran Fisher Exact Test to test for the null hypothesis that moral judgement for a moral
dilemma was independent of dilemma presentation order. Analyses were performed for each
individual scenario, on its MP and MI dilemmas. The results revealed that only for the MP
dilemma of the “Preventing Ebola” scenario was the null hypothesis rejected (p = .011, one-
sided). Therefore, results from 8￿9, and thus a majority of, themes suggest that the eﬀect of
dilemma presentation order was not evident.
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Figure 4.12: Proportion of participants making a UJ, as a function of dilemma type and dilemma
presentation order. Each panel corresponds to a scenario and the title of the scenario is shown on the
top of the panel.
4.5.3 Results for GSR
4.5.3.1 GSR data reading
GSR data were first filtered as follows: GSR recordings from eight participants were excluded
due to technical problems during the experiment. For the remaining 32 participants, three
participants’ recordings were high-pass filtered at .05Hz with the equipment. These three
participants’ data were included in further analysis although it was impossible to recover the
data before the high-pass filter. To avoid losing power in low frequency, data from the other
29 participants were not high-pass filtered. To reduce the possible impact of this inconsistency
in frequency, a linear trend was removed from data that were not high-pass filtered by taking
residuals of the best fit-line. Because high frequency was widely observed, GSR recordings
were further filtered through 50th order zero-phase forward and backward digital filtering.
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The filtering equation is:
GSRfilted(t) =
49￿
i=0(GSR(t − i))
50
where t represents a sampling point. After filtering in the forward direction, the filtered
sequence was reversed and run back through the filter. The 50th order was chosen to make
200Hz data similar to 4Hz data, among which the Nyquist Frequency was 2Hz — twice the
highest GSR frequency (no higher than 1Hz).
GSR amplitude17 (united in micromho) was used as the skin conductance measure for
each dilemma. For each dilemma, the time window for computing the GSR amplitude was
between one second after the dilemma was released and five seconds after a response key was
pressed. When GSR recording showed a downward slope between 100 milliseconds and 1100
milliseconds after the dilemma was presented, the moment of measuring GSR amplitude was
delayed until GSR recording reached the valley point.
4.5.3.2 Eﬀects of dilemma type and mood induction on GSR
Figure 4.13 shows mean values of GSR amplitude at each type of dilemma in the three
mood conditions. On average, GSR seemed similar across the three mood condition. In the
baseline and positive mood conditions, MP and MI dilemmas show higher values of GSR
than NonM dilemmas, but the two types of moral dilemma do not seem diﬀerent. In the
negative mood condition, MI dilemmas show a higher GSR value than both MP and NonM
dilemmas. Given that both dilemma type and mood condition were within-subject factors
and that each participant responded to three dilemmas of each type, we used a mixed-eﬀect
model to analyse eﬀects of the two experimental factors. The model included participant as
a random factor, and dilemma type and mood condition as two fixed factors. The model
examined the eﬀects of dilemma type, mood condition and their interaction on GSR. The
model was fitted by maximising the restricted log-likelihood. There was a significant eﬀect
of dilemma type (F (2,824) = 7.80, p < .001) Neither the eﬀect of mood condition nor that of
the two-way interaction was significant (F (2,824) = .94, p = .392; F (4,824) = 1.19, p = .312).
Planned pairwise comparison between dilemma types revealed that both MP (M = .91) and
MI (M = .95) dilemmas corresponded to a higher level of GSR than NonM dilemmas (p = .003
and p = .005, respectively), whereas GSR values at MP and MI dilemmas were not significantly
17GSR amplitude refers to the mean of only the non-zero values within the duration for computation
(Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000).
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diﬀerent (p = .974). These results indicate that the inclusion of moral tension, as a way of
distinguishing between moral and non-moral dilemmas, increased GSR. This in turn suggests
that moral and non-moral dilemmas diﬀered in terms of the degree of aﬀective processing, and
specifically, emotional arousal. The comparable levels of GSR between MP and MI dilemmas,
however, suggest that the “emotional-processing diﬀerence” between the two types of moral
dilemmas, proposed by Greene et al. (2001, 2004, 2008) as a view to understand the MP–MI
distinction, might not be on the arousal dimension.
Figure 4.13: GSR as a function of dilemma type and mood condition. Hash-marked bars represent
95% CIs.
4.5.3.3 Relationship between GSR and moral judgement
Figure 4.14 shows proportions of UJs in MP and MI dilemmas (presented by the red and black
points) as a function of GSR. The eﬀect of dilemma type is shown by the averagely higher
proportion for MI dilemmas than MP ones. Contrary to this apparent eﬀect of dilemma type,
the change in utilitarian proportion with GSR amplitude was vanishingly small.
For statistical analysis, we used a GEE approach to binary logistic regression. The model
included coeﬃcients for GSR amplitude, dilemma type (dummy variable: 0 for MP, 1 for MI,
and MP was treated as the reference category), and their interaction. The fitted regression
lines are shown in Figure 4.12. The results proved our observation. There was a significant
eﬀect of dilemma type (  = .87; zRobust = 3.86, p < .001). Neither the coeﬃcient of GSR
amplitude nor that of the two-term interaction was significantly diﬀerent from zero (  = 0.04;
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zRobust = .21, p = .834;   = .27; zRobust = .98, p = .327, respectively). Thus, GSR was not
reliably predictive of moral judgement in MP dilemmas. This, combined with the above
result that MP and MI did not diﬀer in GSR amplitude, suggests that GSR was not evidently
an index of diﬀerential emotional response between MP and MI dilemmas.
Figure 4.14: Proportion of UJs in the MP and MI dilemmas as a function of GSR amplitude.
4.6 Discussion
Study 2 aimed to test for two diﬀerent hypotheses with respect to mood’s influence on
moral judgement in a moral dilemma paradigm. The aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, derived
from Valdesolo and DeSteno’s (2006) finding, posits that positive or negative mood increases
or decreases the likelihood of UJs in MP dilemmas by enhancing or eliminating the intensity
of the dilemma-eliciting emotion. On the other hand, the aﬀective tuning hypothesis, based
on the influence of mood on cognitive processing, posits that negative mood increases the
likelihood of UJs in MP dilemmas by eliciting careful, controlled processing, whereas posi-
tive mood decreases the likelihood of UJs by increasing reliance on emotional responses to
MP dilemmas. Results from the primary analysis examining the eﬀect of mood induction on
moral judgement did not provide statistically reliable evidence for either hypothesis. However,
further analyses give an indication of both ideas.
95
Some results lend support to the aﬀective tuning hypothesis. When focusing on the MP
dilemma presented shortly after the mood induction phase, we indeed found that a utilitarian
response was significantly more likely in the negative mood condition than in the baseline
condition. This result is potentially important for informing of an immediate eﬀect of mood.
Similarly, when looking at the variation in response distribution between mood conditions,
we found a significant shift in the percentage of UJs, from 2￿3 in the baseline condition to 3￿3
after being induced into a down state. Thus, as noted earlier, it seemed that there might be
a subpopulation of participants who were inclined to UJs in the baseline phase, and tended
to become more so with the negative mood induction. This implies that, for people who are
already relatively immune to adverse reactions to MP dilemmas, feeling moderately down
could maintain or enhance an analytic, controlled processing strategy and thus make them
behave in a more utilitarian fashion. Also, in line with the aﬀective tuning hypothesis, analysis
concerning the relationship between mood and moral judgement showed that the proportion
of UJs tended to increase with sadness rating. This result is also consistent with Schnall et
al.’s (2010) result that an induction of sadness made moral judgements less severe.
On the other hand, consistent with the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, our results also show
that the proportion of UJs tended to increase with ratings of feeling happy and delighted,
but to decrease with ratings of feeling blue. However, because these, as well as the above,
relational patterns were correlational in nature, they could only be suggestive of the eﬀect of
mood on moral judgement. Nevertheless, the complex pattern of mood eﬀects observed here
suggests that there is more to the eﬀect of mood than that of serving as an aﬀective buﬀer.
However, the design of Study 2 had a limited ability to tease apart the complex eﬀects, as
it collected only moral judgements following mood inductions. This was resolved in Study 3,
which also measured mood mood-as-buﬀer and cognitive processing (reported in Chapter 5).
Our results also show that skin conductance was not related to moral judgement, which
is inconsistent with van’t Wout et al.’s (2006) finding showing a close link between arousal
of emotion and decisions in the UG. This suggests that the impact of emotion on moral
judgement, unlike that on socio-economic decisions, might not be largely attributed to the
physiological arousal of emotion. It is possible that the integral emotions in the strategic
interaction and moral dilemma settings were distinct. Research shows that whereas anger is a
common response to oﬀense to individual right and intentionality of harm, disgust is a more
unique response to “bodily norm violation” (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Rozin, Lowery,
Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). This diﬀerentiation between contextual
cues eliciting anger and disgust seems applicable for comparison between the ultimatum game
and moral dilemma paradigms. Whereas unfair oﬀers in the UG evoke anger (Pillutla &
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Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey, 2003), prompting responders to punish their opponents, harmful
actions passively involved in moral dilemmas perhaps stimulate emotions closer to disgust,
making people avoid the actions. This may also explain the results here that UJs for MP
dilemmas tended to increase with disgust but to decrease with anger.
Next, I turn to methodological concerns with Study 2. One methodological concern is
with the within-subject mood manipulation. As revealed by data analyses, there was an
asymmetric eﬀect of mood induction order. For participants who were induced into a positive
mood first (i.e., the PF group), both mood inductions were eﬀective. However, for those
who experienced the opposite induction order (i.e., the NF group), a positive mood was not
eﬀectively induced. It turned out that the first-induced negative mood endured through the
positive mood induction phase. This is possibly because the NF participants watched the
second half (i.e., the “sad” half) of the whole episode and thus knew what happened at the
end of the story. As a result, when watching the “funny” half of the episode in the positive
mood induction phase, they might not be as engaged as when they watched the “sad” half.
Nevertheless, due to this observed eﬀect of mood induction order, in Study 3, we included
mood as a between-subject variable.
Another methodological concern is with the procedure that participants responded to
multiple moral dilemmas in each mood condition. Although our results have ruled out the
eﬀects of time and dilemma presentation order as confounding variables due to this feature
of design, the multiple-dilemma procedure still had potential confounding eﬀects. For exam-
ple, as mentioned earlier, an unknown eﬀect was on participants’ aﬀective states during the
experiment. It is possible that responding to multiple moral dilemmas could make partici-
pants feel increasingly negative toward the end of each mood condition; and as a result, this
dilemma-elicited emotion might have had a more profound eﬀect than induced moods. As a
tentative solution, we selected a single MP dilemma presented shortly after a mood induction
and examined the mood eﬀect on moral judgement for this dilemma. Although this solution
was reasonable, there was possibly uncontrolled influence due to the selection. Therefore,
we also made a modification in Study 3 that participants responded to one MP and one MI
dilemma. Details in this regard are available in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5
Positive Mood Increases Reliance on
Predisposition to Utilitarian
Judgement (Study 3)
5.1 Study overview
The aim of Study 3 was to examine the trade-oﬀ between mood-as-buﬀer and mood’s influence
on processing style. To do so, we examined the influence of mood on moral judgement,
performance in problem-solving tasks with high cognitive demand, and self-control related
decisions that could be influenced by an “emotional buﬀer”. This design allowed for us to test
for the aﬀective buﬀer and tuning hypotheses by examining the relationship between moral
judgement and responses to the two types of non-moral tasks, respectively.
The experiment used a 3 × 2 mixed factorial design: mood (neutral, positive and negative)
was a between-subject variable, and dilemma type (MP and MI ) a within-subject variable.
Moods were induced by asking participants to write about events in their life (“self-reflective
writing”; SRW; Small & Lerner, 2006) and were measured using Visual Analogue Scales
(McCormack, Horne, & Sheather, 1998). Unlike in Study 2, participants responded to one
MP dilemma and one MI dilemma.
To test for the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, we used a self-control relevant decision task in
which participants indicated whether they were willing to receive negative feedback. Presum-
ably, accepting negative feedback comes at an emotional cost, in that people are confronted
with information focusing their weak aspects (Higgins, 1987). This feature nicely mirrors a
personal killing in the moral dilemma paradigm. Further, it is evident that positive mood
promotes one’s willingness to consider negative feedback and that positive mood reduces the
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perceived negativity of negative feedback (Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998).
These empirical results provide justification for our use of the negative feedback task to mea-
sure mood-as-buﬀer.
To test for the aﬀective tuning hypothesis, we used the Wason Selection Task (WST;
Wason, 1966) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). Importantly, as we
will see in the Method section, both cognitive tasks easily generate incorrect answers that
can be viewed as intuitive fallacies, and deliberative processing is required to reach correct
solutions (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 2009).
Also, neither cognitive task involved obvious emotional content. Thus, performance in the
tasks would unambiguously index processing style.
5.2 Experimental hypotheses
Experimental hypothesis according to the aﬀective buﬀer notion:
HA1: The likelihood of UJs in the MP dilemma would be higher in the positive mood
condition, and lower in the negative mood condition, than in the neutral mood condition.
HA2: Favourable attitude to negative feedback (i.e., willingness to accept the the feedback)
would be positively related to a utilitarian response in the MP dilemma.
HA3: The likelihood of being willing to receive negative feedback would be higher in the
positive mood condition, and lower in the negative mood condition, than in the neutral mood
condition.
Experimental hypotheses according to the aﬀective tuning notion:
HB1: The likelihood of UJs in the MP dilemma would be higher in the negative mood
condition, and lower in the positive mood condition, than in the neutral mood condition.
HB2: Performance in the cognitive tasks would be positively related to a utilitarian re-
sponse in the MP dilemma.
HB3: Performance in the cognitive tasks would be better in the negative mood condition,
and worse in the positive mood condition, than in the neutral mood condition.
Finally, with respect to the MI dilemma, following the same rational as presented for Study
2, we expected that mood would not aﬀect moral judgement in the MI dilemma, and moral
judgement in the MI dilemma would not be related to the index of mood-as-buﬀer or that of
processing strategy.
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5.3 Method
5.3.1 Participants
One hundred and nine English native speakers (43 males and 66 female; aged 18 to 62)
participated in the experiment for course credits or monetary reward at a rate of £6 per hour.
Nighty-four of the participants were students at the University of Glasgow. Participants were
recruited through posters in the departmental waiting room, mass email or word of mouth.
5.3.2 Materials
5.3.2.1 Mood manipulation (mood induction and check of manipulation
Participants assigned to the positive or negative mood condition were asked to write about
events in their lives that made them feel happy or sad; those in the neutral mood condition
were asked to describe typical ways they spent evenings. The written work was completed
in English, either on the computer or on paper, depending on the participant’s preference.
Materials for writing on paper included a stack of departmental headed paper, a pen, a pencil,
a corrected pen and eraser.
Mood was checked using a four-item questionnaire. Two items (happy, excited) measured
positive mood and two (sad, blue) measured negative mood. Each item was rated on a
computerised version of a visual analogous scale (VAS). Each scale was 100 units long (1 unit= 4 pixels), anchored at the left-hand end with the minimum extreme “Not at all ” (scored
zero) and at the right-hand end with the maximum extreme “Extremely” (scored 100; Slyker
& McNally, 1991). A vertical slash marker was initially located in the middle of each scale,
representing the medium score of 50. Participants were asked to indicate how strong they
felt an emotion by placing the slash at some point on the line. The final score was the unit
number rounded to the nearest integer (Slyker & McNally, 1991). The four scales were shown
at the same time on a single page, and above each line was a diﬀerent item.
5.3.2.2 Moral dilemmas
The one MP and one MI dilemmas used in Study 3 were selected from the test pool in Study
2. The selection was subject to the criterion that the likelihood of UJs was approximately
50% (see Appendix C). This was to ensure that we did not encounter ceiling or floor eﬀects
and to maximise the likelihood of finding mood eﬀects, if any. The MP dilemma was the
“Rescue 911” dilemma and the MI dilemma was the “Shark Attack” dilemma (Moore et al.,
2008; see Appendix A for wordings)
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5.3.2.3 Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
The CRT (Frederick, 2005) is ia simple test to measure the cognitive tendency of ability to
override false intuitive response. The test contains three mathematical questions:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? days
The tricky number and framing used in the questions make it easy for people to respond
with “intuitive” answers that are nevertheless incorrect (Frederick, 2005; correct and so-defined
intuitive answers are shown in Table 5.1). Research suggests that such intuitive fallacy can
be overcome by cognitive eﬀort (e.g., Alert et al., 2007) and that a better performance in the
CRT is associated with controlled versus emotion-loaded decision making (Frederick, 2005;
Oechssler et al., 2009). Most importantly, Paxton et al. (2012) found that CRT performance
was positively linked to UJs in MP dilemmas. Thus, the role of intuition versus reflection in
the CRT is structurally similar to the emotion-cognition mechanisms that supposedly underlie
moral judgement in MP dilemmas. The present study used a computerised version of the
CRT. The only change we made was to replace US dollar currency with British Pounds in the
bat-ball question.
Table 5.1: Correct and intuitively incorrect answers to each CRT question.
Correct answer Intuitively incorrect answer
Bat-ball 5 10
Widgets 5 100
Lily pads 47 24
5.3.2.4 Wason Selection Task (WST)
The WST (Wason, 1966) is a cognitive reasoning task in which people are presented with a
conditional hypothesis in the form “if P then Q” and are asked to find a logically valid method
to test the hypothesis. Specifically, people are provided with four cards, each supposedly
displaying the P instance (P or Not-P) on one side and the Q instance (Q or Not-Q) on the
other. Each card only shows one side, presenting the four instances: P, Not-P, Q and Not-Q.
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The task is to decide which card or cards must be turned over to test the hypothesis. The
“if P then Q” hypothesis would be false only when the case “P but not Q” was found. Thus,
the correct solution is to turn over the P card to find if the other side shows Not-Q, and to
turn over the Not-Q card to find if P is on the other side. Much research shows that people’s
ability to correctly solve the WST is rather poor, and most tend to select only the P card or
mistakenly pair it with the Q card (see, e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992 for a review).
In Study 3, we used a social version of the WST: the “social competition task” examined
by Badcock and Allen (2003). The exact wording of this WST is as follows:
“You work in a large, corporate firm, and you’re very excited because recently, you
found out that you are being considered for a promotion. It will improve your quality of
living considerably, and will guarantee your financial security for the rest of your life. It
is, without a doubt, your dream job.
But much to your dismay, you learn that three of your rivals — John, Matt and
Angela, are also being considered for the same position. Your employers tell you that
while they will appoint the best person for the job, anyone who is especially interested
in the job should probably submit an application.
Unfortunately, John, Matt and Angela are all extremely well qualified. They are
aggressive and competitive workers, and you’re extremely worried that one of them will
get the job instead of you. Also, anyone who is going to submit an application has to
write their name on the company notice-board — so if you apply and donâĂŹt get it, the
whole firm will know that you have failed.
You discuss this concern with one of your co-workers, who has been working in the
firm for some time. He thinks that you’ll get the promotion, but only if you take the risk
and submit an application. In other words:
‘IF YOU APPLY FOR THE JOB, THEN YOU WILL GET IT.’
However, the last thing you want is to apply and fail. It’s the job you’ve been waiting
for all your adult life, and if you don’t get it, you don’t think you’ll ever enjoy such a
great opportunity again.
The cards below have information about the possible outcomes of this scenario. Each
card represents a single outcome. One side of a card shows whether or not you apply for
the job, and the other side of that card shows whether or not you get it.
If you apply for the job, will you get it? Or will you fail? Only CLICK the card(s) you
definitely need to turn over to see whether or not your application would be successful.”
(Badcock & Allen, 2003, p. 653)
In the social-competition WST, the P, Not-P, Q and Not-Q cards showed “you apply for
the job”, “you don’t apply for the job”, “you get it” and “you don’t get it”, respectively.
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We selected the “social competition task” for two reasons. First, whereas very few people
correctly solve the normal version of the WST where the to-be- examined statement is about,
e.g., a conditional relationship between number and letter (e.g., Wason, 1966; with only ∼4%
solving the task), more were found to solve this social version (29% on average; Badcock
& Allen, 2003). Thus, it seemed less likely that we would encounter floor eﬀects with this
WST. Second, Badcock and Allen also showed that participants in an experiment-induced
depressed state were more likely to correctly solve the “social competition task” than control
participants. This supports the idea that negative mood could improve performance in the
WST by facilitating cognitively eﬀortful processing.
5.3.3 Procedure
Participants were tested individually. After arriving at the experiment room, participants
were seated at a table in front of an iMac computer terminal. The experiment room was
divided by an oﬃce room divider (1.57 meters high and 1.60 meters wide). After participants
signed the consent form, the experimenter went to sit on the opposite side of the divider
and left the participant alone unless questions or problems arose during the experiment. All
instructions were presented in a step-by-step fashion on the computer screen. There were
two steps before the main part of the experiment: (1) two practice dilemmas (non-moral)
to familiarise participants with the procedure of reading and submitting responses to moral
dilemmas (described below); (2) demographic data (i.e., name, age, gender and nationality)
collection along with a baseline measure of mood using the four-item VAS questionnaire; at
this point, participants were asked to what degree they were feeling each measured emotion
“at the moment”. Participants were then instructed that a “writing task” would occur three
times on an assigned topic (depending on the mood condition) and that they would be asked
to answer some “unrelated” questions between writing exercises. They then moved on to the
main part of the experiment (Step 3) by clicking an option button to write on the computer
or on paper.
Figure 5.1 shows the full sequence of stimuli at Step 3. There were three task sessions
and each session started with a SRW mood induction and ended with the check of mood
manipulation. In each mood check phase, participants responded to the mood questionnaire
by indicating how strongly they were feeling each emotion during the writing exercise in the
same session. In each task session, the in-between task (the MP dilemma, the MI dilemma
or the two cognitive tasks) was presented immediately after the mood induction procedure.
Accordingly, we called the task sessions the MP session, MI session and the cognitive task
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of the sequence of stimuli presentation in the main part of the experiment.
session. The order of task sessions was counterbalanced across participants within each mood
condition. So was the order of the two cognitive tasks within the cognitive task session. So,
for example, in a sequence of task sessions, Task 1 could be the MP dilemma, Task 2 the MI
dilemma and Task 3 the WST and CRT.
For each writing exercise, participants were asked to complete the work within 10 minutes
whilst providing “enough details” so that “other people who read the description would feel
the same” (the positive and negative mood conditions) or “would be able to reconstruct the
way they spent their evenings” (the neutral mood condition). And right before each writing
exercise, participants were instructed to write about a diﬀerent event or a diﬀerent way they
spent their evenings.
Participants read and responded to the MP and MI dilemmas in the following way. The
first line of the dilemma was presented at the top of the screen. Participants needed to press
a key on the keyboard to reveal an additional line of the text of the dilemma. The final
key-press revealed the question asking for judgement on the utilitarian action in the dilemma.
Participants responded to the question by clicking the “Yes” or “No” button on the screen.
They could change their response before submitting it by clicking the “submit” button. All
three buttons were presented below the dilemma text.
Procedures with respect to the two cognitive tasks were as follows. When the WST was
initiated, the text of the “job application” event, the four cards, instructions for answer sub-
mission and the “submit” button were presented simultaneously on one page. Each card could
be selected or de-selected by clicking or re-clicking on it. For the CRT, the three questions
were shown at the same time on one page. We presented a verbatim version of Frederick’s
(2005) instructions above the CRT questions: “below are several problems that vary in dif-
ficulty, try to answer as many as you can.” Participants could switch between questions by
pressing an assigned key and submit their answers by pressing another. Participants were free
to use handwriting materials for computation.
Following the third (final) task session at Step 3, participants were exposed to the “attitude
to negative feedback” question. To fit preceding parts of the procedure, the negative feedback
was related to participants’ written work. Specifically, participants were told through text on
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the screen that they could have their written work assessed by a “literacy critic”, who would
point out the parts where they “could have done a better job”. They were asked whether
they would be willing to receive this feedback. Participants gave their answers by clicking a
“Yes” or “No” button. The end of the experiment was then indicated. The experimenter then
verbally asked participants for their thoughts about the experiment, and their answers were
documented. Finally, participants were carefully debriefed about the experimental purpose.
5.4 Results
Data from 108 of the 109 participants were used in the analysis. One participant had to be
excluded because he was found to have participated in Study 2; he also indicated awareness
of the experimental purpose during the post-experiment oral survey. Other data exclusions
specific to diﬀerent measures were due to problems in certain parts of the procedure. These
are noted in corresponding subsections.
5.4.1 Results for mood manipulation
As mentioned in the Procedure section, mood ratings were taken at four time points: pre-
induction and after each of the three tasks. At the first point, participants indicated their
mood at the moment. At the latter three, participants indicated their mood during the
mood induction writings. Mood rating data from one participant were excluded from analyses
involving the ratings because she was confused in regard to the relevant time point of reporting
her mood.
The two items measuring negative mood (sad, blue) were reliably scaled (Pearson Product-
moment correlation coeﬃcient, r = .92); so were the two measuring positive mood (happy,
excited) (r = .74). Thus, a single index was computed by averaging ratings on items for
positive and negative moods, respectively; they were referred to as positive mood rating and
negative mood rating. The left and right panels of Figure 5.2 shows mean values of positive
and negative mood ratings. In each panel, the left, middle and right groups of bars present
results for the neutral, positive and negative mood conditions, respectively. Measures at pre-
induction, MP, MI and cognitive task (labelled as “Cog” in the figure) sessions are shown by
grey, green, blue and yellow bars.
For both positive and negative moods, pre-induction ratings did not diﬀer across the
mood conditions (see grey bars in each panel). This reveals that: (1) initial aﬀective states
of participants in one mood condition were not biased relative to those in another; and (2)
participants in diﬀerent mood conditions used the mood scales in the same way. Also, the
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Figure 5.2: Mean mood ratings for the three mood conditions at the four points. Left and right panels
correspond to results for the positive and negative mood ratings. Hash-marked bars represent 95%
CIs
ratings at the three post-induction points look similar (green, blue and yellow bars in each bar
group), suggesting that the mood induction procedure at the three points altered participants’
moods to a similar extent.
Positive mood rating was on average higher in the neutral and positive mood conditions
than in the negative one (M = 55.46, 57.59 vs. 35.58), and the opposite (M = 46.91 vs. 22.65,
19.46) was observed for the negative mood rating. This suggests that, relative to the neutral
and positive mood conditions, the negative mood condition induced an overall more negative
aﬀective state. Comparison between pre- and post-induction sessions indicated that while the
negative mood induction had a clear eﬀect by decreasing positive mood ratings and increasing
negative mood ratings, corresponding changes introduced by the positive mood induction were
relatively small. This asymmetry might be caused by the fact that participants arrived came
with a relatively positive mood (Mpositive−mood−rating = 51.56), so there would be a ceiling
eﬀect on mood ratings.
We ran a mixed two-way ANOVA, with mood condition as a between-subject variable and
time point as a within-subject variable. The model tested for main eﬀects of mood condition
and time point, and their interaction. Analyses were performed for positive and negative
mood ratings, respectively.
Analyses for positive mood rating revealed significant eﬀects of mood condition and the
two-way interaction (F (2,104) = 26.95, p < .001, ⌘2 = .341; F (6,312) = 16.21, p < .001,
⌘2 = .238). The main eﬀect of time point was not statistically reliable (F (3,312) = 1.95,
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p = .121, ⌘2 = .018). Post hoc tests indicated that ratings were lower in the negative mood
condition than in the neutral and positive ones (p < .001), whereas the latter two did not diﬀer
(p = .799). Further planned comparison indicated that the pre-induction ratings were the same
in all the mood conditions (F (2,416) = .55, p = .577). Post-induction ratings were lower than
the pre-induction measure in the negative mood condition (Fs(1,105) > 31.52, ps < .001). The
opposite pattern was true in the neutral and positive conditions (Fs(1,105) > 4.01, ps < .048;
except that in the neutral mood condition, comparison between the pre-induction and Cog
session yield a marginal eﬀect of mood induction: F (1,105) = 3.65, p = .059). Thus, both the
negative and positive mood inductions had the desired eﬀects. The slightly light-hearted state
resulting from the neutral mood induction was not entirely unexpected. When writing about
how they spent their evenings, many participants described leisure events such as watching
a movie and dining out with family and friends. Such activities presumably elicit pleasant
feelings.
For negative mood ratings, main eﬀects of mood induction and time point were both
significant (F (2,104) = 30.84, p < .001, ⌘2 = .372; F (3,312) = 21.94, p < .001, ⌘2 = .174); so
was the two-way interaction (F (6,312) = 14.06, p < .001, ⌘2 = .213). Post hoc tests illustrated
a higher rating in the negative mood condition than in neutral and positive ones (p < .001),
whereas the latter two did not diﬀer (p = .684). Pre-induction ratings were same across the
mood conditions (F (2,416) = .005, p = .995). Furthermore, while ratings increased after
each negative mood induction (Fs(1,105) > 64.12, ps < .001), they remained the same as pre-
induction ratings after the neutral and positive mood inductions (Fs(1,105) < 1.74, ps > .190;
though an exception was in the neutral mood condition, where ratings increased at the MP
Session: F (1,105) = 4.59, p = .034). This suggests that the main eﬀect of mood induction
was due to the eﬀect of the negative mood induction, which is also validated by the two-way
interaction.
Overall, Participants in diﬀerent mood conditions were in a similar aﬀective state at the
beginning of the experiment. The negative mood induction had the desired eﬀect on both
mood scales, and the positive mood induction did so on the positive mood scale. The neutral
mood induction had a similar eﬀect to the positive mood induction. Nevertheless, both the
negative and positive mood manipulations were successful.
5.4.2 Examining mood eﬀects on moral judgement
Figure 5.3 shows the proportion of participants making a UJ for the MP or MI dilemma (left
or right groups of bars) in the three mood conditions (shown by the three colours of the bars).
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The average proportions of UJs across all the mood conditions were 51% and 48% for MP
and MI dilemmas, respectively. This is fairly consistent with results from Study 2 (56% and
65%, respectively) and meets our goal of having two dilemmas with a likelihood of UJs being
approximately 50%.
The grey, green and blue bars correspond to the neutral, positive and negative mood
induction conditions. According to the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, we expected a greater pro-
portion of UJs in the MP dilemma with positive mood, compared with negative and neutral.
However, MP data showed that the diﬀerence in UJ likelihood between mood conditions was
vanishingly small (the proportions of UJs were 47%, 56% and 50% for the neutral, positive
and negative mood conditions, respectively). For the MI dilemma, both positive and negative
mood conditions show a higher UJ proportion than the neutral mood condition (50% and
56%, vs. 39%)
Figure 5.3: Proportion of participants making a UJ for the MP and MI dilemmas, in the three mood
conditions.
To test for eﬀects of mood condition, dilemma type and their interaction, we performed a
logistic regression using a GEE approach. Mood condition and dilemma type were defined as a
between-subject and a within-subject factor, respectively. MI type and non-UJ were defined as
the reference categories of response and dilemma type. Maximum-likelihood model parameters
were estimated using a logit link function with the binomial regression, and the correlation
matrix was assumed to have independent entries. Statistical tests were performed using Type
III variance with Wald Chi-Square statistic. Neither the main eﬀect of mood manipulation
nor that of dilemma type was statistically significant at the .05 level ( 2(2) = 1.34, p = .510;
 2(1) = .25, p = .616, respectively). There was also no reliable interaction ( 2(2) = 1.20,
p = .549).
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The above analysis relied on the assumption that the mood manipulation had the desired
eﬀect. While this had been revealed to be true for the negative mood induction, the eﬀect of
the positive mood induction seemed indistinguishable from that of the neutral mood induction.
Considering this imprecision, we again explored the relationship between mood rating and
moral judgement, as in Study 2; we did this analysis with the caveat that it was correlational
and we could not disambiguate real mood diﬀerence between subjects from diﬀerence in the
use of the mood scales.
The left and right panels of Figure 5.4 show the proportion of UJs for the two moral
dilemmas as a function positive and negative mood ratings, respectively. Mood ratings here
were measures in corresponding dilemma sessions. The red and black points show results for
the MP and MI dilemmas (mood ratings were grouped into five equal non-overlapping bins for
presentation, as marked on the x- axis). The scatter points at the top and bottom represent
the actual location of ratings on the mood scale (a small amount of random jitter was added
for presentation). To analyse the relationship between mood rating (positive or negative)
and moral judgement, we performed a binary regression using a GEE approach. The model
included coeﬃcients for mood rating, dilemma type (dummy variable: 0 for MP and 1 for MI;
thus MP was treated as the reference category) and their interaction. The regression fit lines
are shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Proportion of UJs as a function of mood rating. Red and black points correspond to the
MP and MI dilemma. The solid lines were fitted by the model tested above.
The fitted lines depict an interaction for the eﬀect of negative mood rating and dilemma
type on the proportion of UJs (see the right panel). The proportion of UJs in the Mp dilemma
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tended to decrease with negative mood rating. This is similar to what we found in Study
2 and consistent with the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis. Also, as expected, the proportion of
UJs in the MI dilemma seems unchanged along the mood scale. There was also a relatively
smaller increase in the proportion of UJs with positive mood rating. These trends are shown
more clearly in Figure 5.5, which shows the proportional changes in UJs for the two dilemmas
with the maximum increase in positive or negative mood rating (101: from zero to 100);
the proportional changes were predicted by the model tested above. Notably, for the MP
dilemma, the likelihood of UJs was expected to increase by 10%, with the maximum rise in
the positive mood rating, and to decrease by 23%, with the maximum rise in the negative
mood rating. There was a very small change in the likelihood of UJs with either mood rating
for the MI dilemma.
Figure 5.5: Proportional change in UJs deter-
mined by regression fit on positive and negative
mood ratings.
However, Binomial regressions revealed that none of the three coeﬃcients, i.e., coeﬃcients
for mood rating, dilemma type and the two-way interaction, was reliably diﬀerent from zero.
The statistical results are shown in Figure 5.6, in which the three panels show coeﬃcients for
mood rating, dilemma type and their interaction. Coeﬃcients were estimated using gener-
alised estimating equations. In each panel, the right and left points show results computed
by the models regressing on positive and negative mood ratings, respectively. Hash-marked
bars are 95% CIs computed using methods that are robust against inaccurate assumptions of
the covariance matrix. Thus, an eﬀect was considered reliable only when corresponding CIs
do not overlap with zero. This was not the case for any of the tested coeﬃcients.
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Figure 5.6: Statistical results of the regressions on mood scales. Panels, from left to right, show
coeﬃcients for mood rating, dilemma type and the two-way interaction. In each panel, the left and
right points are coeﬃcients computed from the models regressing on positive and negative mood
ratings, respectively. Hash-marked bars indicate 95% CIs.
5.4.3 Results regarding attitude to negative feedback
Figure 5.7 shows the proportion of UJs as a function of dilemma type and attitude to negative
feedback. The green and grey bars correspond to cases where participants were willing and
unwilling to receive critical feedback on their written work. For the MP dilemma, it seems
that more UJs came from those who were not willing to consider the negative feedback (54%
vs. 48%). This is in contrast to what would be expected according to the aﬀective buﬀer
hypothesis. The opposite pattern is shown for the MI dilemma, where more UJs came from
those who indicated willingness to consider the negative feedback (50% vs. 46%). However,
both eﬀects were vanishingly small.
Figure 5.7: Proportion of UJs as a function
of dilemma type and attitude to negative feed-
back.
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We conducted a binary regression using a GEE approach, including coeﬃcients of attitude
to negative feedback, dilemma type and a two-way interaction. Unwillingness and MP were
treated as the reference categories of attitude and dilemma type. Neither the eﬀect of attitude
nor that of dilemma type was significant (  = −.24, zRobust = −.61, p = .542;   = −.35,
zRobust = −.95, p = .342, respectively). Nor was the interaction (  = −.41, zRobust = −.89,
p = .373). Both the lack of statistical significance and the small eﬀect size illustrate a lack of
relationship between attitude to negative feedback and moral judgement for both MP and MI
dilemmas. The result regarding the MI dilemma was within expectations, and that regarding
the MP dilemma was not supportive of the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis.
The use of attitude to critical feedback to measure an emotional buﬀer was built on the
empirical evidence that positive mood promotes and negative mood inhibits acceptance of
negative feedback (Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998). Thus, it was important
that we obtained the same mood eﬀects to ensure that attitude to negative feedback measured
in our experiment was a valid index of mood-as-buﬀer. Figure 5.8 shows the proportion of
participants willing to receive negative feedback in the three mood conditions (ppositive = 56%,
pnegative = 47%, pneutral = 69%) We ran Likelihood-ratio Chi-square Test to test for the
association between mood condition and attitude to negative feedback. The result, however,
revealed that attitude was independent of mood condition ( 2(2) = 3.71, p = .156,   = .18),
suggesting that attitude to negative feedback measured in our experiment might not be a
valid index of an emotional buﬀer.
Figure 5.8: Proportion of UJs as a function
of dilemma type and attitude to negative feed-
back.
Nevertheless, given the imprecision of the mood manipulation discussed earlier, we also
explored the relationship between attitude to negative feedback and mood rating. We per-
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formed a binary regression, and the model tested for the coeﬃcient of mood rating. Analyses
were carried out for positive and negative mood ratings,18 respectively. Regression fitted lines
are shown in Figure 5.9, where the solid and dotted lines correspond to regressions on positive
and negative mood ratings.
The likelihood of being willing to receive negative feedback increased with positive mood
rating, and this eﬀect was significant (  = .02, z = 1.96, p = .050). In contrast, it tended to
decrease with negative mood rating (  = −.01, z = −1.61, p = .11). This pattern provides
rough evidence that attitude to negative feedback as measured in our experiment could have
indexed an emotional buﬀer. However, this interpretation comes with the caveat that the
mood ratings used here did not precisely measure participants’ aﬀective states right before
they chose whether to receive critical feedback.
In sum, a favourable attitude to negative feedback was associated with positive mood. On
the other hand, there was no measurable relationship between the attitude and choices in the
MP dilemma. These suggest a lack of a mediating role of mood-as-buﬀer in moral judgements.
An alternative interpretation should be noted however: the seemingly comparable “buﬀer”
function of positive mood might have diﬀerent underlying mechanism in the negative feedback
and moral dilemma paradigms. We will return to this point in the Discussion section.
Figure 5.9: Proportion of UJs as a function
of dilemma type and attitude to negative feed-
back.
18Because participants responded to this “feedback” question immediately after the last task session, we
did not have a direct measure of participants’ aﬀective state right before then. As a tentative solution, we
used mood ratings reported in the last task session for this analysis, given its temporal closeness. As a result,
possible aﬀective change due to activities in the last task session was arbitrarily ignored.
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5.4.4 Results regarding the CRT
CRT data from one participant in the negative mood condition were not collected due to a
computer malfunction and thus could not be included in following analyses.
5.4.4.1 Relationship between moral judgement and CRT performance
Figure 5.10 presents the proportions of UJs in the MP and MI dilemmas in cases where a
CRT question was correctly or incorrectly answered. Panels, from left to right, correspond
to the bat-ball, widgets and lily pads questions (called q(bat-ball), q(widget) and q(lily pads)
hereafter). In each panel, the dark and grey bars correspond to incorrect and correct answers,
and the left and right groups of bars to the MP and MI dilemmas. As shown in the bat-ball
panel, the likelihood of MP-UJs was clearly higher when the question was solved correctly
(68%) than when it was not (43%). While the opposite pattern appeared for the MI dilemma,
the eﬀect was very small (correct versus incorrect: 47% vs. 52%). With respect to q(widgets)
and q(lily pads), it seems that for both dilemmas, the likelihood of UJs was lower in the
correct than the incorrect cases (47% vs. 52%; 47% vs. 55%; respectively). But again, the
eﬀects were fairly small.
Figure 5.10: Proportion of UJs in the two types of dilemmas when a CRT question was answered
correctly or not. Panels, from left to right, correspond to q(bat-ball), q(widgets) and q(lily pads).
For each question, a participant was scored one if he correctly answered the question and
zero otherwise. This scoring method was the same as that used by Frederick (2005), Paxton et
al. (2012) and other researchers (e.g., Alter et al., 2007) who employed CRT performance as an
index of depth or style of processing. To test for the relationship between moral judgement and
CRT performance, we ran binomial regression using a GEE approach. The model included
coeﬃcients of answer score, dilemma type and their interaction. Analyses were conducted
for each of the three CRT questions. Correctly solving q(bat-ball), compared to failing it,
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significantly increased the log-odds of UJs in the MP dilemma (  = 1.01, zRobust = 2.24,
p = .025). There was no reliable eﬀect of dilemma type (  = .26, zRobust = 1.05, p = .294) when
the model was tested for q(bat-ball). But the two-way interaction was significant (  = −1.33,
zRobust = −2.44, p = .015), suggesting that good performance in q(bat-ball) was associated
with a lower proportion of UJs in the MI dilemma. For the other two CRT questions, neither
the coeﬃcient of answer score nor that of dilemma type was diﬀerent from zero; nor was that
of the interaction term (￿zRobust￿s < .88). Thus, performance in q(widgets) or q(lily pads) was
not predictive of moral judgements.
This discrepancy in predicting moral judgement between CRT items might be due to the
correctness standard. That is, this criterion might have been most appropriate for q(bat-
ball). Thus, the correct/incorrect distinction in q(bat-ball), relative to that in the other
two questions, was more informative of processing style. Response distribution of the CRT
questions provided support for this notion. Figure 5.11 shows the response distribution of
each CRT question. The grey, blue and pink bars correspond to q(bat-ball), q(widgets) and
q(lily pads). The four groups of bars, from left to right, show proportions of participants
providing the correct, the intuitive, a non-intuitive incorrect and no answer. As shown by the
leftmost bar group, relative to q(widgets) and q(lily pads), q(bat-ball) was much less likely
to receive its correct answer (29%; 34% and 54% for the widgets and lily pads questions,
respectively). However, as shown by the “intuitive” bar group, q(bat-ball) was the item most
likely to receive its intuitive answer, suggesting that q(bat-ball) was the trickiest among the
three. This implies that when responding to the CRT, it could be most diﬃcult to overcome
the intuitive solution to q(bat- ball). Thus, correctly solving this question could demonstrate a
reflective processing style more validly. This idea was somewhat supported by the observation
that whereas more than 60% of those correctly answering q(bat-ball) also successfully solved
q(widgets) (64%) or q(lily pads) (77%) questions, it was less likely for those solving q(widgets)
(56%) or q(lily pads) (41%) to correctly answer q(bat-ball).
In addition, as shown in Figure 5.11, whereas q(bat-ball) generated mostly its correct and
intuitive answers, responses to the other two questions were more distributed. Specifically,
only 7% of the participants responded to q(bat-ball) with a non-intuitive incorrect answer or
did not provide an answer. By comparison, a much higher percentage did so for the widgets
(21%) and lily pads (19%) questions. This is noteworthy because although non-intuitive
incorrect answers did not qualify as good performances in terms of correctness, the fact that
they were diﬀerent from the intuitive answers suggests that they might also have resulted from
relatively careful processing but failed due to computation mistakes. Thus, the diﬀerence in
response distribution between q(bat-ball) and the other two questions suggests that evaluating
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Figure 5.11: Response distributions for the three CRT questions.
performance based on correctness was most appropriate for q(bat-ball). Taken together, the
results of the CRT response distribution suggest that the correct/incorrect distinction in
q(bat-ball) was most reliable as a measure of reflective versus intuitive processing. Thus,
for the following analyses involving CRT performance, we used score for q(bat-ball) (called
bat-ball score for simplicity).
5.4.4.2 Relationship between mood and bat-ball score
The following analysis examined whether mood aﬀected answer to the bat-ball question.
Only if so could the above correlation between bat-ball score and UJ in the MP dilemma be
attributed to mood’s influence on processing strategy. The left and right panels of Figure 5.12
show the proportion of participants correctly solving q(bat-ball) as a function of positive and
negative mood ratings. Mood ratings were those measured in the cognitive task sessions. For
presentation, mood ratings were binned into five equal non-overlapping intervals. The scatter
points (slightly jittered to make presentation clearer) at the top and bottom represent the
actual location of ratings on the mood scale.
We ran a binary regression including coeﬃcients for mood rating. Analyses were run for
positive and negative mood ratings. Lines fitted by the regression are shown in Figure 5.12.
As shown by these relatively flat fitted lines, both coeﬃcients yielded a very small eﬀect size
and were not statistically reliable (positive mood:   = −.007, z = −.70, p = .481; negative
mood:   = −.001, z = −.11, p = .912), suggesting a lack of relationship between mood rating
and bat-ball score. These results suggest that mood did not aﬀect answer to q(bat-ball).
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Figure 5.12: Proportion of participants correctly answering q(bat-ball) as a function of positive or
negative mood rating. The solid lines are regression fitted lines.
5.4.4.3 Predictiveness of the bat-ball score depends on mood
The result that reflective processing measured by bat-ball score was predictive of a UJ in
the MP dilemma was consistent with Paxton et al.’s (2012) finding that a greater acceptance
of MP-UJs was associated with a better CRT performance (though in their study the per-
formance was indexed by the summed score across questions). However, bat-ball score was
independent of mood. This, taken at face value, suggests that the processing eﬀect was not
attributed to mood and thus disproves the idea that mood influences moral judgement by
alerting a certain processing style via tuning about the current situation.
On the other hand, this independence between mood and CRT performance reveals that
CRT might measure characteristic reflectiveness that is unaﬀected by momentary factors such
as mood. Accordingly, the link between bat-ball score and MP moral judgement demonstrates
an eﬀect of “trait reflectiveness” on moral judgement, an idea also abstracted by Paxton et al.
(2012). Indeed, recent research suggests that the CRT in large part measures a disposition
to solving problems in an elaborative way (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010; Oechsslera, et al.,
2009), and that performance in the test is not even necessarily related to built-in capacity
such as numeric skill (Campitelli & Labollita, 2010).
Frederick (2005) and Oechsslera et al. (2009) showed that those who performed better in
the CRT also behaved more patiently in an intertemporal choice task and tended to make
the long-term choice (i.e., choosing a larger, delayed reward over a smaller, immediate one).
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Thus, it seems CRT could measure dispositional reflectiveness in regard to the extent to which
one’s decision is not immediately driven by emotional impulse. Related to the moral dilemma
paradigm, this implies that participants who correctly answered the bat-ball question might
have a disposition to think about the moral problem in a thorough pattern; by contrast, those
who failed the question might be more likely to respond impulsively. Taking this notion a
little further, CRT performance might to some extent indicate tell moral inclination, such that
those who performed better in the test are more likely to be utilitarian in general. Indeed,
in an analysis where response time (RT) for moral judgement was included as a predictor
reflecting depth or eﬀort of processing, we found that the association between bat-ball score
and utilitarian judgement was not moderated by the RT.19 However, due to the low reliability
of this result, for the following analysis we entertained the idea that bat-ball score measured
one’s dispositional tendency to make a moral judgement upon reflection or impulse (but we
will return to the proposal of moral inclination in the Discussion section).
Taking account of this individual diﬀerence in dispositional processing style would lead
to an alternative hypothesis for how mood might influence moral judgement. As reviewed in
Chapter 2, recently revised AAI theorising suggests that mood’s influence on JDM depends
on “what comes to mind” at the moment (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). That is, mood aﬀects
one’s final response by “conferring” value on the most accessible cognition content at the
response moment, including thoughts, inclination, processing tendency and so forth (Clore
& Huntsinger, 2007, 2009). Accordingly, positive mood should be expected to prove the
perceived appropriateness or necessity of one’s dispositional approach to a moral dilemma
(i.e., to think about it elaborately or just go with the feeling that killing is bad), whereas
negative mood would confer a negative value to it and in turn invalidate one’s initial processing
tendency. Following this rationale, the eﬀect of trait reflectiveness, as measured by the bat-
ball score, should be profound when participants’ mood was positive but diminished when
participants’ mood was negative.
Figure 5.13 shows proportions of UJs in the MP dilemma when q(bat-ball) was correctly
or incorrectly answered. The three groups of bars correspond to the three mood conditions.
As expected, in the positive mood condition, the likelihood of UJs was much higher among
19The analysis uses a binomial regression with bat-ball score and RT as predictors and MP moral judgement
as a dependent variable. The model included coeﬃcients for bat-ball score, RT and their interaction. Correctly
answering the bat-ball question increased the odds of UJ by 1.30 (p = .054). In contrast, neither the coeﬃcient
of RT nor that of the two-way interaction was diﬀerent from zero (ps > .315). This result, however, is of low
reliability given that the data could not allow for distinction between real diﬀerence in RT and individual
diﬀerence in response latency.
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participants who answered the question correctly than those who answered it incorrectly
(91% vs. 40%). Eﬀects in the same direction were observed in the neutral (54% vs. 44%) and
negative (57% vs. 46%) mood conditions, but were much less pronounced.
Figure 5.13: Proportions of UJs in the three mood conditions when q(bat-ball) was correctly answered
or not.
Statistical analysis used a binomial regression with moral judgement in the MP dilemma
as the dependent variable. The model included coeﬃcients for mood (with positive mood
condition as the reference level), the bat-ball score (set as a categorical variable with the
score of zero as reference level), and a two-way interaction. As expected, in the positive
mood condition, correctly answering the bat-ball question, relative to failing it, substantially
increased the log-odds of UJs (  = 2.71, z = 2.41, p = .016). The eﬀect of correctness was largely
eliminated in both the neutral and negative mood conditions (eﬀects relative to the positive
mood condition:   = −2.91, z = −1.73, p = .083;   = −2.28, z = −1.61, p = .107). Binomial
regression including the coeﬃcient of the bat-ball score run for the neutral or negative mood
condition showed that in neither condition was the coeﬃcient diﬀerent from zero (ps > .532)
Thus, whereas dispositional reflectiveness increased the likelihood of UJs in the positive mood,
dispositional processing style had no eﬀect on moral judgement in the neutral or negative mood
conditions. Whereas the result for the negative mood condition was expected, that for the
neutral mood condition was not, given that participants who experienced the neutral mood
induction reported positive feelings at a similar level to those who experienced the positive
mood induction. This suggests that the combined eﬀect of positive mood induction and
processing disposition might be also due to some feature of the mood-induction procedure.
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5.4.5 Results for the WST
WST data from one participant in the negative mood condition were not collected due to a
computer malfunction and thus could not be included in the following analyses.
Table 5.2 shows counts and frequencies (in parentheses) of diﬀerent responses to the WST.
The top three rows correspond to the three mood conditions and the bottom row shows the
overall results regardless of mood condition. The four columns, from left to right, correspond
to the logically correct response (selecting P card and Not-Q card), the two most common
logical fallacies (selecting P card or selecting P and Q cards) and other errors in selection.
As shown in the “overall” row, a rather small proportion of participants (6%) correctly solved
the WST, whereas most participants made the two common errors (79%). The pattern was
shown across mood conditions, though it is more obvious in the neutral mood condition
than the other two. Likelihood ration Chi-square test revealed that it was not evident to
reject the null hypothesis that the WST response distribution was the same across mood
conditions ( 2(6) = 9.82, p = .132,   = .29). These results are dramatically contrary to those
of Badcock and Allen’s (2003), who showed that a fairly high percentage of participants (29%)
correctly solved the social-competition WST, and that non-clinically depressed participants
outperformed neutral-aﬀect ones in the task. Rather, our results suggest that this social-
contextualised WST, like the normal version of the WST (e.g., Wason, 1966), was also rather
diﬃcult to answer correctly. Thus, it seems likely that we encountered a floor eﬀect with
respect to performance in the WST.
Table 5.2: Responses to the WST.
Correct P error P&Q error Other error
Neutral Mood 3 (8%) 20 (56%) 11 (30%) 2 (6%)
Positive Mood 2 (6%) 18 (50%) 9 (25%) 7 (19%)
Negative Mood 2 (6%) 10 (28%) 16 (46%) 7 (20%)
Overall 7 (6%) 48 (45%) 36 (34%) 16 (15%)
This contradiction between our and Badcock and Allen’s (2003) results might be at-
tributable to procedural diﬀerences. In the current study, participants dealt with only one
WST. In contrast, those in Badcock and Allen’s study responded to four WSTs in total and,
more importantly, the social-competition WST followed a “truth-detection” WST, which was
the most diﬃcult among the four. The repeated presentation and the diﬃculty of the pre-
vious test were likely to improve performance in the social-competition WST. Participants
might have suspected that the task was more diﬃcult than they thought and thus try harder
to solve it. Thus the overall likelihood of accuracy was higher than that observed among
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participants in the current study. Nevertheless, due to the rather low accuracy rate across
mood conditions, we did not use WST performance as a measure to examine the hypothesised
processing eﬀect of mood.
5.5 Discussion
The aim of Study 3 was to investigate the trade-oﬀ between a buﬀer eﬀect and a processing
eﬀect of mood on moral judgement. Below, I consider possible interpretations and implications
of our results while discussing methodological concerns and suggesting directions for further
research.
5.5.1 Mood as an aﬀective buﬀer
The primary result, that UJ likelihood for the MP dilemma tended to increase with positive
mood but to decrease with negative mood, seems in accordance with the buﬀer hypothesis.
However, further analyses revealed that moral judgement was not associated with attitude to
negative feedback and that the acceptance of negative feedback increased with positive mood
but decreased with negative mood. These results, in combination, contradict the idea that
mood aﬀects moral judgement by modifying the emotional negativity integrated in a moral
dilemma. However, this interpretation is inconclusive in (at least) two respects.
First, the dissociation of moral judgement from attitude to negative feedback could alter-
natively suggest that underlying the seemingly comparable buﬀer function of positive mood
might be diﬀerent mechanisms in the two paradigms. Although early research suggests that
positive mood increases willingness to consider negative feedback by diminishing the per-
ceived negativity of the feedback (Trope & Neter, 1994), extended research along the same
line demonstrates that the enhancing eﬀect of positive mood is perhaps through facilitating
an elaborative assessment of negative feedback instead of, or in addition to, downgrading its
negativity (Gervey, Igou, & Trope, 2005; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002; Trope & Pomerantz,
1998). This is indicated by such findings that people in a positive mood think about and recall
more negative than positive suggestive information, and that the more a positive-mood per-
son is biased to processing negative feedback, the worse he feels afterwards (Raghunathan &
Trope, 2002). This mediating eﬀect of negative feedback processing in mood change suggests
that negative feedback is indeed distressful for people in a positive mood. Further studies
also showed that positive mood facilitates processing of negative feedback by adopting a self-
improvement versus ego-defence goal (e.g., Gervey et al., 2005; Trope & Pomerantz, 1998).
This motivational eﬀect on processing of emotion-laden stimuli is not comparable with the
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hypothesised buﬀer eﬀect that positive mood encourages a utilitarian choice by undermining
its emotional cost. Perhaps due to such a diﬀerence was moral judgement not found to be
linked with attitude to negative feedback.
Second, it is questionable whether attitude to negative feedback measured in the current
experiment validly indexed a buﬀer eﬀect of mood, regardless of whether the eﬀect was due
to motivational processing of negative feedback or due to attenuating emotional negativity
of the feedback. Specifically, while we found that willingness to accept negative feedback
increased with positive mood rating and decreased with negative mood rating, this relational
result was obtained with the caveat that mood rating data entered in the analysis could not
capture participants’ mood when responding to the attitude-revealing question. Strictly, as
indicated by the independence between attitude and mood induction, mood did not aﬀect the
likelihood that one was willing to accept the critical feedback on his previous written work.
This absence of a mood eﬀect, however, could be argued to be caused by a lack of diagnostic
importance of the feedback, which casts doubt on the eﬀectiveness of attitude to negative
feedback being an indicator of mood as buﬀer.
Research investigating the role of mood in coping with feedback shows that positive mood
overcomes the emotional deterrent of negative feedback only when the feedback addresses a
domain of personal importance and when the feedback is reliable (Gervey et al., 2005; Raghu-
nathan & Trope, 2002; Reed & Aspinwall, 1998; Trope & Neter, 1994; Trope & Pomerantz,
1998). Although participants in the current study were explicitly asked to write in an aﬀecting
way, and thus the quality of their work could be evaluated, the random format of the writing
entailed that participants might not be concerned with this assessment. As a result, feedback
on the written work was perceived as unimportant. This issue was conveyed by participants’
post-experiment comments. Many participants indicated that since they did not attempt
the written task, the feedback could hardly be important or informative. In addition, there
seemed to be an unexpected eﬀect of the written content due to its self-conveying character.
Specifically, some of the participants who wrote about negative experiences expressed their
unwillingness to disclose their private vulnerability to criticism.
Taken together, our results are unable to conclusively reject the aﬀective buﬀer hypothe-
sis. Nevertheless, inspection of the results and possible methodological shortcomings suggest
directions for future research by addressing the above questions. Future research can employ
an emotion-neutral task on which negative feedback is perceived as both self-relevant and
important. Attitude to negative feedback (e.g., willingness to accept it, interest in consider-
ing it) should also be measured immediately following a mood induction task. Furthermore,
results obtained from the revised design may in turn suggest a re-examination of the buﬀer
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hypothesis for mood’s influence on moral judgement. Specifically, if, with the revised design,
results reveal a reliable association between UJ and favourable attitude to negative feedback,
and replicate the buﬀer eﬀect of positive mood on attitude to negative feedback, it could be
argued that positive mood’s buﬀer eﬀect on moral judgement is due to facilitating an elabo-
rate processing of a moral problem instead of simply undermining negative emotion elicited
by the problem.
5.5.2 Mood and processing strategy
By addressing the relationship between cognitive task performance and moral judgement, and
the relationship between cognitive task performance and mood, we examined the aﬀective
tuning hypothesis, according to which mood influences moral judgement by alerting a certain
processing style via its informational function. We found that successfully solving the most
revealing CRT question, i.e., the bat-ball question, was associated with a higher UJ likelihood
in the MP dilemma. This result, reconciled with the dual-process model for moral judgement
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008), suggests that moral judgement can be guided by processing
style such that engaging in reflective processing gives rise to UJs, which was similarly revealed
by previous research (e.g., Moore et al., 2008; Paxton et al., 2012). However, the result that
bat-ball score, as an index of processing style, was independent of mood suggests that the
processing eﬀect on moral judgement could not be attributed to diﬀerence in mood, thus
disproving the aﬀective tuning hypothesis. However, further analyses suggest that mood
might have aﬀected moral judgement through informational value, but the aﬀective tuning
hypothesis was invalid due to neglecting individual diﬀerence in trait reflectiveness during
analysis.
The independence between bat-ball score and mood gives rise to the idea that bat-ball score
measured one’s dispositional reflectiveness versus impulsiveness, based on research showing
CRT performance as an indicator of characteristic tendency to make a decision upon reflection
instead of emotional impulse (Oechssler et al., 2009). A follow-up analysis considering this
individual diﬀerence showed that the predictive link from dispositional reflective processing
to UJ was a function of mood. Whereas dispositional reflectiveness was related with a higher
likelihood of UJs in the positive mood condition, no such a processing eﬀect was found in
either the neutral or negative mood condition.
This interaction between processing disposition and mood can be argued to fit into Clore
and Huntsinger’s (2007, 2009) mood-and-accessible-cognition framework, which suggests that
positive or negative mood aﬀects JDM by conveying positive or negative value on the most
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accessible cognition content (e.g., thought, inclination, processing tendency) in the first in-
stance. Accordingly, we argued that positive or negative mood provides positive or negative
value to one’s initially activated approach to a moral dilemma. That is, if a person is generally
disposed to cope with problems in a reflective pattern and tends to do the same when faced
with a moral dilemma, he would see this processing tendency as appropriate when being in a
good rather than a bad mood, and would in turn be more likely to make a UJ. Similarly, if
a person in general tends to respond spontaneously based on emotion, this inclination would
be particularly likely to operate and in turn promote non-UJs when in a good mood. Con-
sistent with this idea, whereas there was a disparity of UJ probability between reflective and
impulsive tendency in the positive mood condition, moral judgement was not diﬀerentiated
by dispositional processing tendency in the negative mood condition. This meta-cognition
pattern is in line with the idea that mood influences moral judgement by conveying informa-
tion about the value of one’s initially activated processing tendency. From this perspective,
our results are in accordance with other research demonstrating a meta-cognition mannered
mood eﬀect on cognitive processing. For example, Ruder and Bless (2003) showed that pos-
itive mood promotes reliance on the “ease-of-retrieval” heuristic; that is, people in a positive
mood, compared to those in a negative mood, are more likely to judge a position as credible
when they find it easy to come up with arguments for the position. Similarly, Koch and
Forgas (2012) found that when judging whether a claim was true, participants in positive but
not negative mood relied on “processing fluency” as a clue that the claim was true. Just as
mood confers value on the ease-of-retrieval feeling or the congruence-truth link, mood confers
value on reflective or impulsive processing in response to a moral dilemma.
The current study uses bat-ball score, a dependent variable, as a criterion to assign par-
ticipants into dispositional reflectiveness or impulsiveness groups. This means the sample size
of each level was not balanced. Thus, we expected a modest reliability of the interaction
between mood and dispositional processing. Future research can address this problem by
setting processing tendency as an independent variable, priming participants with reflective
or impulsive processing tendency.
5.5.3 Mood and goal adoption
The interaction between processing disposition and mood also gives rise to a thought with
respect to mood’s influence on goal adoption: positive mood encourages and negative mood
inhibits the adoption of a utilitarian goal. This thought is first based on the proposal that
CRT performance might have measured the degree to which one is utilitarian in general. This
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proposal is drawn in part from the predictive role of CRT score for utilitarian judgement, as
found in both Paxton et al.’s and the current study. It also builds on research that consistently
shows the predictive power of CRT performance on responses in a variety of heuristic-and-bias
tasks (i.e., tasks in which certain illogical or short-term responses are prepotent; Campitelli
& Labollita, 2010; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). More importantly, score on the CRT is
found to account for a considerable amount of variance in heuristic-and-bias task performance
that is unexplainable by cognitive ability or dispositional processing style (see Toplak et al.,
2011).
Accurate responses in most heuristic-and-bias tasks require both deliberative processing
and capacity of computing or inferring accurate answers (Stanovich, 2009). Thinking dis-
position can be argued to be responsible for the activation of deliberative processing, and
cognitive capacity for accurate computation or logical reasoning. Thus, the CRT seems to
uniquely measure some other construct than cognitive capacity and dispositional processing.
Two specific economic tasks — in both of which responses are found to be predicted by CRT
performance — provide a hint in this regard. One is the intertemporal choice task, in which
one is faced with a choice between a smaller, immediate and a larger, delayed reward. An-
other is a gambling task in which the risk-taking choice corresponds to a high expected value.
CRT performance has been found to be positively predictive of long-term decisions in both
tasks (i.e., the larger but delayed reward and risk-taking choice; Campitelli & Labollita, 2010;
Frederick, 2005). Note that whereas an inaccurate response is immediately available in most
heuristic-and-bias tasks (e.g., the Linda problem; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) this is not the
case for the intertemporal choice and high-expected-value gambling tasks. These two tasks,
like a moral dilemma, create a dilemma where one is faced with an immediate reward, safety
and a future larger gain. Thus, inhibiting the pursuance of a short-term benefit calls for the
consideration of future payment. Simply put, one needs to be farsighted. This gives rise to
the idea that the CRT might uniquely measure a broader processing scale, which enables one
to assess given information as a whole rather than focusing mainly on salient pieces.
Thus, those who performed better in the CRT, when faced with a moral dilemma, might
be more likely to consider saving the majority versus minority while being less bounded by
the aﬀective pain. Interpreted in this way, CRT performance might, to some extent, indicate
whether one can be seen as utilitarian in general. This is not to say that a utilitarian choice
in a moral dilemma is necessarily the rational decision. Rather, we contend a notion that
those who are utilitarian keep in mind a goal being deciding for the greater good. Indeed,
as mentioned earlier, we found that the predictive power of dispositional reflectiveness, as
indexed by bat-ball score, was not moderated by the response time in the moral dilemma.
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Admittedly, this result is of low reliability because the current data do not allow for the
partition of variance of individual diﬀerence in response latency. Nevertheless, it still gives
rise to the idea that for those performing better in the CRT, reaching a utilitarian judgement
does not necessarily rely on more eﬀortful processing. Thus, those performing better in the
CRT may have been habituated to be inclined to a utilitarian goal (this routine may be shaped
by e.g., individual learning, circulation by culture).
Relating CRT performance to utilitarianism, the combined eﬀect of mood and bat-ball
correctness can be argued in terms of mood’s influence on goal adoption. Research in neu-
rophysiology distinguishes an approach system generally related to positive aﬀect and an
avoidance system generally related to negative aﬀect (cf. Carver & White, 1994; Depue &
Collins, 1999).20 Congruent with this implicit association between positive or negative aﬀect
and approach or avoidance tendency, research on mood and motivation shows that positive
mood encourages the adoption of the most accessible goal whereas negative mood promotes
avoidance of the goal (Fishbach & Labroo, 2007). Our results can be argued to be compatible
with this pattern and thus add to the argument that positive mood promotes goal adoption
whereas negative mood dissuades it. For those whose most accessible goal is utilitarian, being
in a positive mood facilitates the adoption of the goal whereas being in a negative mood
inhibits it. As a result, the utilitarian inclination gives rise to a UJ in the positive but not
negative mood condition. This interpretation is also compatible with the mood-and-accessible-
cognition framework, if the most accessible cognition content refers to one’s accessible goal at
the moment. This idea, that mood can aﬀect moral judgement by encouraging the adoption or
rejection of a utilitarian goal, can be further examined by priming participants with diﬀerent
moral-related goals.
Finally, note the above explanations in terms of mood’s influence on the adoption of
dispositional processing or a utilitarian goal cannot account for the result in the neutral mood
condition. Whereas participants receiving the neutral-mood manipulation were induced with
a positive mood at a similar level to those receiving the positive-mood manipulation, moral
judgements were not diﬀerentiated by CRT performance in the neutral mood condition. This
diﬀerence suggests that the facilitating eﬀect of positive mood induction on the predictive
power of CRT performance might be not only an eﬀect of a positive mood. For example,
writing about happy life experience, compared to casual evening activities, might enhance
one’s self-esteem and thus cause one to value the most accessible processing tendency or goal.
20Though it should be noted that some specific negative emotion, e.g., anger, is associated with approach
tendency (Carver, 2004).
126
Indeed, congruent with this view, research on self-esteem shows that people with high self-
esteem tend to focus on positive aspects of accessible information (Dodgson & Wood, 1998).
Given this imprecision in mood eﬀect in the current study, future research should employ
various mood induction methods to confirm the observed mood eﬀect.
Nevertheless, our results highlight the need to consider individual diﬀerence in cognitive
aspects related to JDM, such as thinking disposition and implicit motivation, as reflected in
the current study. Meanwhile, the importance of considering such dispositional factors also
gives rise to thoughts on the comparison between the current dilemma paradigm and the
paradigms used by de Vries et al. (2008b, 2012), who showed that positive mood facilitates
reliance on intuitive processing whereas negative mood promotes reliance on deliberate pro-
cessing. It might be due to certain essential diﬀerences between the paradigms that our results
contradict the initial thesis hypothesis that positive mood gives rise to emotion-based judge-
ments or decisions whereas negative mood increases more cognitively controlled outcomes.
This perspective will be discussed in detail in the following (General Discussion) chapter.
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Chapter 6
General Discussion
6.1 Review of empirical chapters
The current thesis aims to explore the influence of mood on JDM in scenarios positing an
emotion/deliberation dilemma such that spontaneous, emotional judgements and decisions are
in conflict with more controlled, objective, utilitarian judgements and decisions. The initial
thesis hypothesis was that positive mood should give rise to judgements or decisions reflective
of an emotional impulse, whereas negative mood should give rise to judgements or decisions
characterised by cognitive control. This hypothesis was built on the AAI theoretical framework
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) and related empirical evidence
suggesting that moods present valence-congruent information about the current situation and
in turn influence processing style. To examine the hypothesis, we used two specific paradigms
that are analogously assumed to incorporate the emotion/deliberation dilemma: One is the
mini-UG setting, in which intention- and outcome-based decisions should be diverged (Study
1); the other is a moral dilemma paradigm in which a utilitarian judgement favouring the
welfare of the majority is at the cost of an emotion-laden act sacrificing the minority (Studies
2 & 3).
Study 1 examined the eﬀect of a sad mood, relative to a neutral mood, on responders’
decisions in the mini-UG. Drawing on research on emotion and fairness perception (Hegtvedt
& Killian, 1999; Sanfey et al., 2003), on negotiations (Babcock et al., 1997; Leung et al., 2004)
and on attribution (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), we reasoned that the mini-UG engendered an
emotion/deliberation dilemma in cases where a highly disadvantageous oﬀer (e.g., 2 out of 10
tokens) is backed with a sensible justification (e.g., the alternative option is even worse, as was
the case in the Hyper-unfair game). We proposed that in such cases, an aversive emotional
response to the disadvantageous inequality would opt for rejection of the oﬀer, whereas more
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cognitively controlled processing would promote the objective assessment of the situation,
hence acceptance of the oﬀer.
For the core idea of the thesis, we hypothesised that a sad mood would promote acceptance
of seemingly unfair oﬀers when they are justifiable given certain situational constraints. This
experimental hypothesis was based on the AAI framework and empirical evidence that a
sad mood imposes reliance on deliberative processing versus intuitive feeling (de Vries et al.,
2008b, 2012), promotes situational attribution in the presence of environmental force (Forgas,
1998b), and increases equity-based fairness judgements and decisions (Inness et al., 2005;
Sinclair & Mark, 1991). These, in combination, arguably suggest that a sad mood should give
rise to decisions reflective of a more comprehensive assessment of the situation.
Our results, however, did not meet the initial prediction; rather, they showed comparable
likelihoods of rejecting 8:2 oﬀers between participants receiving a neutral mood induction and
those receiving a sad mood induction. This null eﬀect of a sad mood was further discussed
in view of a rather minor impact of intention on responders’ decisions in the mini-UG, which
was suggested by both our results for game type and the literature of reciprocity behaviour.
Specifically, we found that whereas an 8:2 oﬀer was highly rejected disregarding the variation
in intention, a 6:4 oﬀer was fairly easily accepted when it came with a reasonable intention. A
relatively definite reading of the contrast could be that the consideration of intention depends
on the quality of outcome. Nevertheless, a more fundamental point is that payoﬀ distribution
plays a highly dominant role over intention in determining socio-economic decisions. A closer
analysis of relevant literature showed that this claim was in accordance with the empirical
evidence that payoﬀ distribution, but not intention or intentionality, determines final decisions
in the context of positive reciprocity (Stanca, 2010; Xiao & Bicchieri, 2010).
In Studies 2 and 3, we used a moral dilemma paradigm to examine the idea that moods
can influence moral judgements by aﬀecting individuals’ processing style. In a moral dilemma,
participants were confronted with a choice between a utilitarian action (e.g., saving five people
at the cost of killing an innocent person) and a deontological/non-utilitarian action (e.g., not
killing the person). We adopted a dual-process approach according to which a person’s nega-
tive emotional response provokes a non-utilitarian judgement, whereas a cognitively controlled
process gives rise to a utilitarian judgement (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Mendez et al., 2005; Moore et al., 2008; Paxton et al., 2012). Unlike the mini-UG, the
moral dilemma paradigm posits a dilemma where the emotional cost of a utilitarian, situation-
responsive choice does have a material payoﬀ (i.e., achieving the welfare of the majority); thus,
the moral dilemma paradigm is believed to more eﬀectively embody an emotion/deliberation
dilemma.
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In Study 2 we examined two diﬀerent hypotheses with respect to the influence of moods
on moral judgements. The aﬀective tuning hypothesis was based on the AAI approach for
the process tuning eﬀects of moods. It argued that because negative mood gives rise to
systematic, deliberative processing, it should increase the likelihood of utilitarian judgements
in moral personal dilemmas; in contrast, because positive mood tends to increase reliance
on emotional responses, it should reduce the likelihood of utilitarian judgements in moral
personal dilemmas. The aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, implied by Valdesolo and DeSteno’s
(2006) study, predicted the opposite. It assumed that positive mood would attenuate the
emotional negativity integrated in moral personal dilemmas, whereas negative mood would
strengthen it.
Using a within-subject design in Study 2, we did not find an aggregated-level diﬀerence
between the negative mood and baseline conditions in terms of the likelihood of utilitarian
judgements for moral personal dilemmas. However, further inspection of the data presented
mixed, intriguing results. On the one hand, in line with the aﬀective tuning hypothesis,
the negative mood induction led to a higher proportion of utilitarian judgements for the
moral personal dilemma presented shortly after the mood induction. On the other hand,
in accordance with the buﬀer hypothesis, the likelihood of utilitarian judgements tended to
increase with positive mood.
Accordingly, Study 3 further examined the above two hypotheses with respect to mood
eﬀects on moral judgement. We measured, in addition to moral judgements, processing style
and mood-as-buﬀer in non-moral tasks, and looked at whether and how the indicator variables
were related to moral judgement. With respect to the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, we found
that the more positive a participant felt, the more likely he was to make a utilitarian judgement
on a moral personal dilemma, and the more willing he was to accept negative feedback.
However, the result that moral judgement and feedback-acceptance were unrelated did not
support the buﬀer hypothesis. This absence of support, as noted in Chapter 5, was subject
to the caveat that acceptance-of-negative-feedback might not validly measure the function of
mood suggested by the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis: The buﬀer hypothesis for moral judgement
suggests that positive mood gives rise to utilitarian response by downgrading the degree of
emotional negativity, hence pointing out a deactivation of the emotional path; in contrast,
research on aﬀect and self-control suggests that positive mood promotes the motivation to
process negative feedback without fading its emotional cost, hence illustrating an enhancement
of the cognitively controlled path (Gervey et al., 2005). Meanwhile, given the conceptual
parallel between the moral dilemma and self-control (i.e., feedback-acceptance) paradigms, the
possibility that mood may influence moral judgements through aﬀecting self-control emerged,
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a point I will return to later.
With respect to the aﬀective tuning hypothesis, we found that reflective processing (in-
dexed by the bat-ball score in the CRT) was predictive of a utilitarian judgement in a moral
personal dilemma. This was in general in line with the dual-process model for moral judge-
ment (Greene et al., 2001, 2004, 2008; Paxton et al., 2012). Meanwhile, processing style
(impulsive or reflective) as measured in Study 3 was independent of mood, suggesting that
the association between reflectiveness and utilitarian judgements was not related to changes
in mood. Thus, these results were not illustrative of the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis.
Given the dissociation between CRT performance and mood, we further took the bat-ball
score as an indicator of dispositional reflectiveness. We showed that the association between
reflectiveness and moral judgements was dependent on mood induction. Whereas in the pos-
itive mood condition, dispositional reflective processing was related with a higher likelihood
of utilitarian judgements, in neither the neutral nor the negative mood condition was there a
statistically reliable relationship between dispositional processing tendency and moral judge-
ment. This result is in accordance with the “aﬀective processing principle”, which posits that
mood conveys a valence-congruent value of the most accessible thought or behaviour ten-
dency (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007, 2009). Accordingly, positive or negative mood aﬀects moral
judgement by transmitting a positive or negative value of one’s initial processing approach
to a moral dilemma (i.e., whether to respond to the dilemma based on emotional impulse or
further reflection). Similarly, assuming that CRT performance may inform a person’s moral
orientation (utilitarian or deontological), the above interaction suggests that mood may in-
fluence moral judgement by conveying a positive or negative value of an individual’s moral
orientation. In this respect, generally, our finding of the mood eﬀect on moral judgement is
illustrative of an informational role and tuning function of mood.
6.2 Homogeneity of the most accessible thought
Taking into account the individual diﬀerence in moral orientation may help reconcile the
inconsistency between the current and de Vries et al.’s (2008b) results. As reviewed in Chapter
2, de Vries et al. showed that, whereas positive mood was associated with a greater reliance
on emotional reaction (e.g., a gut feeling a deck was advantageous in the IGT; de Vries et
al., 2008b), negative mood was associated with a greater reliance on deliberative decisions
(e.g., a computation of the expected value of a gamble; de Vries et al., 2012). As a result,
happy-mood participants outperformed sad-mood ones in, e.g., the early stage of the IGT,
when individuals’ “wise” decisions are largely guided by their gut feelings that distinguish
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advantageous from disadvantageous decks (de Vries et al., 2008b).
Unlike response to moral dilemmas that could be largely related to implicit moral orien-
tation, response to the above risky decision making task seem to be relatively uniform among
individuals. This is not to say that risk-related decision making is independent of disposi-
tional factors. Indeed, Peters and Slovic (2000), for example, demonstrated that people with
greater emotional reactivity were more likely to sample from the advantageous decks in the
IGT. Weller, Levin, and Bechara (2010) also showed that performance in the IGT was re-
lated to risk-taking tendency and sensitivity to expected loss. Yet, the point is that people’s
decisions in the gambling game are still based on their ascertainment about the gain/loss con-
tingencies through sampling (Weller et al., 2010), which is more of a gut feeling at the early
stage. Thus, for probably the majority of the participants in de Vries et al.’s (2008b) IGT
study, the most accessible information in the early trials wer their gut feeling about which
decks were advantageous and which were not. Given that positive mood promotes the reliance
on this kind of intuition, while negative mood decreases it, participants in a positive mood
outperformed those in a negative mood in the early stage of the IGT. However, compared
with the emotional signal evoked in the IGT, individuals’ moral orientations in the face of a
moral dilemma could be less homogeneous, thus so could be their inclined moral judgements.
This is also illustrated by the fact that the moral personal dilemma we used in Study 3 was
approximately 50% likely to receive a utilitarian judgement. Thus, while there was no mood
eﬀect in terms of a between-group diﬀerence, an interactive eﬀect between mood condition
and moral orientation was detected.
6.3 Alternative explanations for mood eﬀect on moral judge-
ment
An interesting pattern observed in the current studies was that the likelihood of utilitarian
judgements for moral personal dilemmas tended to increase with positive mood (Studies 2 &
3) but decrease with negative mood (Study 3). Although this might be seen as consistent
with the aﬀective buﬀer hypothesis, below I consider two alternative accounts that deserve
attention: One is with respect to mood’s influence on the implementation of willpower; the
other is with respect to mood’s processing eﬀect in terms of thinking level and scope.
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6.3.1 Mood, willpower and ego depletion
The observation that utilitarian judgements tended to be reduced with negative mood is
arguably in with research showing a link between negative mood and ego depletion (e.g.,
Jones, Graupmann, & Frey, 2006; Knapp & Clark, 1991; Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Schwarz
& Pollack, 1977; Seeman & Schwarz, 1974). Before turning to this point, let us first consider
the dual-proces model for moral judgement and an inherently related concept, willpower.
Greene et al.’s (2001) initial claim was that both an emotion-driven process and a more
cognitively controlled process are involved in forming moral judgements. In later articles
(Greene et al., 2004, 2008), they made the structure more specific, such that the emotionally
impulsive processing drives non-utilitarian judgements and the cognitively controlled process-
ing can overcome the impulse and encourage utilitarian judgements. Although inconclusive,
this position does suggest that the dual-process model is more of a “intervention”, or sequen-
tial, than a “parallel-competitive” structure (Evans, 2008, p. 266). This is plausible given that
one’s emotional responses to a moral dilemma represent a focus on spontaneous and hedonic
versus future and material values (Pham, 2007).21
Willpower and ego-depletion An inherently related concept to the sequential struc-
ture is willpower. Taken analogous to energy, willpower is thought and found to be an limited
inner resource that is demanded in a variety of “acts of self-control and executive functioning”
(Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003, p. 33; for overviews of the “limited-resource” model,
see Baumeiter & Heatherton, 1996; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000; for empirical evidence, see,
e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 1998;
Vohs & Heatherton, 2000; for reviews, see, e.g., Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; Vohs,
2006). From a dual-process perspective, willpower exerts its influence when the cold, reflective,
cognitively controlled processing overcomes the hotter, impulsive, emotion-driven processing
(Mischel, DeSmet, & Kross, 2006, p. 300). This implies that depletion of willpower, referred
to as “ego depletion” (Baumeister et al., 1998), would promote the tendency to act upon
emotional rather than cognitively controlled processing (Loewenstein & O’Donoghue, 2007;
Vohs, 2006). In support of this view, ego depletion has been found to lead to, e.g., reduced
patience (Baumeister et al., 1998; Experiment 2), greater impulsive consumption (Vohs &
21The sequential structure is not essentially incompatible with the above notion of individual moral orien-
tation, bearing in mind that individual moral orientation could have been shaped through personal learning
and/or cultural transmission. People with a utilitarian orientation may not experience an aversive emotion at
all, or, more probably, they have learnt to regulate emotion rapidly and eﬃciently to match a utilitarian goal.
For the latter case at least, the sequential-structure dual-process model is still applicable.
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Faber, 2007), increased procrastination (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001; Experiment
3) and a greater preference for immediate gratification (Tice et al., 2001; Experiment 2) — all
can be seen as allowing an immediate, emotional act the cost of a long-term, greater reward.
Analogously, ego depletion may reduce utilitarian judgement in the moral dilemma context.
Negative mood and ego depletion Negative mood is found to contribute to ego
depletion and in turn makes people more prone to act or decide upon emotional impulse than
cognitive control. For example, early research showed that children (aged 9 to 11) induced
in a negative mood, compared to those induced in a positive and/or neutral mood, were less
resistant to immediate gratification (Schwarz & Pollack, 1977; Seeman & Schwarz, 1974).
Likewise, among adults, negative mood is associated with a greater preference for immediate
gratification in an investment setting (Knapp & Clark, 1991; Wertheim & Schwarz, 1983).
Leith and Baumeister (1996) also showed that negative mood led to more irrational risk-
taking decisions (i.e., pursuing a gambling act with a very “slim” likelihood of resulting in a
huge win). More recently, Jonas et al. (2006) found that negative mood reduced the selection
of dissonant information, which is shown to be willpower-expended (Fischer, Greitemeyer, &
Frey, 2008). In a similar vein, for activities requiring self-regulation to overcome visceral drive,
such as dieting (Baucom & Aiken, 1981; Ruderman, 1985) and smoking cessation (Shiﬀman &
Waters, 2004), precedent negative mood has been shown to be associated with quicker lapse.
Together, the evidence above suggests that for moral judgement, negative mood may decrease
utilitarian judgements through ego depletion, which reduces cognitive control.
6.3.2 Mood and processing scope
On the other hand, the observation that utilitarian judgements tended to increase with positive
mood can be seen to be in accordance with the upgrading eﬀect of positive mood on construal
level and processing scope (Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Isen, 2007, 2008;
Isen & Reeve, 2005; Pyone & Isen, 2011). This is based on two theoretical considerations.
First, according to the “construal-level” theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), construal level is
influential for JDM where final choices give priority to either present, salient gain or future
reward that has a larger implication. Specifically, low-level construals are associated with a
more concrete perception of the situation and give rise to present-focused choices; in contrats,
high-level construes are associated with a more abstractive perception of the situation and
give rise to long-run beneficial decisions (Trope & Liberman, 2003). In accordance with
this position, research shows that high-level construals promote, e.g., preference for delayed
gratification and attempt to be less short-tempered but more self-controlled (e.g., Fujita,
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Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006).
Moral judgements in the moral dilemma paradigm can also be analysed in terms of con-
strual level: Whereas utilitarian judgements represent a superior consideration of accom-
plishing “overarching goals” (e.g., to save five people even though one person will be killed),
non-utilitarian judgements represent a superior consideration of “means” to accomplish the
goal (e.g., an innocent person is killed; Amit & Greene, 2012). Thus, whereas utilitar-
ian judgements are associated with a broader scope and abstractive, high-level construals,
non-utilitarian judgements are associated with a “present bias” (Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O’Donoghue, 2002) and more concrete, low-level construals. In line with this notion, Amit
and Greene (2012) showed that visualised processing (e.g., imagery) of a moral dilemma boosts
a non-utilitarian judgement, and verbalised processing of it boosts a utilitarian judgement.
Recent research has suggested that visualised processing is associated more with low-level con-
struals, and verbalised processing is associated more with high-level construals (e.g., Amit,
Algom, & Trope, 2009). Consistently, assuming that CRT performance was a potential mea-
sures for level of thinking, our results also suggest such a link between moral judgement and
construal level (Study 3).
Second, positive aﬀect literature suggests that mild positive aﬀect gives rise to flexible,
thoughtful processing and high-level construals (see Isen, 2007, 2008, for reviews). In Chapter
2, I noted that positive mood seems to be associated with a moral flexible processing style.
This notion was based on the review that, whereas individuals in a negative mood tend
to employ a systematic, careful processing approach regardless of external demand, those
in a positive mood do not do so until the necessity is explicitly highlighted (e.g.. Bless et
al., 1990, 1996c; Bodenhausen et al., 1994), and that positive-mood people are better at
solving creative tasks through perceiving unusual links between given items (e.g., Isen et
al., 1987; Isen & Daubman, 1984). These are merely two specific illustrations of the idea
of “flexibility” in terms of “cognitive organisation” (Isen, 2008). Accordingly and beyond, a
more advanced idea is that positive mood can broaden processing scope, give rise to high-level
construals and trigger considerations of multiple aspects of the situation (Fredrickson, 2001;
Isen, 2007). In support of this view, research shows that positive mood leads to improved
self-regulation (Isen & Reeve, 2005) and broad-mind coping (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002).
And, as mentioned earlier, Trope et al.’s studies suggest that people in a positive mood
have greater self-control and are more likely to accept negative yet useful feedback (Gervey
et al., 2005; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002). More relevantly and recently, Pyone and Isen
(2011; Study 4) showed that positive-mood participants, relative to neutral-mood ones, were
more prone to delayed than immediate gratification, suggesting that positive mood gives rise
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to a forward-looking perspective. Together, the evidence of the promoting eﬀect of positive
mood on high-level construals and broad processing scope, and that of the link between moral
judgement and construal level and processing scope, suggests that positive mood may increase
utilitarian judgement by heightening thinking level and/or broadening processing scope.
6.4 Contextual variation
Earlier, I discussed our results from the perspective that moods may influence moral judge-
ment through modulating the subjective value of moral orientation (Study 3). Given that
Study 3 tested one specific moral personal dilemma (i.e., the Rescue-911 dilemma), the ques-
tion would be whether this pattern of mood eﬀect on moral judgement is subject to the
dilemma in question. To illustrate, below I consider a specific comparison between our result
with the Rescue-911 dilemma and Valdesolo and DeSteno’s (2006) result with the footbridge
dilemma.
Recall that the Rescue-911 dilemma showed a proportion of utilitarian judgements being
approximately 50% (Studies 2 & 3). At an individual level, this suggests that a person would
be 50% likely to make a utilitarian judgement in the face of the dilemma, regardless of his
moral orientation. By extension, if we consider a person’s moral orientation as a utilitarian-
deontological continuum that is sensitive to dilemma scenario, this is analogous to saying
that most people’s moral inclination would be at the midpoint of the continuum. Thus, there
would be equal space to evaluate one’s inclination in the direction favouring either end. Hence,
for such a mildly diﬃcult dilemma, mood can aﬀect people’s moral judgement by conferring
valence-congruent value onto their moral orientation.
In contrast, the footbridge dilemma engenders rather intense tension, illustrated by a util-
itarian judgement rate of approximately 20% (Study 2 in the current thesis; also consistently
shown in Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006, as well as other studies, e.g., Moore et al., 2008).
This suggests that most people have a non-utilitarian inclination when confronted with this
dilemma. In keeping with the idea that moral orientation is a utilitarian-deontological con-
tinuum that is responsive to the dilemma in question, most people’s inclination in the face
of the footbridge dilemma would be much closer to the deontological end than the utilitarian
end. Thus, merely weighting one’s moral inclination as more positive or negative might be
insuﬃcient to drive a utilitarian response. Instead, high-level and broad-scope thinking should
be more advantageous in this respect, because it can fix the tension by facilitating a consider-
ation of consequence at an aggregate level. Therefore, for moral dilemmas as diﬃcult as the
footbridge dilemma, positive but not negative mood would be expected to foster utilitarian
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judgements, as shown in Valdesolo and DeSteno’s (2006) study.
Broadly, the above analysis is in accordance with the contextualist approach (McGuire,
1983), according to which diﬀerent standpoints (or, experimentally, diﬀerent or seemingly
contradictory result patterns) can be converged by considering the contextual boundary. In-
deed, with respect to mood eﬀect on cognitive processing, there is evidence that mood may
initiate multiple kinds of eﬀects simultaneously, and the observed one depends on the context
under consideration (e.g., Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, & Martin, 1997). Accordingly,
the initial thesis hypothesis emphasising a determinant role of mood’s processing eﬀect might
have been overextended in the emotion/deliberation dilemma contexts we considered.
The contextualist approach also helps explain the lack of mood eﬀect on responders’
decisions in the mini-UG (Study 1). In the mini-UG, payoﬀ distribution dominates intention
in shaping reciprocity behaviour. Possibly, this priority has been built into social convention
due to its self-protective utility. Thus, mood, as a diﬀuse extraneous factor, cannot influence
decisions in such a situation, where a certain normative solution is highly outstanding. This
is also in line with the argument highlighting the limitation of mood’s informational value in
contexts where decision-relevant information is salient (Schwarz & Clore, 1987, 2007).
Somewhat related to the contextualist point, an intriguing idea is that the extent to which
one finds it diﬃcult to make a choice in a dilemma depends not only on the degree to which
the dilemma is emotion-laden in itself, but also on the compatibility between the person’s
moral orientation in general and the extremity of the dilemma. Consider a modified version
the footbridge dilemma in which the choice is between not killing one person and saving 50,
instead of five, people. When faced with this dilemma, an individual who is deontological in
general would probably also feel tempted to make a utilitarian choice. In such an instance,
people not only are confronted with a moral issue but also experience a dissonance such that
the momentary, spontaneous thought is at odds with their predisposition. The dissonance
may also contribute to the subjective diﬃculty in responding to a moral dilemma.
This idea has been similarly advanced in quite recent model by Baron et al. on moral
judgement (Baron, Gurcay, & Stracke, 2012; called the BGMS model henceforth). The key
assumption of the BGMS model is that a person’s moral judgement or decision is a function of
the comparison between his “ability” (i.e., the degree to which he is utilitarian in general) and
the “diﬃculty” of the dilemma (an easy dilemma would receive utilitarian response from most
people). In particular, the model predicts that when faced with an easy dilemma, both high-
and low-ability people can make a utilitarian judgement, but the latter would spend more time
doing so. Using response time as a dependent variable, the BGMS model has fitted several
data sets in this respect (see Baron et al., 2012). Our results suggest that for a mildly diﬃcult
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moral dilemma, mood can aﬀect moral judgement by providing the value of one’s initial
moral disposition. This, combined with the BGMS model, suggests that when a generally
deontological person is dealing with a relatively easy dilemma, mood may influence response
latency through aﬀecting the degree of the incompatibility between the moral disposition and
dilemma extremity. Specifically, positive mood may enhance the dissonance by conferring
a positive value onto a person’s moral disposition, whereas negative mood may reduce the
dissonance by conferring a negative value onto the disposition. Future research may test the
idea.
So far, dilemma diﬃculty has been discussed in terms of the likelihood of utilitarian
judgements. Of course, distinguishing moral dilemmas based on this quantitative criterion is
in a simplified manner. Underlying causes for the distinction can be various moral-related
factors integrated into dilemmas .Questions such as whether and how mood’s influence on
moral judgement depends on any specific moral-related factor should be considered in future
research.
6.5 Practical implications
Our findings may have implications for legal decision making. Drawing on psychological prin-
ciples, recent research shows that legal decisions are largely prompted by emotions embedded
within moral intuitions (referred to as “moral indignation” by Sunstein, 2008, for example).
Research also emphasises that aﬀective states such as personal mood can aﬀect jurors’ decision
making (see, e.g., Feigenson & Park, 2006). Generally in line with this, the finding of the cur-
rent thesis imply that mood may aﬀect jurors’ decisions through interaction with individual
moral outlook. It seems possible that in ambiguous situations where the morally acceptable
behaviour is not clear and/or people’s moral notions are sparse, mood may acts as a form of
inner feedback on individual moral perspective at the outset. In this respect, factors that can
potentially induce a long-lasting mood, such as weather, stress and court atmosphere (this
can be especially important for complicated cases lasting over multiple trials), may deserver
attention.
6.6 Methodology limitations
Several experiment-specific problems have been mentioned in the empirical chapters, including
the inability of the mini-UG to incorporate an emotion/deliberation dilemma to a useful degree
(Study 1), undesired confounding eﬀects due to the presentation of multiple moral dilemmas
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(Study 2), and a possible mismatch between mechanisms underlying the mood eﬀect on moral
judgement and on self-control (Study 3). Additionally, several methodological limitations with
respect to the general approach of our design should be noted.
One limitation is that mood was measured using self-reporting. In addition to being used
to check the eﬀectiveness of mood manipulation, an important usage of mood self-report in
this thesis was to examine the relationship between mood and targeted variables (i.e., moral
judgement (Studies 2 & 3), CRT performance and willingness to accept negative feedback
(Study 3)). Self-reporting was of questionable validity because it could have been aﬀected by
uncontrolled factors such as subjective criteria of feeling emotionally positive or negative, and
personal usage of the scale in question (Isen, 2007). Thus, as noted in previous chapters, the
results from the relational analyses in the current studies should be considered with caution
due to such problems led by self-report measurement.
Another methodology limitation in the current studies is that we assessed decisions and
judgements with dichotomised responses (i.e., whether to accept an oﬀer; whether a utilitarian
solution is appropriate). This means that, by examining mood eﬀects on moral judgements
and socio-economic decisions using binary data, we might have suﬀered from weakened statis-
tical power. This can be understood in light of a divergence between dichotomised response
and response specified on certain sub-category scales. For example. a person who perceives
pushing the giant man in the footbridge dilemma as being highly morally acceptable may not
agree that it is appropriate to do so. Likewise, a responder may indeed agree that an 8:2 oﬀer
in the No-alternative game is unintentional, but is still unwilling to accept it. Thus, possibly,
mood eﬀect on mini-UG decisions and moral judgements would be detected if continuous
dependent variables were measured. For example, for decision making in the mini-UG, the
variable can be the degree to which one thinks intention should matter; for moral judgement,
the variable can be the degree to which one thinks a utilitarian act is morally acceptable.
Indeed, most recent studies of moral judgement using the moral dilemma paradigm asked
participants for their ratings on the moral acceptance of harmful acts for majority-saving
goals (e.g., Greene et al., 2009; Paxton et al., 2012). A related issue is that the question
accessing moral judgement, i.e., whether “it is appropriate” to initiate a utilitarian act, might
lack definiteness, such that participants might have responded to the question on varied bases,
e.g., moral acceptance, desirability. Future research should not only access judgements and
decisions using continuous variables, but also look at various underlying components for final
judgements and decisions, and examine on which dimension mood, or broadly, extraneous
aﬀect may have an eﬀect.
Finally, it should be stressed that, although we assume that the experimental paradigm
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used here, especially the moral dilemma one, incorporate an emotion/deliberation tension, we
do bear in mind that they might be over-hypothetical. Thus, the extent to which the current
findings can be generalised to real-life contexts is still questionable.
6.7 Concluding remarks
The current thesis demonstrates that mood can aﬀect JDM when emotionally compelled an
more deliberative, cognitively controlled choices are in tension, and final choice is related to
others’ welfare. Adding to the line of research on aﬀect and JDM, this thesis suggests that the
influence of mood on judgements and decisions in such emotion/deliberation dilemmas may be
through its informational value, and that whether and how the informational input of mood
is put into eﬀect may be determined by its interaction with contextual (e.g., environmentally
induced extreme disadvantage to oneself) and dispositional (e.g., personal moral inclination)
factors. It also hints at specific questions for future research, including whether mood can
influence other-regarding emotion/deliberation dilemmas by aﬀecting willpower exertion and
processing scope, and whether and how mood’s influence on moral judgement depends on any
specific moral dimension.
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Appendix A
Moral dilemmas materials 22
1/25 – BURNING BUILDING
Personal
You and five other people are trapped in a burning building. There is only one emergency exit through
which all of you could escape to safety, but it is blocked by burning debris. You notice another person
in the hallway leading to the exit who has been injured but is about to crawl to safety through a small
hole at the bottom of the exit door.You and the five people behind you do not have time to climb
through the small hole.
You realize that you could grab the injured man and use his body as a battering-ram to break through
the burning blockage in the hallway that is preventing your escape.
Doing this is certain to kill him. However, if you do not do this, you and the five people behind you
will die.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this man in order to save yourself and the other five people?
Impersonal
You and five other people are trapped in a burning building. There is only one emergency exit through
which all of you could escape to safety, but it is blocked by burning debris. You notice another person
in the hallway leading to the exit who has been injured but is about to crawl to safety through a small
hole at the bottom of the exit door. You and the five people behind you do not have time to climb
through the small hole.
The hallway’s emergency system puts out fire by eliminating oxygen from the hall and you can activate
the system by pressing a nearby button.
The fire will go out, but the injured person will suﬀocate and die. However, if you do not do this, you
and the five people behind you will die.
Is it appropriate for you to activate the system in order to save yourself and the other five people?
2/26 – MODIFIED CRYING BABY
Personal
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians over
the age of two. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in two rooms of the cellar of
22Used in Studies 2 and 3. The 24 dilemmas scenarios were developed and used by Moore et al. (2008)
based on an original version created by Greene et al. (2001).
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a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables.
Your baby, who is with you in the room, begins to cry loudly. You put your hand over his mouth to
block the sound.
If you remove your hand from his mouth his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will
spare your baby’s life, but will kill you and the others hiding in both rooms.
To save yourself and the others you must keep your hand on his mouth and smother your baby to death.
Is it appropriate for you to smother your baby in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?
Impersonal
Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians over
the age of two. You and some of your townspeople have sought refuge in two rooms of the cellar of
a large house. Outside you hear the voices of soldiers who have come to search the house for valuables.
Your baby begins to cry loudly in the other room.
His crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will spare your baby’s life, but will kill you
and the others hiding in both rooms.
If you turn on the noisy furnace to block the sound, the other room will become uncomfortably hot
for adults and children, but deadly for infants.
To save yourself and the others you must activate the furnace, which will kill your baby.
Is it appropriate for you to overheat your baby in order to save yourself and the other townspeople?
3/27 – MODIFIED SUBMARINE
Personal
You are a crewperson on a marine-research submarine traveling underneath a large iceberg. An on-
board explosion has damaged the ship, killed and injured several crewmembers. Additionally, it has
collapsed the only access corridor between the upper and lower parts of the ship. The upper section,
where you and most of the others are located, does not have enough oxygen remaining for all of you to
survive until you reach the surface. Only one remaining crewmember is located in the lower section,
where there is enough oxygen.
There is an emergency access hatch between the upper and lower sections of the ship.
If released, it will fall to the deck and allow oxygen to reach the upper section.
However, a crewmember in the lower section was knocked unconscious and is lying beneath the hatch
while you and the rest of the crew are almost out of air.
If you shove the hatch open you and the others will have air, but it will fall to the deck, crushing the
unconscious crewmember.
Is it appropriate for you to open the hatch and crush the crewmember below to save yourself and the
other crewmembers?
Impersonal
You are a crewperson on a marine-research submarine traveling underneath a large iceberg. An on-
board explosion has damaged the ship, killed and injured several crewmembers. Additionally, it has
collapsed the only access corridor between the upper and lower parts of the ship. The upper section,
where you and most of the others are located, does not have enough oxygen remaining for all of you to
survive until you reach the surface. Only one remaining crewmember is located in the lower section,
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where there is enough oxygen.
There is an emergency access hatch between the upper and lower sections of the ship.
If released by an emergency switch, it will fall to the deck and allow oxygen to reach the area where
you and the others are.
However, the hatch will crush the crewmember below, since he was knocked unconscious and is lying
beneath it.
You and the rest of the crew are almost out of air though, and you will all die if you do not do this.
Is it appropriate for you to release the hatch and crush the crewmember below to save yourself and
the other crew members?
4/28 – SHARK ATTACK
Personal
You are part of a U.N. humanitarian team of SCUBA divers who are deactivating old World War II
underwater anti-ship mines. One member of your diving team scrapes himself while trying to deac-
tivate a mine. The blood in the water has attracted several sharks in the area. A feeding frenzy is
about to ensue, with the sharks eating everything and everyone in sight. You have a spear-gun, but
only one spear and there are many sharks.
The bleeding diver is swimming toward the last protective shark cage and will reach it before you and
the others.
The sharks, following the blood, are coming too close for you and the other divers to escape.
You realize that if you shoot and kill the injured diver with your spear-gun before he reaches the cage,
the sharks would stop to eat him while you and the others escaped to safety.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this diver in order to save yourself and the rest of the group?
Impersonal
You are part of a U.N. humanitarian team of SCUBA divers who are deactivating old World War II
underwater anti-ship mines. One member of your diving team scrapes himself while trying to deac-
tivate a mine. The blood in the water has attracted several sharks in the area. A feeding frenzy is
about to ensue, with the sharks eating everything and everyone in sight. You have a spear-gun, but
only one spear and there are many sharks.
The bleeding diver is swimming toward the last protective shark cage and will reach it before you and
the others.
The sharks, following the blood, are coming too close for you and the other divers to escape.
You realize that if you used the emergency remote to detonate one of the mines, the resulting explo-
sion would kill the injured diver before he reached the cage, allowing you and the others to reach safety.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this diver in order to save yourself and the rest of the group?
5/29 – ORPHANAGE
Personal
You work in an orphanage in a war torn country. Rebel soldiers have staged a successful takeover of
the government and are now killing everyone who did not support their regime. Soldiers have entered
your town and are burning and killing all those whose loyalty is in question. You and the children
in the orphanage did not support this regime. Furthermore, this group of soldiers is conducting an
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“ethnic cleansing” genocide campaign to kill everyone of a particular ethnic group in the country. You
have one child of this ethnic group in your orphanage.
You know smugglers who could safely get her out of the country but there is no way for you and the
other children to escape, and the soldiers will certainly kill you all.
You could smother the one child to death with a pillow while she is sleeping.
Since the soldiers hate the ethnic group she is part of, they would see this as supporting their regime.
Consequently, they would spare you and the other children.
Is it appropriate for you to smother this one child to death to save yourself and the rest of the children?
Impersonal
You work in an orphanage in a war torn country. Rebel soldiers have staged a successful takeover of
the government and are now killing everyone who did not support their regime. Soldiers have entered
your town and are burning and killing all those whose loyalty is in question. You and the children
in the orphanage did not support this regime. Furthermore, this group of soldiers is conducting an
“ethnic cleansing” genocide campaign to kill everyone of a particular ethnic group in the country. You
have one child of this ethnic group in your orphanage.
You know smugglers who could safely get her out of the country but there is no way for you and the
other children to escape, and the soldiers will certainly kill you all.
You could order the nurse to lethally overdose the child on sleeping pills.
Since the soldiers hate the ethnic group she is part of, they would see this as supporting their regime.
Consequently, they would spare you and the other children.
Is it appropriate for you to order the nurse to overdose and kill this one child to save yourself and the
rest of the children?
6/30 – PREVENTING EBOLA
Personal
You are a Peace Corps health-worker who is volunteering in a rural African village. A prominent
man from a nearby village has contracted an Ebola virus that is extremely contagious, incurable, and
almost always fatal within a week. Miraculously, this man has survived for a month, and so he must
be a rare carrier who is immune to the virus’ deadly eﬀects. However, this man wrongly believes that
your health center can cure his disease.
You see him approaching and you know that if he enters the village he will spread the virus to hun-
dreds of innocent people who, unlike him, will die.
There is a loaded gun in the health center.
You realize that the only way you can prevent him from entering the village and spreading the virus
to you and the rest of the village is to shoot and kill him as he approaches.
Is it appropriate for you to kill the man in order to save yourself and the rest of the village?
Impersonal
You are a Peace Corps health-worker who is volunteering in a rural African village. A prominent
man from a nearby village has contracted an Ebola virus that is extremely contagious, incurable, and
almost always fatal within a week. Miraculously, this man has survived for a month, and so he must
be a rare carrier who is immune to the virus’ deadly eﬀects. However, this man wrongly believes that
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your health center can cure his disease.
You see him approaching and you know that if he enters the village he will spread the virus to hun-
dreds of innocent people who, unlike him, will die.
The only way you can prevent him from entering the village and spreading the virus to you and the
rest of the village is to warn the village council that he is coming.
This will result in him being shot and killed as he approaches.
Is it appropriate for you to warn the council in order to save yourself and the rest of the village?
7/31 – RESCUE 911
Personal
You are the sole paramedic riding on a rescue helicopter, responding to a devastating flood. You
have rescued several critically injured people and you have been treating them to keep them alive.
Suddenly, the pilot notifies you that there has been an engine malfunction and the helicopter can no
longer support the weight of you, the pilot, and all the injured people on board.
If the helicopter crashes, it will kill everyone on board including you, the pilot, and the injured people
that you have rescued.
In order to avoid a crash that will kill everyone on the helicopter, you realize that you must lighten
the load enough to keep the helicopter aloft.
Because all of the equipment is bolted down, and you are needed by the injured people, the only way
to do this is to throw one of the injured people oﬀ the helicopter.
This will lighten the load enough to keep the helicopter in the air but will cause the death of the
person thrown oﬀ.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this injured person in order to save yourself and everyone else on board?
Impersonal
You are the sole paramedic riding on a rescue helicopter, responding to a devastating flood. You
have rescued several critically injured people and you have been treating them to keep them alive.
Suddenly, the pilot notifies you that there has been an engine malfunction and the helicopter can no
longer support the weight of you, the pilot, and all the injured people on board.
If the helicopter crashes, it will kill everyone on board including you, the pilot, and the injured people
that you have rescued.
In order to avoid a crash that will kill everyone on the helicopter, you realize that you must lighten
the load enough to keep the helicopter aloft.
Because all of the equipment is bolted down, and you are needed by the injured people, the only way
to do this is to cut the cable that is raising up the last rescued person.
This will lighten the load enough to keep the helicopter in the air, but it will also kill the person who
is dropped.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this injured person in order to save yourself and everyone else on
board?
8/32 – SPACE STATION
Personal
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You are an engineer on the international space station, in orbit around the Earth. Suddenly, a fire
breaks out in the cargo bay. The automatic fire safety system will open the outer door of the cargo
bay, letting the oxygen out of the bay and thus putting out the fire. The automatic system only
works when the inner portal to the rest of the station has been sealed. One member of the crew, a
mechanic in the cargo bay, has put on half of his bulky space suit when the fire begins. He runs to the
portal to climb through to safety, but the portal is too narrow to fit through while wearing a space suit.
You realize that if he tries to climb through, he will get stuck and the fire will spread through the rest
of the station because the safety system will not operate with the portal open.
There is no time for him to take oﬀ the suit before the fire spreads.
The only way you can prevent the spread of the fire, and save your life and the rest of the crew, is to
push the mechanic back through the portal and into the cargo bay.
This way, the safety system will seal the door and decompress the cargo bay, but it will also suck the
mechanic into space and kill him.
Is it appropriate for you to push the mechanic back through the portal, and into space, in order to
save yourself and the rest of the crew?
Impersonal
You are an engineer on the international space station, in orbit around the Earth. Suddenly, a fire
breaks out in the cargo bay. The automatic fire safety system will open the outer door of the cargo
bay, letting the oxygen out of the bay and thus putting out the fire. The automatic system only
works when the inner portal to the rest of the station has been sealed. One member of the crew, a
mechanic in the cargo bay, has put on half of his bulky space suit when the fire begins. He runs to the
portal to climb through to safety, but the portal is too narrow to fit through while wearing a space suit.
You realize that if he tries to climb through, he will get stuck and the fire will spread through the rest
of the station because the safety system will not operate with the portal open.
There is no time for him to take oﬀ the suit before the fire spreads.
The only way you can prevent the spread of the fire, and save your life and the rest of the crew, is to
press a button in the control room that seals the portal before the mechanic gets there.
This way, the system will seal the door and put out the fire, but it will also suck the mechanic into
space and kill him.
Is it appropriate for you to seal the portal and kill the mechanic in order to save yourself and the rest
of the crew?
9/33 – NUCLEAR REACTOR
Personal
You are the inspector of a nuclear power plant that you suspect has not met its safety requirements.
The plant foreman and you are touring the facility when one of the nuclear fuel rods overheats. The
emergency coolant system fails to activate, and a chain reaction is about to begin which will result in
a nuclear meltdown. This will release lethal radiation into the nearby town, killing thousands of people.
You realize that the only way to stop the meltdown is to push the foreman into the fuel rod assembly
.
This will remove just enough heat energy from the rod assembly to prevent the nuclear chain reaction.
However, it will also incinerate the foreman instantly.
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Is it appropriate for you to push and kill the foreman in order to save yourself and the nearby town?
Impersonal
You are the inspector of a nuclear power plant that you suspect has not met its safety requirements.
The plant foreman and you are touring the facility when one of the nuclear fuel rods overheats. The
emergency coolant system fails to activate, and a chain reaction is about to begin which will result in
a nuclear meltdown. This will release lethal radiation into the nearby town, killing thousands of people.
You realize that the only way to stop the meltdown is to manually release liquid nitrogen into the fuel
rod chamber.
This will remove just enough heat energy from the rod assembly to prevent the nuclear chain reaction.
However, it will also instantly kill an employee trapped nearby.
Is it appropriate for you to kill the employee in order to save yourself and the nearby town?
10/34 – CINDERBLOCK
Personal
You are the explosives expert for a company that has been hired to demolish a skyscraper. You
are examining the last of the explosive charges when you notice a teenager below who is about to
accidentally detonate one of the charges out of sequence. This explosion will result in the building’s
uncontrolled collapse onto you, the teenager, and the crowd of spectators.
The teenager is several floors below you and cannot hear you because of the loud demolition noise.
You realize that the only way to stop the teenager from detonating the charge is to drop a heavy
cinderblock on his head.
This will crush his skull and kill him almost instantly but will prevent the out-of-sequence explosion.
Is it appropriate for you to kill the teenager in order to save yourself and the crowd of spectators?
Impersonal
You are the explosives expert for a company that has been hired to demolish a skyscraper. You
are examining the last of the explosive charges when you notice a teenager below who is about to
accidentally detonate one of the charges out of sequence. This explosion will result in the building’s
uncontrolled collapse onto you, the teenager, and the crowd of spectators.
The teenager is several floors below you and cannot hear you because of the loud demolition noise.
You realize that the only way to stop the teenager from detonating the charge is to flip a switch that
reactivates the building’s electricity.
Because he is touching an open circuit, this will electrocute him but will prevent the explosion.
Is it appropriate for you to kill the teenager in order to save yourself and the crowd of spectators?
11/35 – CLIFFHANGER
Personal
You are a construction worker. You and your crew are high on a scaﬀold, working on a skyscraper.
Suddenly, the scaﬀolding partially collapses. You and several others are hanging on to a dangling
crossbar, but it cannot hold all of your weight.
The worker next to you slips oﬀ the crossbar and grabs a hold of your one free arm.
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However, you realize that the entire structure is about to give way.
The only way to avoid you and everyone else falling to your deaths is to repeatedly kick your co-
worker in the stomach and chest until he lets go of your hand and falls to his certain death.
This will remove just enough weight that the rest of you can make it to safety before the scaﬀold
collapses.
Is it appropriate for you to kill your co-worker in order to save yourself and the rest of the crew?
Impersonal
You are a construction worker. You and your crew are high on a scaﬀold, working on a skyscraper.
Suddenly, the scaﬀolding partially collapses. You and several others are hanging on to a dangling
crossbar, but it cannot hold all of your weight.
The worker next to you slips oﬀ the crossbar and catches himself on another portion of the scaﬀolding;
however the entire structure is about to give way.
The only way to avoid you and everyone else falling to your deaths is to pull out a latch that will
detach the section of scaﬀolding with your co-worker on it.
This will remove just enough weight that the rest of you can make it to safety before the scaﬀold
collapses.
However, his fall will certainly kill him.
Is it appropriate for you to kill your co-worker in order to save yourself and the rest of the crew?
12/36 – BUS PLUNGE
Personal
You are the bus driver for a kindergarten field trip to the zoo. On the way, faulty tires cause the bus
to overturn and plunge oﬀ of a bridge and into a roaring river. You and three of the children are still
in the sinking bus, but the rest of the passengers have been swept away down the river to their deaths.
You grab the two children nearest to you and begin to swim toward the exit door.
The third remaining child grabs onto your leg.
You realize that you are not strong enough to fight the current and swim with all three children
holding on to you.
The only way to reach the surface before you and the children drown is to shake the third child oﬀ of
your leg.
This will allow you to bring the two children to the surface with you, but the third child will drown.
Is it appropriate for you to shake the child oﬀ your leg in order to save yourself and the two other
children?
Impersonal
You are the bus driver for a kindergarten field trip to the zoo. On the way, faulty tires cause the bus
to overturn and plunge oﬀ of a bridge and into a roaring river. You and three of the children are still
in the sinking bus, but the rest of the passengers have been swept away down the river to their deaths.
You grab the two children nearest to you and begin to swim toward the exit door.
The two children you’re holding onto cannot swim, nor can they hold their breath much longer.
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Unfortunately, the exit door is blocked by some mangled seats.
You realize that the only way out is to pull the seats away from the exit, allowing you and the two
children to escape the bus.
However, this will trap the third child at the other end of the bus, causing him to drown.
Is it appropriate for you to pull the seats away, trapping the third child, in order to save yourself and
the two other children?
13/37 – MODIFIED TRANSPLANT
Personal
You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about to die due to a failing organ of some
kind. A new person is rushed into the hospital after a serious car accident. This person is critically
injured, and will die without immediate surgery.
It is likely you can save this accident victim, though it would involve long and complicated surgery.
You realize that if you purposely cut his carotid artery during surgery it would cause his death and
no one would ever know.
Then you could harvest his organs for transplant into the bodies of the other five patients. If you do
this, the other five patients will live, but the accident victim will die.
Is it appropriate for you to kill the accident victim in order to save your five patients?
Impersonal
You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about to die due to a failing organ of some
kind. A new person is rushed into the hospital after a serious car accident. This person is critically
injured, and will die without immediate surgery.
While involved in long and complicated surgery on the accident victim, you notice that a nurse is
about to give him an inappropriate medication.
You know that this error will be lethal and by ignoring this mistake and allowing it to happen, the
patient will die.
This would allow you to harvest his organs for transplant into the bodies of the other five patients.
If you do this, the other five patients will live.
Is it appropriate for you to ignore the lethal mistake in order to save your five patients?
14/38 – ON THE WATERFRONT
Personal
You are part of a shipyard dock team that attaches crane cables to huge transport containers that are
to be unloaded from ships onto the shore. You and the others attach these cables and then ride on top
of the containers, wearing safety harnesses, to make sure that the containers are unloaded properly.
While you are riding on top of one container that is just being lifted out of the cargo bay, you see the red
warning light that indicates that the crane cable is about to fail. You realize that if the cable fails and
the container falls onto the deck of the ship, many of the crewmembers below will be crushed to death.
You see that the cable is in danger because two other crewmembers are fighting on top of the con-
tainer, causing it to sway dangerously.
You could run over to the fight and push them apart, but one of the crewmembers has taken oﬀ his
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safety harness, and will certainly fall to his death.
However, if you do not do this, the continued swaying will cause the cable to fail and the container to
fall onto the deck, killing several people below.
Is it appropriate for you to push the un-harnessed crewmember oﬀ the container to his death to save
the people below?
Impersonal
You are part of a shipyard dock team that attaches crane cables to huge transport containers that are
to be unloaded from ships onto the shore. You and the others attach these cables and then ride on top
of the containers, wearing safety harnesses, to make sure that the containers are unloaded properly.
While you are riding on top of one container that is just being lifted out of the cargo bay, you see the red
warning light that indicates that the crane cable is about to fail. You realize that if the cable fails and
the container falls onto the deck of the ship, many of the crewmembers below will be crushed to death.
You could hit the emergency release button, thereby dropping the container back into the cargo bay
while you and the others remain securely attached to the crane by your safety harness.
However, there is one person below you who is in the cargo bay and will be killed by the falling
container because he has nowhere to go.
If you do not do this though, the container will fall onto the deck of the ship and kill several other
crewmembers.
Is it appropriate for you to activate the emergency release, thereby killing the worker below, in order
to save several other workers?
15/39 – MODIFIED VACCINE TEST
Personal
A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing thousands of people. You are a medical researcher
and have developed two substances in your laboratory. You know that one of them is a vaccine, but
you don’t know which because both of the vials have been mislabeled as vaccine. You also know that
the other substance is deadly.
Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can create more to save thousands of lives.
You have two lab assistants who work with you, and the only way to identify the vaccine with certainty
is to inject the two substances into these people against their wishes.
One person will live, the other will die, and you will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine.
Is it appropriate for you to kill one of these people with a deadly injection in order to identify a vaccine
that will save thousands of lives?
Impersonal
A viral epidemic has spread across the globe killing thousands of people. You are a medical researcher
and have developed two substances in your laboratory. You know that one of them is a vaccine, but
you don’t know which because both of the vials have been mislabeled as vaccine. You also know that
the other substance is deadly.
Once you figure out which substance is the vaccine you can create more to save thousands of lives.
You could allow another doctor to inject two unsuspecting patients, who need the vaccine, with these
substances without warning them or the doctor that one of the substances is deadly.
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One person will live, the other will die, and you will be able to start saving lives with your vaccine.
Is it appropriate for you to let one of these people die from a deadly injection in order to identify a
vaccine that will save thousands of lives?
16/40 – MODIFIED FOOTBRIDGE/TROLLEY
Personal
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley
proceeds on its present course. You are standing next to the track on which the trolley is traveling,
but you are too far away from the workmen to warn them of the impending danger.
Next to you there is a very large stranger who is minding his own business.
It occurs to you that if you pushed this person onto the tracks in front of the trolley, it would stop
the trolley and save the five workmen from certain death.
However, this would most certainly kill the stranger.
Is it appropriate for you to push this stranger onto the tracks to save the five workmen?
Impersonal
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will be killed if the trolley
proceeds on its present course. You are standing next to the track on which the trolley is traveling,
but you are too far away from the workmen to warn them of the impending danger.
Next to you there is a control switch for the tracks that can reroute the trolley.
You could divert the trolley onto another track and spare the five workmen from certain death.
However, there is another workman on the new track that will certainly die if you divert the trolley.
Is it appropriate for you to divert the trolley and kill the lone workman in order to save the five
workmen?
17/41 – NOBEL PRIZE
Personal
You and a fellow researcher have discovered a powerful new energy source that is cheap, safe, and
clean. You realize that this could lead to the elimination of pollution and poverty around the world.
However, your colleague wants to sell this discovery.
You know your colleague well enough to know that he will sell the discovery to the highest bidder at
the first opportunity.
You know that he plans to contact the potential buyers today, some of whom will certainly try to use
this as a horrible weapon.
The only way that you can prevent him from doing so is to poison him with an extremely deadly
chemical normally found in the lab working on these types of projects.
Everyone will think that it was just a lab accident, and the discovery will not be sold to those who
might create a weapon out of it.
Is it appropriate for you to poison your colleague to keep this energy source out of the hands of those
who might use it as a weapon?
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Impersonal
You and a fellow researcher have discovered a powerful new energy source that is cheap, safe, and
clean. You realize that this could lead to the elimination of pollution and poverty around the world.
However, your colleague wants to sell this discovery to the military, which will turn it into a powerful
new weapon.
You know your colleague well enough to know that he will sell the discovery to the highest bidder at
the first opportunity.
You know that he plans to contact the potential buyers through email, some of whom will certainly
try to use this as a horrible weapon.
You can prevent this by releasing a flammable gas in the lab, so that when he turns on his computer,
it will cause an explosion.
Everyone will think that it was just a lab accident, and the discovery will not be sold to those who
might create a weapon out of it.
Is it appropriate for you to release the gas, leading to an explosion, to keep this discovery out of the
hands of those who might use it as a weapon?
18/42 – BIKE WEEK
Personal
You are an expert motorcycle rider and you have gone on vacation in order to participate in Bike
Week. Thousands of other motorcycle riders from across the country have come to ride in this event.
As you are riding down the road in the front of a large group of other riders you see that someone up
ahead is losing control of their bike.
As you speed up to pull alongside the unstable rider, you realize that this person is going to crash at
any second.
This would certainly result in a large pile-up and several deaths as the riders behind you run over
each other trying to avoid the crashed rider.
You realize that you could physically run this rider oﬀ the road and into some trees.
This would cause him to crash and, at your current speed, almost certainly die, but it would prevent
a crash in the middle of the street and the large pile-up of riders behind you.
Is it appropriate for you to crash the other rider to avoid the deaths of the riders behind you?
Impersonal
You are an expert motorcycle rider and you have gone on vacation in order to participate in Bike
Week. Thousands of other motorcycle riders from across the country have come to ride in this event.
As you are riding down the road in the front of a large group of other riders you see that someone up
ahead is losing control of his bike.
As you watch him fall, you know that you could easily ride around the fallen rider but if you do, the
riders behind you will run over each other trying to avoid the crash.
This would result in a large pile-up and several deaths.
You, as an expert, could lay your bike over on its side while throwing yourself clear, allowing the bike
to slide into the fallen rider.
This would warn the riders behind you of a wreck and prevent a large pile-up, but would also certainly
kill the fallen rider.
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Is it appropriate for you to allow your bike to kill the rider ahead of you to prevent the deaths of the
riders behind you?
19/43 – MODIFIED EUTHANASIA
Personal
You are the leader of a small group of soldiers, and all of you are out of ammunition. You are on your
way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of your men steps in a trap set by
the enemy. His leg is badly injured and caught in the trap. You cannot free him from this trap without
killing him. However, if you leave him behind, the enemy troops will find him and torture him to death.
This soldier begs you not to leave him behind to be cruelly tortured to death.
The enemy troops are closing in on your position.
It is not safe for you or your men to remain with your trapped comrade any longer.
In order to prevent this man’s needless suﬀering at the hands of the enemy, you could kill him yourself
by stabbing him in the heart.
Is it appropriate for you to stab this man in the heart in order to prevent his needless suﬀering?
Impersonal
You are the leader of a small group of soldiers, and all of you are out of ammunition. You are on your
way back from a completed mission deep in enemy territory when one of your men steps in a trap set by
the enemy. His leg is badly injured and caught in the trap. You cannot free him from this trap without
killing him. However, if you leave him behind, the enemy troops will find him and torture him to death.
This soldier begs you not to leave him behind to be cruelly tortured to death.
The enemy troops are closing in on your position.
It is not safe for you or your men to remain with your trapped comrade any longer.
By programming his location into your missile-targeting computer, the area would then be bombed
and he would die without being tortured to death.
Is it appropriate for you to program his location into the targeting computer in order to prevent his
needless suﬀering?
20/44 – MODIFIED FUMES
Personal
You are an orderly in a hospital during the night shift. You notice that a chemical has just been
spilled in a room containing six patients. This chemical is highly toxic and if left on the floor will
rapidly evaporate creating a poisonous gas. This will inevitably kill all the patients in the room. This
chemical cannot simply be mopped up, nor can it be soaked up with towels or sheets.
However, because you have worked around this chemical before, you know that this chemical absorbs
into human skin very rapidly.
You could pull one of the patients out of bed onto the spill so that the chemical will completely soak
into this person’s skin instead of evaporating into the air in the room.
This will quickly kill the one patient but save the other five patients from the gas.
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Is it appropriate to put this person onto the spilled chemical in order to save the other five patients?
Impersonal
You are an orderly in a hospital during the night shift. You notice that a chemical has just been
spilled in a room containing five patients. This chemical is highly toxic and if left on the floor will
rapidly evaporate creating a poisonous gas. This will inevitably kill all the patients in the room. This
chemical cannot simply be mopped up, nor can it be soaked up with towels or sheets.
You can flip a switch controlling the ventilation system that will draw the poisonous fumes out of the
room in which the spill has occurred, saving the five patients.
However, the exhaust duct leads to a room upstairs containing one other patient in critical condition.
This patient will certainly die from exposure to the poisonous fumes before you can get to her, and
there isn’t anyone else around to help.
Is it appropriate to flip the switch to divert the air flow, killing one patient but saving five?
21/45 – MODIFIED ROWBOAT
Personal
You are in a rowboat with a tour guide while sight-seeing on a lake in Alaska. You notice that three
children have overturned their boat nearby. They are now in danger of quickly freezing to death in
the icy water. You begin to row over to rescue them when you realize that your boat will not hold
you, the tour guide, and the three children.
Two of the children are closer to your boat than the third child.
As you and the tour guide pull in the first two it is obvious that one of them is too heavy and if you
keep him on board your boat will sink and all of the children will die.
Neither you nor the guide can get out because you are rowing and the guide is performing CPR. The
only way to save two children is to throw the large child oﬀ the boat and rescue the third one.
Is it appropriate to throw one child oﬀ the boat to die in order to save the other two?
Impersonal
You are in a rowboat with a tour guide while sight-seeing on a lake in Alaska. You notice that three
children have overturned their boat nearby. They are now in danger of quickly freezing to death in
the icy water. You begin to row over to rescue them when you realize that your boat will not hold
you, the tour guide, and the three children.
Two of the children are closer to your boat than the third child.
As you and the tour guide pull in the first two it is obvious that they are too heavy and if you try to
rescue the third child your boat will sink and all of the children will die.
Neither you nor the guide can get out because you are rowing and the guide is performing CPR.
The only way to save the two children is to row quickly away from the third one, leaving him to die.
Is it appropriate to leave the one child behind to die in order to save the other two?
22/46 – MINE SHAFT
Personal
You are a worker in a mine. The only way to exit the mine is to ride up in rock-buckets that can hold
up to three people at a time. It is the end of the workday and miners from lower levels are riding past
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you. As you are waiting for a bucket to ride in, you notice that the cable supporting the rock buckets
is about to snap.
If the cable snaps, all of the miners in the buckets will fall to their deaths.
The only way to prevent this is to use your axe to hit the last bucket causing it to flip over and dump
its contents, lightening the load enough to save the miners above.
There is one miner in this bucket who will be killed as a result.
Is it appropriate to flip over the last miner’s bucket, killing him, to save the other miners?
Impersonal
You are a worker in a mine. The only way to exit the mine is to ride up in rock-buckets that can hold
up to three people at a time. It is the end of the workday and miners from lower levels are riding up
past you. As you are waiting for a bucket to ride in, you notice that the cable supporting the rock
buckets is about to snap.
If the cable snaps, all of the miners in the buckets will fall to their deaths.
The only way to prevent this is to hit the emergency bucket release switch which will automatically
detach the last bucket from the cable, lightening the load just enough to save the miners above.
There is one miner in this bucket who will be killed as a result.
Is it appropriate to detach the last miner’s bucket, killing him, to save the other miners?
23/47 – TYCOON
Personal
You are an electrician who has been hired to fix an electrical problem in the home of a very wealthy
steel tycoon who is terminally ill with a very slow-growing cancer. Recently it had been publicly
announced that when this man eventually dies, his enormous personal fortune is to be given to the
local children’s hospital. You know that there are many children at this hospital who could be saved
with this money, but who cannot wait much longer before they die.
It occurs to you that while you’re in the house, fixing the electrical problem, you could quietly slip
into the tycoon’s room while he is sleeping and suﬀocate him by covering his nose and mouth with
your gloved hands.
This would look exactly like he had died from a heart attack.
Then his money would go to the children’s hospital where it would save many lives.
Is it appropriate for you to kill this man so that the children’s hospital will get the money that it needs?
Impersonal
You are an electrician who has been hired to fix an electrical problem in the home of a very wealthy
steel tycoon who is terminally ill with a very slow-growing cancer. Recently it had been publicly
announced that when this man eventually dies, his enormous personal fortune is to be given to the
local children’s hospital.
You know that there are many children at this hospital who could be saved with this money, but who
cannot wait much longer before they die.
It occurs to you that while in the house, instead of fixing the electrical problem, you could overload
the circuits.
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The next time someone turned on something electrical, it would short out the tycoon’s life support
equipment, causing him to die.
It would look like an accident, and the money would go to save the lives of children.
Is it appropriate for you to short circuit this man’s house, which will lead to his death, so that the
children’s hospital will get the money that it needs?
24/48 – ENEMY SPY
Personal
You are an oﬃcer in the military during a war. Your soldiers have found a high-ranking enemy spy
trapped and injured inside of a partially collapsed building. You have been informed over the radio
that a large group of enemy soldiers is planning a surprise attack on one of several nearby towns.
These soldiers will kill all the civilians in the town if you and your soldiers do not stop them, but you
do not know which town they plan to attack.
You have questioned the trapped spy who is high ranking and surely knows these plans, but he has
refused to tell you which town is the target of the impending enemy attack.
He will die soon from his many injuries.
You could begin to beat, burn, cut, and otherwise painfully torture him in order to force him to reveal
this information.
He would die from this painful torture, but you and your soldiers could then protect the town from
the surprise attack, saving hundreds of innocent lives.
Is it appropriate for you to torture and kill this enemy spy in order to protect one of the nearby towns?
Impersonal
You are an oﬃcer in the military during a war. Your soldiers have found a high-ranking enemy spy
trapped and injured inside of a partially collapsed building. You have been informed over the radio
that a large group of enemy soldiers is planning a surprise attack on one of several nearby towns.
These soldiers will kill all the civilians in the town if you and your soldiers do not stop them, but you
do not know which town they plan to attack.
You have questioned the trapped spy who is high ranking and surely knows these plans, but he has
refused to tell you which town is the target of the impending enemy attack.
However, rats have begun to chew at the spy and he is in agony.
You could do nothing and leave him to the rats until he reveals this information.
He would almost certainly die from this, but you and your soldiers could then protect the town from
the surprise attack, saving hundreds of innocent lives.
Is it appropriate for you to leave this spy to the rats in order to protect one of the nearby towns?
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Appendix B
Non-moral dilemmas23
1. You are a farm worker driving a turnip-harvesting machine. You are approaching two diverging
paths. By choosing the path on the left you will harvest ten bushels of turnips. By choosing
the path on the right you will harvest twenty bushels of turnips. If you do nothing your turnip-
harvesting machine will turn to the left.
Is it appropriate for you to turn your turnip-picking machine to the right in order to harvest
twenty bushels of turnips instead of ten?
2. You are bringing home a number of plants from a store that is about two miles from your home.
The trunk of your car, which you’ve lined with plastic to catch the mud from the plants will
hold most of the plants you’ve purchased. You could bring all the plants home in one trip,
but this would require putting some of the plants in the back seat as well as in the trunk. By
putting some of the plants in the back seat you will ruin your fine leather upholstery, which
would cost thousands of dollars to replace.
Is it appropriate for you to make two trips home in order to avoid ruining the upholstery of
your car?
3. You are in charge of scheduling appointments in a dentist’s oﬃce. Two people, Mr. Morris and
Mrs. Santiago have called to make appointments for next Monday. The only available times
for next Monday are at 10:00 AM and at 3:00. Mr. Morris’s schedule is rather flexible. He
can have his appointment either at 10:00 AM or at 3:00 PM. Mrs. Santiago’s schedule is less
flexible. She can only have her appointment at 10:00 AM.
Is it appropriate for you to schedule Mr. Morris for 3:00 PM so that both he and Mrs. Santiago
can have their appointments next Monday?
4. You have a headache. You go to the pharmacy with the intention of buying a particular name-
brand headache medicine. When you get there you discover that the pharmacy is out of the
brand you were looking for. The pharmacist, whom you’ve known for a long time and in whom
you have a great deal of trust, tells you that he has in stock a generic product which is, in his
words, “exactly the same” as the product you had originally intended to buy.
Is it appropriate for you to purchase the generic brand instead of searching further for the
name-brand product you were looking for?
23Used in Study 2. These nine non-moral dilemmas were developed and used by Greene et al. (2001); we
made modifications in cases involving money, where we switched US to UK currency.
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5. You have decided to make a batch of brownies for yourself. You open your recipe book and find
a recipe for brownies. The recipe calls for a cup of chopped walnuts. You don’t like walnuts,
but you do like macadamia nuts. As it happens, you have both kinds of nuts available to you.
Is it appropriate for you to substitute macadamia nuts for walnuts in order to avoid eating
walnuts?
6. You need to travel from New York to Boston in order to attend a meeting that starts at 2:00
PM. You can take either the train or the bus. The train will get you there just in time for your
meeting no matter what. The bus is scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting, but the
bus is occasionally several hours late because of traﬃc. It would be nice to have an extra hour
before the meeting, but you cannot aﬀord to be late.
Is it appropriate for you to take the train instead of the bus in order to ensure your not being
late for your meeting?
7. You are looking to buy a new computer. At the moment the computer that you want costs
£1000. A friend who knows the computer industry has told you that this computer’s price will
drop to £500 next month. If you wait until next month to buy your new computer you will
have to use your old computer for a few weeks longer than you would like to. Nevertheless you
will be able to do everything you need to do using your old computer during that time.
Is it appropriate for you to use your old computer for a few more weeks in order to save £500
on the purchase of a new computer?
8. A representative of a reputable, national survey organization calls you at your home while you
are having a quiet dinner by yourself. The representative explains that if you are willing to
spend a half an hour answering questions about a variety of topics her organization will send
you a check for £200.
Is it appropriate for you to interrupt your dinner in order to earn £200?
9. You have gone to a bookstore to buy £50 worth of books. You have with you two coupons.
One of these coupons gives you 30% oﬀ of your purchase price. This coupon expires tomorrow.
The other coupon gives you 25% oﬀ your purchase price, and this coupon does not expire for
another year.
Is it appropriate for you to use the 30%-oﬀ coupon for your present purchase so that you will
have another coupon to use during the coming year?
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Appendix C
Summary of moral judgement data for
nine moral dilemmas in Study 2
Table C.1: Proportions of utilitarian judgements in MP and MI dilemmas of the nine scenarios that
were tested on more than 30 participants in Study 2.
Numeric label Dilemma’s name putilitarian MP putilitarian MI
2/26 Modified Crying Baby 44.12% 50%
3/27 Modified Submarine 85.49% 91.89%
4/28 Shark Attack 55.88% 64.71%
6/30* Preventing Ebola 70.27% 94/59%
7/31* Rescue 911 56.41% 74.36%
10/34* Cinderblock 62.86% 80%
12/36 Bus Plunge 66.67% 84.85%
16/40** Modified Footbridge/Trolley 18.42% 81.58%
20/44** Modified Fumes 38.24% 73.53%
* Cochran Q Test p < .05 (null hypothesis: judgements were not diﬀerent between MP and MI dilemmas).
** Cochran Q Test p < .01 (null hypothesis: judgements were not diﬀerent between MP and MI dilemmas).
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Glossary of Abbreviations
AAI aﬀect-as-information.
ACC anterior cingulate cortex.
AI anterior insula.
AIM aﬀect infusion model.
CRT Cognitive Reflection Test.
DLPFC dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging.
FTD frontotemporal dementia.
GEE dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
GSC galvanic skin conductance.
GSR galvanic skin response.
IGT Iowa Gambling Task.
JDM judgement and decision making.
MI Moral Impersonal.
Mini-UG mini-ultimatum game.
MP Moral Personal.
NonM non-moral.
rTMS repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation.
SC skin conductance.
SIM social intuitionist model.
SRW self-reflective writing.
UG ultimatum game.
UJ utilitarian judgement.
VAS visual analogous scale.
VMPC ventromedial prefrontal cortex.
WST Wason Selection Task.
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